


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SEPTEMBER, 1920.

THE
MODERN
CHURCHMAN



A Magazine to maintain the cause of
TRUTH, FREEDOM, and COMPREHENSIVENESS
in the Church of England.

EDITOR: REV. H. D. A. MAJOR, B.D.

OXFORD CONFERENCE NUMBER

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FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF LIBERAL RELIGIOUS THOUGHT

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
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THE MODERN CHURCHMAN



By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

Nos. 6 & 7.

SEPTEMBER, 1920.

VOL. X.

THE SEVENTH CONFERENCE OF MODERN CHURCHMEN

THE subject selected for the consideration of the seventh conference of Modern Churchmen was 'The Relation between Modern Knowledge and Traditional Christianity.'

This was divided roughly into five sections.

In the first section it was proposed to consider how far our modern astronomical, geological, and biological knowledge requires the modification or abandonment of the Old and New Testament cosmology which the Christian Church has inherited, and the bearing of this on various traditional Christian doctrines.

The second section was devoted to the consideration of the effect of the application of modern historical methods of study to the Scriptures and Church History.

The third section was assigned to the examination of the changes which seem to be required in our view of Christian doctrines and rites by the comparative and psychological study of religion.

The fourth section was intended to deal with the modern evolutionary conception of ethics and the changes it has brought about in our view of sin and the sanctions of morality.

The fifth section was allotted to the influence of modern political and social ideals on Church systems and methods of government. It was arranged that the evening sessions of each day should be given to the elucidation of five positives and negatives of the Christian religion. These were 'reverent, but not superstitious'; 'inspired, but not infallible'; 'comprehensive, but not unconvinced'; 'eternal, but not unprogressive'; 'free, but not anti-social.'

The afternoon addresses in Wadham College chapel were assigned to the treatment of four pioneers of thought, *viz.*, Galileo, Edwin Hatch, Raymond Lull and Mazzini.

Whilst members of the Conference felt the papers and speeches to be stimulating and instructive, there were some present who wished that they could have been more precise in their conclusions. Their authors seemed to be more concerned with methods than with results. They exhibited the modern Churchman's desire to know the truth; his realisation that a number of traditional Christian doctrines must be seriously

re-cast and many mediaeval beliefs abandoned; but they did not state precisely the author's personal convictions as to the exact form which certain traditional doctrines had assumed for him under the pressure of modern knowledge.

We cannot treat this matter adequately here, but we wish to indicate very briefly the general effect which modern knowledge seems to be exercising on the form of particular traditional doctrines.

Take first the case of modern science and the traditional doctrine of creation. The modern Churchman no longer believes that the universe was created by a series of divine instantaneous acts some 6000 years ago. For him creation is a process that is not yet completed—nevertheless, it is a process which originated with the divine mind and is guided by the divine will. He has no doubt but that the result of the creative process will justify itself at the bar of reason and conscience. He regards the supreme purpose of creation to be the evolution of beings who shall be able to enjoy fellowship with God.

Modern science has shattered the Biblical cosmology. From being definite localities it has resolved heaven and hell into moral and spiritual states in which the soul dwells. The ancient localisation of God in the sky is no longer possible. The modern Churchman regards Him as enfolding the Universe, as being at one and the same time transcendent or outside it; immanent or within it; incarnate or dwelling in the human soul, and supremely manifested for humanity in the historical personage, Jesus of Nazareth. Such sayings as 'In Him we live and move, and have our being,' 'Who is above all, and through all, and in you all,' have at least as deep a meaning for the modern Churchman as for his traditional brother.

Modern historical criticism has disposed of the doctrine of Scriptural infallibility, but it has not removed the Bible from its supreme position as the world's greatest moral and religious classic. Those who know the world's sacred literatures will not think less of the Bible. Babylonian penitential psalms, Vedic hymns and Greek epics and dramas, Chinese moral philosophy and Koranic suras all testify to the Indwelling Word in humanity, but their inspiration falls below that of Christ. While the modern Churchman does not view the Bible as an infallible authority in scientific and historical matters, he still uses it as a great manual of religious experience and moral stimulus.

Modern historical criticism even more than scientific research forbids the modern Churchman to believe in miraculous interventions either in Biblical times or to-day. God does not cause axe-heads to swim nor corpses that have been four days dead to revive. Nevertheless the modern Churchman's creed retains the essentially religious values which the pre-scientific belief in the miraculous expressed.

The first of these is the attitude of wonder. The *nil admirari* temper is irreligious; it lacks reverence. The second is the conviction that God is ever present in human history and in personal life, and that He can and does guide and guard the ways of nations and men, so that they who call on Him are holpen, and they who trust in Him are not confounded.

The comparative and psychological study of religion has helped the modern Churchman to realize that mankind is 'incurably religious,' and that religion is an essential element in all progressive life whether social or individual. It has also taught him to value religious rites not because they are commanded by authority, but because of their psychological value.

While it has led him to recognise and reject the magical, superstitious and mechanical elements in his own devotional life, it has also helped him to realise profoundly the need and value of true religion. The choice for the mass of mankind lies not between atheism and religion, but between the highest form of religion which is rational, spiritual and ethical, and those baser forms which are ever ready to seduce and enslave mankind. This knowledge does not make the modern Churchman contemptuous in his attitude towards primitive forms of religion, but it forces him to insist on the need of cultivating the higher type of religion, although it is much easier to solace himself with its lower forms. The Canaanite is still in the land.

As the result of modern knowledge and modern ways of thought, the traditional doctrines of Christianity are being not abandoned, but transmuted. Canon Barnes' admirable sermon before the British Association in Cardiff delivered whilst the Modern Churchman's Conference was meeting in Oxford illustrates this process. Like Canon Barnes, the modern Churchman regards the Fall Story as a myth. The Tree of Knowledge and the talking serpent and the seraph with the fiery sword are fiction, not fact. Yet for the modern Churchman human sin, which is the central theme of that narrative, is as grim a reality as it is to the traditional Churchman. But the modern Churchman does not find that a view of primitive man which is discredited by anthropologists, a view of the Atonement as a propitiatory sacrifice which is discredited by moralists, a belief in Baptism as an antidote to the inherited effects of the Fall, which is discredited by religious experience, are going to help him to transmute the natural in him, into the moral and spiritual. Christ's example, teaching and spirit he finds can help him 'to move upward working out the brute,' orthodox beliefs in theological transactions seem to be of no avail here. Whilst the modern Churchman believes in God as his Father, he no longer regards Him as some external Lawgiver, Judge and Avenger, but as Creative Spirit working in and through the personalities of men, revealing to them the Divine Will, developing their moral consciousness and inspiring them to seek the truth. As a natural consequence the modern Churchman's conception of the Christian Church has changed. He does not regard it as a Divine Society, the members of which are insured against damnation, but as the company of the disciples of Jesus seeking to advance the Kingdom of God on earth. For this purpose the Church makes use of Scriptures, Sacraments, Ministries and Creeds, which it has inherited from the distant past. The modern Churchman despises none of these things, they all have their use; but he refuses firmly to be enslaved by them; he judges them by their fruits, and he claims for himself the freedom of the Spirit in his use of them.

Christ's legacy to His Church was not the Old and New Testament Scriptures, the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds, the threefold ministry of Bishops, Priests and Deacons, nor possibly even the two Sacraments, but the Spirit of His Father manifested in His own personality, teaching and conduct, and it is that by which all else must be judged and valued. The saying, 'Where the bishop is, there is the Church,' becomes for the modern Churchman 'Where the Spirit of Christ is, there is the Church.'

This preface may seem needless, but modern Churchmen are so open to misunderstanding by their traditional brethren that a few words of explanation appeared advisable. It is the fashion to speak of the religion of modern Churchmen as so very vague. This is really not the case. Modern Churchmen are quite clear as to their religious and moral ideals,

which they believe to be those of Christ; they are equally clear as to the methods by which those ideals must be realized, which they also believe to be those of Christ; but they claim absolute freedom for themselves, and concede it equally to others, to come to whatever conclusions they feel they ought to come to on various historical, literary, and scientific questions which, although not of the essence of the Christian Faith, have yet been closely associated with traditional Christianity for many centuries. The papers published in this number and our next will at least suggest that the Church would have been saved much strife and error and weakness had its rulers and teachers been content not 'to make more fundamentals than Christ ever made.' The Christian Church has an enormous task before it to-day, but will be the better able to accomplish it, when casting aside much of the traditional *impedimenta* by which it has been hindered, and trusting only in the Divine Fatherhood and Human Brotherhood, the Inspiring Spirit and the Coming Kingdom—the Galilean rather than the Lambeth Quadrilateral—it faces the forces of the new age.

The practical question, how far modern-minded clergymen and congregations can continue to use profitably creeds, formularies, and liturgies which assume or express traditional views which modern knowledge has compelled the users to modify or surrender, the Conference did not treat. This is mainly a psychological question. The religious spirit is pained by new-fangledness. We can use profitably a formulary or a liturgy which we know to be scientifically or historically inaccurate, not because we regard scientific or historical error as unimportant, but because the formulary or liturgy is knit very closely with the awakening of our faith in the spiritual life, and is a treasured heirloom of many generations of Christians. In that case it has ceased to be for the user a dogmatic formulary, and has become a vehicle of devotion. Nevertheless we need to have a continual readjustment of religious thought and language to the best knowledge of the age, or else religious services become, especially for younger people of scientific temperament and training, utterly unreal and childish superstitious. What we need in order to effect this is freedom for experiment and encouragement of all sincere endeavour.

It has proved impossible to include all the Conference papers in this number of the *Modern Churchman*. We propose therefore to publish the rest of them in our November number. Not a little of value and interest was contributed to the proceedings of the Conference by the speeches and addresses of members and visitors, particularly those of Miss Maude Royden, Mr. Clutton Brock, Dr. Hadfield, Mr. A. D. Lindsay, Professor Foakes-Jackson, Canon Burroughs, Mr. Claud Mullins, Dr. Skrine, Mr. Fergus Wood, Dr. Rendall, Mr. Shebbeare and Miss Dougall. We could wish that space had permitted us to publish *verbatim* reports of their contributions. This was impossible. Compressed reports, as they so seldom do justice to the speaker or transmit to the reader the effect produced on the audience, we have regarded as inadvisable. Our readers will have therefore only the carefully prepared papers and addresses upon which the discussions turned, but not the comment and criticism.

The grateful thanks of members of the conference are due to the authorities of Somerville College, Oxford, who were our indulgent and generous hosts from August 23—31. Our thanks are also due to the Warden of Wadham College for the use of the beautiful college chapel, and to the Vicars of St. Giles' and St. Peter's-in-the-East for the privilege of holding our services in their parish churches.

The thanks of the Principal of Ripon Hall are due to members of the Conference who contributed so liberally to the Exhibition Fund of the Hall. A full account of the sums contributed will appear in our next issue.

The following resolution was passed unanimously by the Conference :—

‘That this Conference commends to the members of the Churchmen’s Union the cause of the League of Nations as being an ideal of applied Christianity which can only be made effective by the co-operation and influence of all men and women of goodwill, and calls upon them for their active support.’

Two thoughts rise in our mind as we reflect on the lesson and purpose of the Conference. Francis Bacon expressed the one, Rabbi Jochanan Sandalarius the other.

Regnum Scientiae ut Regnum Coeli non nisi sub persona infantis intratur.

‘Into the Kingdom of Knowledge, as into the Kingdom of Heaven, whoso would enter must become as a little child.’

כָּל בְּנֵי־בְנֵי־אָדָם לֵישׁוּב שְׁמַיִם סוֹפָה לְהִתְקַיֵּם :

‘Every Conference held in the Name of Heaven shall in the end lead to some practical result’ (*Pirke Aboth* IV, 14).

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

By PROFESSOR PERCY GARDNER, D.Litt., LL.D., F.B.A.

IN this year’s Conference we have to consider the influence on the Christian faith of two things, progress in science, and change in moral and social ideals. And, without undue optimism, we may hope in both directions to find elements of good to direct the Christianity of the future: or, to put it in another way, powers and influences well worthy of baptism into Christ, as Platonism was baptized into Christ by the Fourth Evangelist and Clement of Alexandria, and as Aristotelianism was baptized into Christ by Aquinas and the Schoolmen.

But there is an important distinction to be recognized between progress in science and change in moral ideals. The former is necessarily good. All fresh acquisition of knowledge is an enlarging of power and opportunity in the world. I do not of course mean that the latest views in matters of science are necessarily the best. False theories are continually being started in most of the departments of knowledge. But they cannot persist. Continually coming to the test of practice and experience they soon die away, unless they are in accordance with the truth of things. Science is steadily and necessarily

progressive; it ever grows from more to more, whether in the investigation of the laws of the material world, or in the study of mankind and society.

In the case of moral ideals the test is far less easily applied. The moral level moves up and down, usually it is moving up in some respects and down in others. Here also in the long run there is a practical test, the test of fruits. If a society allows itself to be deluded by false ethical views, it will in the long run be punished and suffer. But the test is very slow in operation. Generations may pass before such a society discovers that it is on the downward path. And very often no repentance or turning back will avail to undo the evil which has been done.

Thus while the acceptance of the assured results of scientific investigation is in all cases good, the acceptance of fresh movements in the sphere of ethics and sociology may be either beneficial or ruinous. There rests on each of us in this matter a profound responsibility. And the paths to degeneracy are many and attractive, while the path to a nobler life is hard to tread. The very superficial notion which is accepted by many that mankind, at least in Europe and America, is growing better and better is a mere groundless assumption. I think that the events of the last six years have convinced all thoughtful people of its flimsiness.

Thus in our attempts at restatement of religious principles we have a twofold task. The progress of science, of ordered knowledge, whether in the physical or the human sphere, compels us to modify the forms in which those principles are stated. We cannot be justified in allowing such forms to be distorted and debased by an ignorance now superseded, by false views in astronomy, in geology, in history, in psychology. So far our way is quite clear. But the second part of our task is far more difficult and complicated. We want also to discern in what ways the progress of knowledge and experience and the spread of better ethical ideals has enabled us better to grasp the great principles of religion, to reach to nobler ideas of God, of the nature of inspiration, of the work of the Church. This must be a tentative process. We shall no longer dare to say, 'I know,' but only 'I think,' 'I hope,' 'I am convinced.' And

unless the Divine Spirit which has in the past worked in the Church continues to aid our endeavours and favour our aspirations, we shall not meet with any success.

The proceedings of our Conference are arranged in a sequence which is quite methodical. We begin with physical science, with what is definite and matter of exact knowledge. On the second day we come to history, which is not matter of knowledge in the same sense, since it cannot be tested by sight and experiment, yet which is in all countries except England and America regarded as a branch of science. *Exact* science of course it is not; but in recent years the methods of history have been so greatly improved and the principles of its investigation have grown to be so generally recognized, that any edifice built in defiance of those methods and principles is a house built on the sand. Immense as has been the progress of physical science in our days, that of the historic sciences such as psychology, anthropology and archaeology has been equally rapid and equally striking. I fear that it is largely due to the influence of Oxford, and its conservative methods in the teaching of history, that to an English audience this assertion may sound paradoxical. I cannot stop to justify it: but I hope that our discussions will tend to establish it. On the third day we deal with what may be called the natural history of religion, religion regarded from without in an objective way and studied by those comparative methods which have brought us such abundant fruit in all the departments of what may be called humane science. The last two days of the Conference will bring us into the region of ideas, moral and social: and here we may look for less unanimity, no doubt, but for our most helpful and interesting discussions.

At our annual meeting in London, Mr. Creed put forward a statement which I could not accept, though at the time there was no opportunity for disputing it. He said that the 'Broad Church party has ceased to exist, because the positions which it once maintained in the teeth of ecclesiastical authority are now generally accepted.' Mr. Creed might have cited, in his support, passages in the address of the Archbishop of Canterbury to the members of the Lambeth Conference. Yet I think his view untenable. He observed that now considerable lati-

tude was allowed by the general opinion of churchmen in the treatment of the Old Testament. This is true: and it is largely the result of the work of Professor Driver, who while criticizing the Jewish Scriptures on most modern and scientific lines, declined to express any views as to the criticism of the New Testament. Some strong churchmen have maintained that the conditions of the writing and production of the books of the New Testament differ so completely from those of the Old Testament Scriptures, that we can make the process of rigid historic criticism halt at the blank pages between the two portions of the Bible. I need not stay to refute a view which probably no one in this room would hold, and which is entirely indefensible. Mr. Creed went on to say that the problems of New Testament criticism were now regarded as open, even by strict Churchmen. He included the authorship of the Fourth Gospel. Here I join issue. The great majority of the clergy and the devout laity draw a rigid line somewhere in the criticism of the New Testament, and say to the historic critics, 'Thus far shalt thou come, but no further'; and they draw that line short of the historicity of the Fourth Gospel. That Gospel is a noble embodiment of Spiritual Christianity, and was by the author intended to be such. But it does not embody the earliest form of historic Christianity, but a form in which the Church re-interprets the influence of her Founder. When once the true position of the Gospel in history has been recognized, all the literature of the New Testament falls at once into perspective, and Christian belief is seen to be, not an authoritative doctrine once for all revealed, but a gradual evolution, the result of a great spiritual force working amid human and very imperfect surroundings. The theory of a progressive revelation, now almost universally accepted in regard to the Jewish Scriptures, is seen to apply to the early history of the Christian Church also. Christianity appears not as static, a complete scheme of belief, but as dynamic, a gradual permeation of the human medium by the power of an internal energy.

The view thus acquired of the Christian origins has to be applied also in the subsequent history of the society. The construction of the Creed and the organization of the Society

was not, as Cardinal Newman maintained, a *logical* working out of principles already implicitly contained in the first teaching, but a *vital* process by which, in the language of Jesus himself, the leaven of the Christian inspiration gradually transformed the beliefs and institutions of the Roman World.

Our point of view, both in regard to the origin and in regard to the progress of the Christian faith, is necessarily a mediating one. We shall not find, even in the earliest Gospels, any infallible guide to belief. We shall recognize that the accounts which we have of the sayings and doings of our Founder are very imperfect, so that, in the wisdom of God, we can never regard them as an infallible record of infallible truth, but rather as hints to be interpreted and developed in the growth of our religion. And on the other hand we shall certainly not regard the voice of the Church, even when the Church was undivided, as infallible: we see too clearly how baser elements, of arrogance, of covetousness, of faction, were mingled with the Christian enthusiasm at all periods. Our Prayer Book tells us that General Councils may err, and sometimes have erred, even in things pertaining unto God. And I think that few serious students of Church history would deny this thesis.

I have already observed that probably our most interesting, and as I hope our most fruitful, discussions will turn on the effect on Christianity produced by changes in our ethical and social ideas and standards. Six years of severe strain have done much to shatter the complacent optimism with which many of us were ready to regard the course of life and the arrangements of society. We see almost everything called in question, established ideas in relation to the providential government of the world, sin and forgiveness, divine and human justice, the comparative value of various virtues. We find in some strata of the population a fierce denunciation of the established organization of society, and of every religious body which lends any support to it. Society seems to be more completely in the melting pot than it has been at any time since the French Revolution. These phenomena make us pause and consider whether after all we have not much to unlearn and to learn afresh in our religious and social views. General Booth, who has just returned from a tour round the world, has stated that

a notable feature of society in every country which he has visited is a new aversion to any kind of regular work and a passion for amusement. There is in the ferment which disturbs society much which no reflecting man, certainly no Christian, can regard with approval, or without concern. The aversion to steady work and the widespread desire for amusement and dissipation, the breaking up of the nation into strata, each of which is bitterly determined to assert its own interests, the immense value attached to material prosperity; all these are anti-Christian. And intensely anti-Christian, the very negation of Christian ideas, is the tendency visible all round us in every class and most persons to press their own claims and assert their own rights, while they are disinclined to perform the duties which are correlative to those rights. The assertion of rights, even when those rights are legitimate, is apt to take an anti-social form: and when the demand for rights in any group is prolonged and insistent, it is apt to degenerate into a war against society. The recognition of duties, on the other hand, is a marvellous bond to unite a nation into a whole. This is the great truth which Mazzini preached, with but little result, it is to be feared.

One clings to the belief that much of this indolence and self-assertion is the result of the great strain of the war, which for a time raised the patriotic and altruistic feelings to a level at which they could not be permanently maintained. One hopes it may be only a backward swing of the pendulum. At the same time it is impossible to regard the anti-social tendencies as altogether caused by the war, since we can all remember the terrible strikes which preceded the war and threatened the well-being of the nation, and we can all remember the repulsive excesses to which the reckless attempts to assert the rights of women led, and which set a shocking example copied on many sides. But I need not enlarge on this topic: let us rather consider the effects on the religious outlook of tendencies and ideas which are not directly anti-Christian, but which may perhaps be the way to a higher organization of society. Among these one of the most important, for good and evil, is the growth of the principle of democracy.

The great war was waged nominally in the interest of demo-

cracy against autocracy; and most of our leaders think that when they have said of any movement that it is democratic they need say no more to commend it. In all English-speaking countries aristocracy is at a discount, and is regarded as outworn. And the tyrannous temper of Germany has been set down as an example of the essential badness of autocracy, which it certainly was not. The evils of democracy among us have in the past been less prominent. They are beginning to show more and more clearly. I am not going to attack the general tendency to democracy, or to deny that the wider spread of comfort, of freedom and of education is a good thing, whatever be its drawbacks. If it tend somewhat to diminish the polish of the surface of society, and to make life harder for the professional and middle classes, that may be a result which we are bound to face cheerfully and hopefully. No change in the tendencies of society can be a benefit to everyone. But a reckless and unreflecting assertion of the rights of the manual workers may clash not only with the well-being of other classes, but with the whole constitution of society. The insistence upon rights may lead to constant quarrels and a disruption of society, just as the insistence on national rights threatens to be a source of many wars in the future in Eastern Europe.

But if we look at society from the point of view, not of rights but of duties, its character changes completely. It then becomes the higher duty of each of us not to assert our rights, but to do what we can for the glory of God and the good of our neighbour. Instead of a congeries of individuals, each of whom has a right to get all the happiness he can, we have an organism in which everyone has a place to hold and duties to perform. We have to set aside the old dictum that God made all men and women free and equal; and instead of it to learn that God made us all dependent one on another, and anything but equal. Every one has something to bring to the general good, some faculties which he should place at the disposal of society. The teaching of Menenius Agrippa as to the body and the members, the wisest of all fables, adopted and baptized into Christ by St. Paul, is the only safe and permanent basis for any society. There is profound truth in the saying that it is more blessed to give than to receive; and when our country-

men cease to ask what can I demand from the commonwealth, and ask instead how can I benefit the commonwealth, we shall have passed from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan to the Kingdom of God. Many of them no doubt still feel the call of duty which has in history always appealed to Englishmen : but on the surface the clamour for rights is most insistent.

But we have to deal not with political but with religious ideas and tendencies. Not long ago an American writer boasted that he was going to democratize God. He openly professed what many have thought in their hearts, and tried to carry out in practice. But the attempt is vain, because it is sure to clash with the whole stream of tendency which makes for righteousness, the fundamental laws of the universe and of human nature. Whatever be the nature of our government, and whatever the waves of popular opinion and feeling, virtue and vice, beauty and ugliness, truth and falsehood will remain as permanent ideals, rooted in the nature of things. And the nation which does not try to discern them and to direct its conduct by them will sooner or later perish miserably.

We may most clearly see this by considering the character of truth. Everyone must have noticed in recent times persistent attempts to democratize truth ; to maintain that what the majority think must be true, that unions of all sorts can read the events going on in the world in the light of their particular views and interests and determine how they shall work out. They magnify every circumstance which seems to tell in their favour, and minimize every circumstance which tells against them, and then expect the trend of events to take the course which they wish it to take. And this they often do with such obstinacy that they disregard all warnings, and deny the existence of facts which are not convenient. They are determined that truth shall follow the will of the majority, that when popular opinion wishes a thing to take place, the course of events shall conform to that wish. This is the broad way in which multitudes walk, the wide gate through which they pass, unheeding the fact that it may lead to utter destruction. Yet as Butler said, things are what they are, and the consequences will be what they will be. As St. Paul said, God is not mocked,

whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap. If all his neighbours tell him he can sow without reaping, it makes no difference to the event.

This chaotic and anarchic state of things is doubtless the result of the loss of respect for authority and tradition. The absolute standards have lost their prestige; and the popular opinion which sets them aside thinks that if the absolute standards are discredited, no standard at all remains, and the race is set free to think and act as it pleases. What the majority thinks good becomes good, what the majority thinks beautiful becomes beautiful, what the majority thinks true becomes true. Popular opinion thinks that if it cannot have the old standards it will have none at all; that goodness and beauty become mere matters of fashion and are decided by the popular vote. And many people, who are more serious-minded, in their reaction fall back upon mere conservatism and become retrograde.

The task which lies before societies such as ours, societies neither revolutionary nor retrograde, is to make every effort to substitute relative standards for absolute standards. We consider that absolute methods and standards are out of date, whether in ethics or religion, and mere abstract systems are always defective, because, as Lord Bacon said, thought cannot match the subtlety of things, and what is living cannot be comprehended in formulae. As one of our most vital thinkers, Professor McDougall has maintained, societies and nations have personalities as well as individuals. Societies are like growing plants, and like them are conditioned by their surroundings. We are set in a definite framework; there are fixed laws of nature, fixed laws of mind and spirit, fixed laws of society. And as we can only learn to command nature by obeying her, so we can only move to a higher stage of society by conforming to our conditions, modifying them no doubt by constant effort, but not superseding them. If all the world were determined that mercury should be as light as wood and float on the water, it would yet conform to the law of its being and refuse to float. And if all the world were determined that men should be born equal, they would yet be born unequal. If all the world were determined that the functions of men and women in society should be exactly the same, they would not be the

same. In trying to make them the same any society might do itself irreparable damage, but it would not succeed. As Sophocles observed, the divine laws do not belong to one period, but are eternal.

There is nothing on which Jesus dwelt more persistently than on the duty of man to conform to and carry out the will of God. And the will of God is to be discerned alike in the fundamental laws of nature and society and in the continued inspiration which leads to the development of society in accordance with those laws. Knowledge will not by itself make us do the thing which we know to be good. But history shows abundantly that the knowledge which comes from practical work must be supplemented and corrected by systematic inquiry. How many noble-minded men have done more harm than good from sheer want of knowledge!

Here, perhaps, is the weak point of democracy. It is obvious that those who give their lives to the study of a particular subject will know more about it than those who do not. Popular feeling, however noble in purpose and endeavour, must be willing to acknowledge that it does not know everything, and to take advice from the experts. We do so already in matters in which the want of scientific knowledge brings immediate failure: in agriculture, in ship-building, in aeronautics. No one would prefer, in matters such as these, the wish of the majority to the guidance of experts. As science enlarges its borders, this will become the case in more and more of the practical pursuits of life. But there must always remain a broad margin in which science has not made good, and in which the best leading that popular feeling can find is the voice of the prophet, the advice of those who are most susceptible to the subconscious urging of the great formative ideas which are working out from the unseen into the world of experience. As an example of the way in which the progress of science has affected our view of duty and conduct, I will take almsgiving. As an example of the way in which we are still dependent on the word of the prophet, I will take the sense of sin and guilt among Christians.

All through the Middle Ages almsgiving was regarded as one of the greatest merits a man could acquire. Private per-

sons were in a great measure judged by the Church and by popular opinion according to their liberality in giving. And the monasteries made this giving into a system. Mr. Coulton has shown how each monastery became the centre of a crowd of dependents who looked to it for sustenance, and gradually became unfit to carry on work in the world. When the monasteries were suppressed in England, the credit, and to a great extent the custom, of almsgiving survived, and still in popular estimation men of wealth are often judged by their liberality in this respect. But in recent years a change has been taking place, as a result of systematic thought acting in the realm of conduct. For it has been most luminously shown by science that a living thing which gives up leading its own life and becomes parasitic on some other creature, at once begins rapidly to degenerate, loses one organ after another, and finally may become a mere formless blood-sucker. That law holds in the animal world, and it holds also in the human world. One result of its recognition is that whereas in the Middle Ages all giving of alms was regarded as virtuous, because it was an immediate and obvious self-sacrifice, now any person who has a conscience will carefully consider, before he gives alms, what the result will be to the receiver of alms, whether it will help him towards a manly independence or whether it will degrade him into a parasite.

My next example, the changed sense of sin, is not a result of the growth of knowledge, but of changed feelings. In the last number of the *Expositor*, one of our members, Dr. Prideaux, describes the general feeling in this matter in the following words :

‘Sin is rather the perversion of activity, the misuse and misapplication of powers, missing the mark, failure to do the right thing or come up to standard. It is more frequently regarded as offence against man and society than as against God.’

Readers of *Ecce Homo* will remember that the brilliant author of that work describes the pagan sense of wrong-doing, as contrasted with the Christian sense of sin, in almost these very words.

It must be confessed that Dr. Prideaux rightly represents the general feeling. But we have yet to learn whether this change is permanent, and whether it is good. And here we

cannot appeal to science, since it is a question not of fact, but of ideals and principles. Is this turning from heaven to earth, this thinking less of God and more of man, a movement towards perfection or towards destruction? Certainly it is not a mere recent movement: it has long been manifest. And from the point of view of psychology it is not difficult to account for it. The sense of sin in the sight of God is developed in quiet and meditation, and does not grow strong in societies which are prosperous and flourishing in things material. But from the modern world quiet and meditation are almost banished: everyone is actively striving after some object, pursuing either business or pleasure with unresting anxiety. And life has run for the great majority of people, in this country at all events, on easy wheels. The second half of the last century was a time of steady material progress and increase of comfort for the mass of the nation. It was then that the sense of sin became dulled.

The result of a more easy life, lived in closer relations with one's neighbours, does seem to blunt the edge of spiritual sensibility. One does come to feel that if one does like other people and has a good reputation among them, if one is kindly and liberal, one cannot be far amiss. In such an atmosphere the severe religious crises which were passed through by such religious heroes as Augustine and Luther and Bunyan seem extravagant and unreal. Revivalist preaching seems to have far less striking effects than it had half a century ago. There can be little doubt that the acuteness of the sense of sin rests in a great degree on a vivid expectation of a judgment of souls, of the alternatives of heaven and hell. And this expectation has become less urgent on every side. It will be said that the expectation of judgment by a stern deity may well be replaced by a fear of offending a loving God. To minds naturally Christian this may be true. And philosophers may well maintain that in reason nothing could be worse than to be out of harmony with the scheme of the world and impervious to divine influence. But it is certain that these gentle impulses are not strong enough to move the mass of mankind: the hopes and fears of a future judgment of souls and of heaven and hell have infinitely more driving power; and these are precisely the beliefs which have become less insistent.

I am afraid that the services of the English Church do not tend to strengthen the sense of sin. Morning and evening every day we confess our sins in the most general and abstract way, and receive absolution. Confession and absolution tend to become mere forms, and pass without serious thought or resolve. A rarer and more personal confession would be far more effective.

The author of *Ecce Homo*, after speaking of the laxity of the pagan sense of sin, adds, 'When such a view of sin prevailed, no high virtue was possible.' This is an exaggeration: many Greeks and Romans showed high virtue, but it lacked the Christian element of devotion, of the feeling of the supernatural, of the hope of eternal life. It has been a commonplace of Christian writers that it was the permeation of society by these elements which transformed the ancient world and made progress possible. Can we lose them with impunity?

But it will be said that in the last six years the wheels of life have run anything but smoothly. It has been a time of trial, of strong hope and fear, of sadness and disappointment. Should we not have expected that under these conditions the sense of sin would revive? Yet, so far as I am able to judge, it has not done so. Here certainly is a matter well worth discussing, and one of the most important subjects in our programme. In this matter it is not the progress of knowledge that will be decisive, but the utterance of the prophets: and in our days prophets are few and little regarded. Can we imagine a prophet arising who would make not a few but many men have as keen a sense of guilt in anti-social action as many Christians in the past have had in transgression against God?

The recent terrible war was probably the greatest crime ever committed in the world, whether against God or against man. But each nation and each group seems to be content with trying to prove that someone else was guilty of causing it. I have not heard that anyone is overcome with remorse at the thought that he was himself at fault in the matter. Many people seem to regard the war not as the result of human wickedness, but as brought on by an inevitable fate. Surely this is not a religious, nor even a moral, way of regarding the war. It was quite possible to escape it, if not by statesmanship at the time,

then earlier, by moderating the feelings of envy, of rivalry and self-assertion which were its real causes. I dare not say how, or by whom, this could have been done, but the guilt of the war lies at some door or other; and until this is acknowledged and repented of, we have no real security against the outbreak of an even more terrible conflict. In this case the diminished sense of sin may have unmeasured consequences in history.

I have said enough by way of introduction, and must now pass on the torch to other runners in the hope that if they do not reach final results, they may yet help us alike in thought and in action in the very critical time in which we live.

MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF THE UNIVERSE AND TRADITIONAL CHRISTIANITY

By the Rev. J. C. HARDWICK, M.A., Author of *Religion and Science*.*

THE conceptions which we entertain of the universe cannot fail to affect our general outlook upon life, or (as we may prefer to call it) our religion. Revised conceptions of the universe have had important effects on the religious attitude of mankind. What men know of the world naturally affects their view of what may lie behind it or take place in it.

The history of modern European thought begins with a subversive change in scientific theory which seemed to involve serious consequences for both religion and society. So much so that religious and civil authorities united in the most extreme measures of repression. Bruno was considered too dangerous a man to be permitted to exist, and Galileo was threatened into a recantation. This persecution probably had the wide support of public opinion. Ordinary people felt towards the exponents of the New Astronomy much the same mixture of dislike and fear which the *bourgeoisie* of Europe now feels towards Lenin and all he represents. In the sixteenth century religious questions were felt to be as vital as are economic questions to-day.

It is true that Bruno never ceased (so far as we can discover) to regard himself as a Catholic Christian, and the staggering conception of an infinite universe which he was the first

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to introduce to humanity had no terrors for him. He regarded it as the natural complement of an infinite God. But the plain man thought differently, and naturally so. Lay and learned alike had hitherto been accustomed to the quaint concatenation of Ptolemaic astronomy, Aristotelian physics, and Biblical imagery which we find systematically elaborated in Aquinas. The world, thus understood, was a homely place: a man's feet were on firm ground, and there was a roof over his head. And the human race was able to feel that it was playing its part upon a stage not altogether inappropriate or unworthy—one upon which the eyes of angels and arch-angels and all the company of heaven were fixed in anxious suspense.

To the Psalmist, when he considered the heavens, had occurred the momentous question—What is Man? But the Psalmist and all the predecessors of the New Astronomy at least were denizens of a universe which had its limits. They were not confronted by the nightmare of infinity—those awful gulfs of space which, as Pascal said, 'I knew not, and which know not me.'

Indeed the New Astronomy, and the New Physics with which it was associated, had created between them an illimitable and automatic universe which might be habitable by man, but would prove uninhabitable for his religion, because his higher ideals and interests now seemed impertinent. That universe wore an aspect of strangeness and remoteness, even of menace. What is Man? was a question which presented itself in a more peremptory form. The proportions of the old problem, large enough before to trouble many pious hearts, had expanded. The inevitable interrogation stood there challenging every aspiration, every ideal of man.

It is plain that the existence of every attitude worthy of the name religious was threatened. Various thinkers attempted to represent the basis of existence as being spiritual, *i.e.*, congruous to ourselves. Leibniz and Pascal achieved the impossible in different ways. The former found in personality the fundamental reality, and the latter was the first to understand that value is everything, size nothing:

'All bodies, the firmament, the stars, the earth and its kingdoms are not worth the smallest mind.'

And he placed his finger on the weakness of any merely materialistic outlook when he wrote :

‘With space, the universe encloses me and engulfs me like an atom, but with thought I enclose the universe.’

So that the new conceptions, formidable as these were, did not, as was feared, involve the eclipse of religion. Men, being incurably religious, found a way of interpreting the new conceptions so that the values, which the old conceptions had cherished and preserved, were not lost. The universe might be infinite, but it was still (to the religious mind) the creation of an infinite God.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the New Astronomy and the New Physics were further elaborated. Newton’s comprehensive formula of gravitation, valid in every corner of the universe, eliminated the old distinction between the celestial and sublunary regions. Laplace, in his *Mechanique Céleste*, found (as Napoleon complained) no place for God. Yet there was nothing new in principle introduced by these developments.

The New Geology, associated with the name of Lyell, did, however, introduce a new terror to the religious mind. To the conception of infinite space was added the equally formidable idea of infinite time. Geological processes had not been sudden and catastrophic, but similar in extent and character to those which we now see operating around us. For the calculus of the New Geology the life of the human race upon this planet is an episode, and an insignificant episode.

Closely allied with and originating from the New Geology was the New Biology, which we associate with the name of Darwin. There is little need to emphasize the significance for religion of the new theory. It seemed to have put the finishing touch to a process of disintegration which had been going on for three centuries. The last feature of the old background of European religious experience had now disappeared. The last claim of mankind to special consideration seemed finally discredited, now that the animal origin of our race was proclaimed as a fact established upon experimental evidence.

And meanwhile the phenomena of life itself, which had

hitherto been shrouded in mystery, had been reduced to order by the new sciences of organic chemistry and bio-physics. As early as 1828 the German chemist Whöler had prepared an organic compound (urea) from inorganic materials—an achievement of the utmost significance, eliminating as it did the barrier between the organic and inorganic areas.

Moreover, the phenomena of growth, of muscular action, and of the vital processes generally, were investigated by such chemists as Schwann, and all subjected to the realm of physics. For the old miracles of vital forces was substituted a molecular mechanism, complicated it is true, but intelligible in terms of mathematics.

And thus the goal, to which three centuries of patient labour had been devoted, seemed now to be in a fair way of being attained. The domain of mechanics, in other words the extrusion of personality from the universe, was tolerably complete. To summarise the situation:—

The modern man was now faced, not with a universe of manageable proportions in which he could feel at home, but with a nightmare of infinity which rendered him insignificant. The old distinction between heaven and earth had vanished, nor was he able to regard the history of his race as Milton still seems to have been able to regard it, as a cosmic epic played out in a few thousand years. The history of mankind had become an episode, no more, in a period of incalculable time. Nor could man any longer erect barriers either between himself and other living creatures, or between the organic and the inorganic worlds. Such were the results of the New Astronomy, the New Geology and the New Biology respectively.

Nor is this by any means an exhaustive summary. No mention has been made of the systematic materialism of which the new atomistic theories of Dalton had formed the foundation. Lucretius had been modernised and brought up to date by the New Chemistry.

And yet, the infinite extension of space and time, and the lowly origin of the human species, and the new doctrine of atoms were not the only, nor even perhaps the most damaging achievements of the New Science. We allude to the entire change of outlook which characterised those who were trained

in scientific ways of thinking; as a distinguished historian of ideas puts it:

‘It is not so much the results at which science is arriving, or has arrived, which bring about the quarrel between science and religion, and condition the religious problem . . . but rather the entire habit of mind which empirical science has fostered. . . .’¹

And the new habit of mind was definitely hostile to certain notions of ‘divine action’ with which traditional religion had hitherto been associated. So-called ‘natural’ explanation of phenomena now replaced the old views which had found divine purpose everywhere. A sudden storm (for instance) involving the death of individuals, would no longer be regarded as caused by the divine wrath, but as having been the inevitable result of certain circumstances of atmospheric pressure, of wind, of tide, and so on. All notions of purpose and value were regarded as anthropomorphic and unscientific.

The new view was that the material universe was governed by certain unalterable laws which operate regularly and mechanically. These laws are inherent in the nature of matter itself. There are, and from the nature of the case can be, no exception to them. These laws are not yet fully known, hence apparent exceptions to the laws already known; but the knowledge of them is gradually growing, and omniscience with regard to them would make it possible to calculate the occurrence of any event happening at any time, past or future, upon the surface of this planet, or anywhere else in the material universe.

This view, attractive as it seemed, was evidently hostile to religion. Religion sees personality everywhere, the idea of Universal Natural Causation sees it nowhere. Not only did the new view exclude interpretations of natural phenomena, such as that put upon the storm in the instance above quoted, but it met with a blank and uncompromising negation every suggestion of the occurrence of supernatural phenomena. For these there was no room in a material universe operating mechanically and guided by inherent and unalterable law. Every such notion was fantastic, the absolute negation of all science—indeed, making science impossible, as undermining the presuppositions upon which all science rests.

¹ Höfding *Philosophy of Religion* (p. 27).

Uniformity, for the new attitude of mind, was an axiom—the corner-stone of a whole system of thought. Such is the attitude of mind which the last couple of generations has rendered familiar to all of us. So long as its implications for religion are understood, there is no need to dwell further upon it. Its implications for religion were simply and bluntly the negation of all religion: all religious ideas, or at least all traditional religious ideas, were degraded by it to the level of superstition. The time for such childish notions was past, the era of positive knowledge was at hand. Writings such as Guyau's brilliant *L'irreligion de L'Avenir* reflect this attitude.

Much noble (though illegitimate) idealism attached to this negative attitude. And the new non-religion of the nineteenth century proved attractive to many social reformers as well as to the men of science: and a new Scholasticism, of which Herbert Spencer was the Aquinas, was already in process of construction, and was almost completed, when a reaction began. This was brought about in two ways:

- (1) By the critical analysis of the presuppositions upon which all Natural Science rests.
- (2) By new discoveries in the realm of the physical, biological and psychological sciences themselves.

To deal with these separately.

A radical analysis of the methods and principles of natural science has been an important feature of recent thought. This critical attitude was first adopted, or first elaborated, by Ernst Mach, Professor of Physics at Prague, and afterwards at Vienna, who as early as 1863 had laid it down as the business of science to give (what he called) 'an economic presentation of the facts'; by which phrase he meant that science takes account only of certain salient features which it selects from among the manifold features which experience presents us with. Scientific method is thus 'selective' or 'abstract,' and deals not with things themselves (as is generally supposed), but with *certain selected aspects* of things, disregarding those aspects which happen (for the moment) to be non-essential or irrelevant.

This method, abstract as it is—in fact just because it is abstract—leads to highly valuable and highly accurate results. Its characteristic advantage is that it is economical of thought:

by disregarding all irrelevant considerations it is able to reach its goal, as it were, by a short cut. Did the scientist have to take into consideration all the manifold and complex aspects of each concrete 'thing' (whether it be leaf, field, lever, or what not) with which he deals, he would never be able to cut his way through the jungle. His method of abstracting irrelevancies carries him at once to his goal.

The sciences, of course, vary in 'abstractness.' Mathematics is the abstract science *par excellence*, hence the accuracy and inevitability of its results. For 'the exactness of a science depends on its abstractness, *i.e.*, on the number of conditions it is able to ignore.'² Mathematical science is 'exact' because it can ignore every aspect of phenomena save the simple and universal ones of number and space. But if these were the *only* aspects of phenomena which we knew, we should know very little of phenomena.

Thus the mathematician's view, though so fruitful in results of a certain kind, is perhaps the most superficial (because it is the most abstract) of all.

It is certain, because it is given no chance to be otherwise. All discrepant or irrelevant features (which are the *characteristic* features of phenomena) are shorn off. The world of mathematics may be a rational world, and a tidy world, but it is not a real world.

Of course this line of criticism has an important bearing upon the mechanical view of nature. Mach pointed out that mechanical 'laws of nature' are nothing but formal patterns to which the processes of nature may (for convenience' sake) be represented as conforming. A clear account, though not a *complete* account, of all physical processes may be given in terms of mechanical 'laws.' In fact it remains a question, Mach observed, 'whether the mechanical view of things, instead of being the profoundest is not, in point of fact, the shallowest of all.'

These criticisms, and others of a like nature, have been elaborated in England by writers like Karl Pearson and Professor James Ward, and in France by Poincaré, Boutroux, Bergson and others.

² Nettleship, *Lectures on Logic*, Note B. (*Remains*, p. 232.)

Nor need it be supposed that scientific method is discredited by such criticism—it is far too well established and has been far too fruitful in results for that. The suggestion that science deals with analogies and abstractions rather than with things does not deprive science of validity—it only shows its incompleteness as an explanation of phenomena. This critical estimate of scientific methods shows just how much and how little we can expect from them. They will supply us with explanations which are accurate so far as they go, they will give us accurate descriptions of phenomena as they are seen when reduced to their simplest terms of matter and motion, but beyond this they cannot go. Of the manifold world of experience as the individual knows it, they give us, and can only give us, the most superficial representation. As Bacon had said long before, ‘thought cannot match the subtlety of things.’

And those who try to erect the principles of scientific method into a system of philosophy, denying the reality of any but these aspects of things of which alone science can take cognisance, are indulging in dogmatism of the most unwarrantable and disreputable kind.

With regard to those recent developments of actual scientific theory, which we spoke of, these have been of the highest importance, and of the most revolutionary character. In this sphere it were perhaps best to confine ourselves to quotations from specialists in the areas concerned.

In the first place, to deal with recent developments of Physics, chiefly in the sphere of what is called *molecular physics*. Professor Cunningham, in Pearson’s *Grammar of Science*, writes :—

‘Whereas through the greater part of the nineteenth century “matter” was the concept which was looked upon as fundamental in physical science, and of which there was a curious accidental property called electricity, it now appears that electricity must be more fundamental than matter, in the sense that our more elementary matter must now be conceived as a manifestation of extremely complex electrical phenomena.’³

In brief, the atomic theory of matter has collapsed, and been replaced (for the present) by an electrical theory of matter. And the old dogmatism is now out of fashion :

‘We do not know, and are probably incapable of discovering, *what matter is*,’

³ *Grammar of Science* (Part I, p. 356).

says Professor Tait, and again :

‘ The discovery of the ultimate nature of matter is probably beyond the range of human intelligence.’⁴

And in fact, as Mr. A. J. Balfour has said in his Gifford Lectures,

‘ We now know too much about matter to be materialists.’

If this chief pillar of the mechanico-materialist temple has given way, others are tottering. As one writer puts it in a different metaphor :

‘ The ancient limits are being trampled down in all directions.’⁵

Even the laws of the Conservation of Mass and the Conservation of Energy are subject to criticism.

‘ Is the law of the conservation of mass the expression of an absolute truth?’ writes Professor Duncan (‘ *The New Knowledge*,’ pp. 249 f.). ‘ It does not seem so, at any rate in the case of radio-active bodies.’

And Le Bon says :

‘ Energy is no more indestructible than the matter from which it emanates’ (*Evolution of Forces*, p. 16).

With regard to Professor Einstein’s criticisms of the Newtonian formula of gravitation, although these have created a sensation in scientific circles, they seem to require much more elucidation before their exact bearing upon the difficult questions of the nature of matter and its relation to space can be satisfactorily gauged. It seems evident, however, that the new theory leads up to the conclusion (previously established by processes of metaphysical reasoning) that space and time are not absolute, but relative.

With regard to recent advances in Biology, these have tended to rehabilitate what is called the vitalistic as opposed to the mechanical theory. The organism is no longer regarded by the majority of biologists as fully explicable in terms of mechanics and chemistry. To quote Professor J. S. Haldane :

‘ The main outstanding fact is that the mechanistic account of the universe breaks down completely in connection with the phenomena of life . . . in the case of life, the facts are inconsistent with the physical and chemical account of Phenomena.’⁶

⁴ Quoted by Bishop Mercer, *Problem of Creation*,—Appendix B.

⁵ Poincaré, in *The New Physics* (quoted by Mercer).

⁶ *Mechanism, Life and Personality*, 1913 (p. 81).

Great importance is attached to the researches which Driesch sums up in his *Science and Philosophy of the Organism*, where he says (vol. ii., p. 338):

'There is something in the organism's behaviour (in the widest sense of the word) which is opposed to an inorganic resolution of the same, and which shows that the living organism is more than a sum or aggregate of parts; that it is insufficient to call the organism "a typically combined body," i.e., a machine, without further explanation.'

Similar passages could be quoted from biologists like Professor J. A. Thomson, who describes the organism as a self-stoking, self-repairing, self-reproducing and self-regulating machine, i.e., no machine at all.⁷

It is now realised (at least in biology) that facts need not necessarily be subjected to a mechanical interpretation in order to be intelligible. That bed of Procrustes is no longer regarded as necessary.

But it is not only physical and biological, but psychological science that is contributing to the reconstruction of view which is taking place. Particular attention is due to those branches of psychology which deal experimentally with the subconscious, with instincts, with the phenomena of thought-transference, psychotherapy, and those abnormal phenomena which come under the popular and perhaps misleading title of 'spiritualism.'

Considerable difference of opinion, and even confusion of thought, may still exist in regions which are still largely a *terra incognita*. And (as generally happens) those who are most competent to give an opinion are the least ready to dogmatise in any direction. We may say that we are in the position of not knowing what the future may bring forth. At any rate, it is safe to say that the too hasty negations of the last century, which were never, in the strict sense, scientific, are now out of fashion. It is extremely difficult to imagine a return to the view which dismisses 'mind' from the universe as being an obscure by-product of matter, or a comparatively insignificant 'epiphenomenon' accompanying certain obscure chemical or mechanical processes. The old theories, gratifying in their simplicity, will no longer cover the facts.

Thus we may say that the critical examination of the pre-

⁷ See article in *Hibbert Journal* for October, 1911: 'Is there one Science of Nature?'

suppositions of scientific knowledge, together with certain rather startling developments in several departments of science (*i.e.*, physical, biological and psychological) have combined to throw discredit upon, if not entirely to destroy, the fabric of materialistic mechanism which was the dominant, and indeed the only reputable system of thought a generation ago.

It may now be said that against a definitely religious view of things, science has no word of protest to utter—far otherwise. It is possible to suggest (without seeming absurd) that we are at the dawn of a new era when the lion of natural science will lie down with the lamb of religious faith, when rationalist and mystic can see one another's point of view, and perhaps speak with one voice; and when (what is most important of all) there shall be no more dogmatism, either on the side of science because it will seem absurd, or on the part of religion because it will seem unnecessary.

HISTORY AND CHRISTIANITY

By G. G. COULTON, M.A., Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge;
author of *Christ*, *St. Francis* and *To-day*, etc.

I MUST confess, on the very threshold of my subject, that I cannot believe in any very direct connection between history and the essence of religion. We walk by faith, not by sight, but history is a matter rather of sight than of faith. When we talk of historical certitude, we mean something like the same degree of certitude which we get through the microscope and through chemical analysis; and, though we generally have to be content with a good deal less than this, yet there are some facts of history which seem to us as indisputable as anything in the physical sciences. The date of the battle of Hastings is probably as accurately known as the composition of any salt can be; and any man who in history should resolve to limit himself to what are generally called certainties, would be walking as much by sight as even the most unsympathetic critic could have accused Tyndall or Huxley of doing.

Whether anyone has in fact made this attempt, we need not enquire; my point is that historical certitude, so far as it exists

at all, partakes of the certitude of sight, and we cannot too often remind ourselves that true religion walks by faith. Therefore we may paraphrase in this connection even that other Pauline word of which the plain meaning, I must confess, is decisively against me here: we may say that if in history alone we had hope in Christ, we should be of all men most miserable. For, though history may support, it is absolutely and essentially incapable of proving our highest hopes in Christ. A great deal of what is historically recorded of Christ is credible to us only because, and only in so far as, we already believe in Christ. History cannot possibly be the permanent foundation of faith. It may be the kindly half nurse, half schoolmaster, the *παιδαγωγός*, helping us along to faith as ancient philosophy helped St. Augustine on to Christianity; or it may be the wise physician, supplying us with antidotes to those poisonous secretions which sometimes mingle with true faith much as St. Augustine's knowledge of Aristotelian physics enabled him to see the falsehood of Manichaean physics. But only so far as this are we justified in asserting of Christianity that it is an historic faith; only so far as that can any party among Christians have the right to claim—as one party does rightly or wrongly claim—that it is the historic party.

It is true that there are many to whom this exordium would seem paradoxical or worse; many to whom Christianity seems an historic faith in the most literal sense in which that adjective can be used—a faith so wrapt up in one or more historic certainties that the loss of these would leave us without anything worthy of the name of faith. Yet we shall find, when we look closer, that these same minds repudiate the religious importance of history in general quite as emphatically as they assert its supreme religious importance in one or two particular cases. In these particular cases they speak of the Historic Faith and the Historical Party, but without reflecting clearly what they mean by those words.

Whatever room we may leave for imagination in the highest history, its main object is, as I began by saying, to come as nearly as possible to sight. The perfect historian would be he who would reproduce the events of the past as if they were actually present before our eyes; so truly and vividly that we

could pass judgment upon them as directly and with the same degree of accuracy as we judge the significance of things which we have actually seen and heard. The historian never, of course, does attain all this; but this, and no less, is what he aims at; this, and no less, would be historical certitude even in that limited guise in which alone we can never use the word certitude at all. But, to arrive at anything like this certitude, we must begin with quite as much scepticism as faith. We must test our documents carefully, weighing in each case how far the author speaks from his own experience, how far that author was competent to pronounce upon events thus brought within his experience; how far, again, he might personally be trusted to tell us the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, or how far some strong desire, some violent antipathy, might have wrinkled the mirror of his mind, or even seduced him into conscious concealment or deceit. All these questions we need to ask of an original writer; we must ask them still more insistently when the document we possess is known to have been written at second hand; for there we must recognize double or more than double chances of distortion. Therefore, although exaggerated scepticism in history may be quite as fatal as superstitious credulity, yet still the historical student's methods must be strongly sceptical. He need not weary the reader with all his doubts; he may even legitimately keep silence concerning them, so long as he steers clear of false implications of certainty where certainty is not. But silently or confessedly, doubt is of the essence of his work. If he has proceeded without his constant element of healthy doubt, he may be anything else that is good, but he is no historian.

So much has always been conceded to history in general; but, a century ago, most people still thought it blasphemous to deal thus with sacred history. That limitation, however, has gradually been swept away; it would be difficult to find any modern theologian of repute who does not take for granted that we must study the Bible historically as well as devotionally. The Bishop of London recognized this as frankly as the Bishop of Durham; for he writes:

‘ Well, there, it is quite true that many books which were thought to be very ancient are discovered now to be much less ancient than we

supposed. But the point is that the books never said they were of that age. The idea that it unsettles the Bible is ridiculous . . . e.g., the second part of Isaiah is no less inspired because it was probably written a hundred years after the first.¹

Since therefore historical method is largely sceptical; the man who tries to make us see the thing as it actually happened must himself take great pains to judge between rival claimants, if I may so put it. Often one document, or one part of a document, suggests 'I am the true fact,' while from another part comes a very different plea, 'I am the truth'; if there is no way of reconciling these apparent contradictions, then one of the two claims must be set aside after patient examination—or else the final judgment must be one common enough in history: *Not proven*. There are countless cases in which we are compelled to suspend our judgment altogether, because the evidence is either too scanty, or too conflicting, to help us honestly to a clear-cut decision. We may, it is true, be yet inclined to a decision by other than strictly historical evidence—or shall I say other than direct historical evidence. Our knowledge of a man's character, our reverence or our contempt for him, may incline us definitely to one side even when the direct evidence is either non-existent or evenly balanced. But we often lack even this collateral evidence; and then our historical judgment must remain in absolute suspense. Whatever our belief may be in such cases as this, we must not deceive ourselves or our fellows by claiming to base this belief on history.

Thus far, I think, most people will agree with us in the place they assign to history. Yet there are many who will refuse adherence to the initial contention that history has little to do directly with true religion. They will say that there are at least two historical facts which we are bound to hold if we are Christians at all. One is the Virgin Birth, the other is the physical Resurrection. Unless your faith is founded on these two historic facts (they tell us), you may have a religion, but you have not Christianity. And this is what they mean when they claim for the Nicene Creed the title of the Historic Faith. But the adjective Historic is here commonly used in a very equivocal sense. In one sense it is indisputably correct;

¹The Gospel of the Miraculous (p. 228).

Nicene Christianity rests upon the belief in these two events as having happened in the past; that is, in historic events as opposed to present happening; in that sense it is unquestionably historic. And that belief undoubtedly does separate Nicene Christianity from such a creed as ordinary Buddhism (which, I believe, is almost independent of history), and even from Mohammedanism, which is less dependent upon historical statements with regard to the Prophet's life. But the phrase Historic Faith is constantly pressed into a second very different meaning—it is taken to signify historically proven, as for instance when Mr. Vernon Staley contends that 'the resurrection of our Lord is better attested than any other fact in history,'¹ or when Mr. N. P. Williams asserts that our evidence here is practically as conclusive as that of a legal affidavit.

Therefore it seems important for us to recognise not only that this is not so, but that it could not be so; that the real essence of Christianity is too great to be historically provable. History may lend us her support, but history cannot possibly be our foundation. To those who maintain the phrase Historic Faith in both meanings of the adjective, we put the natural question: If it is so supremely important that these historical assertions should be universally recognised facts, why then is the historical evidence for the Virgin Birth so scanty? Why do the inspired writers sometimes almost go out of their way to leave a different impression, giving us Christ's genealogy through Joseph only, using the words *first-born* instead of *only* son, *brethren* instead of *cousins*, with other similar touches of which all indeed are separately able to be explained away, but each of which does need such explanation before we can get rid of its superficially unfavourable implications? If God had intended faith to stand or fall by history, would not the Gospels have been free from these apparent contradictions or inconsistencies, which in any other story would confessedly be reckoned as sources of serious historical doubt? Why was not this event, this basic fact, as Catholics would call it, recorded with something of the care which the Romans of that day took to hand down their own deeds exactly to a remote posterity?

¹*The Catholic Religion*, sixth ed., p. 187.

Or, if it be pleaded that the early Christian tradition was necessarily rather oral than scriptural (a plea in which that word necessarily always seems to me to set strangely narrow limitation to the operations of the Holy Ghost), why was not that oral tradition guarded from the very first by something of the same systematic and commonsense precautions which ensured the exact oral transmission of the Koran, though not from the first, at least from a very early date? These questions are inevitable; if our faith was intended to stand or fall upon certain historical facts, why are not those facts attested with a precision proportionate to their overwhelming importance? Why did not the writers anticipate the inevitable needs of students living even two thousand years after their own time? To this question it will be answered, very reasonably, God speaks only through human agencies and that if this be so, neither the four evangelists in their writings nor the apostles in their oral teaching, could be expected to have anticipated so fully the desires of so remote a generation. And our interlocutor may go farther than this, and point out that such an anticipation would rather have lowered than exalted Christianity; that our faith is the more real because we do not require for the Incarnation or the Resurrection such exact documentary evidence as we should require before we invested our money in a new joint stock company. Such an answer seems to me as true as our own question was natural and inevitable; but could any answer imply more clearly that we do not really base our faith upon strictly historical evidence?

Not only we do not, but it is humanly impossible that we should; for even if history could vouch absolutely for the events themselves, she could not go on to decide for the doctrines deduced from them—the doctrines which alone can give supreme religious value to these events. Let us, for the moment, put aside Hume's objection that no documentary or oral evidence could, in the nature of the case, prove so unusual an occurrence as the Virgin Birth or the physical Resurrection in that literal sense in which both have been understood at least from very early Christian times. Let us suppose both events to have been historically proved, in the sense in which we take the Norman Conquest as proved. Yet even the two

together, however certain in themselves, would not involve the certainty that the person thus miraculously born and thus miraculously raised was God Almighty. To jump from this historical fact to that metaphysical conclusion would involve a strangely inadequate—we may almost say a blasphemously inadequate—conception of God; or, at least, a most irreligious over-exaltation of human reason. However much either the one or the other miracle may place its worker above common humanity, who could have the temerity to assert that human reason can measure that superiority, can measure also the distance between us and God Almighty, and can assure us that the distance between the Virgin Birth and daily human births, between the risen body of Christ and the dust and decay of all other bodies that have gone before us is the exact distance separating man from Omnipotence?

Yet nothing short of this would enable us to proceed from even the most unquestionable historical fact to so absolute a conclusion as is implied in the Nicene Creed. Nicene Christianity therefore is not really based upon history, in any strict and direct sense of that word. We may be glad to find it consonant with history, as we are glad to find it uncontradicted by biology or chemistry or anthropology; but history cannot prove it. And I feel bound to record my personal conviction that the essence of Christianity is independent even of the personal existence of Jesus Himself. The little I have read about the Christ-myth seems to me foolish and superficial, the work of people in whom historical sense is either lacking or abeyant; yet I should be ashamed to think that, if ever I were compelled to agree with those critics, I should therefore lose one jot or tittle of essential truth from the New Testament. It would leave untouched not only the conviction that God is Love, but even the experience, 'My peace I give unto you; not as the world giveth, give I unto you.' In these latter years of my life, it leaves me unmoved when men say, 'Lo! here' and 'Lo! there'—if you want God's truth, you can only get at it in this particular way or from these particular men! And, so we find how many others feel with us, conviction deepens as the daily shadows deepen; it becomes more personal from year to year, and we say of our minds what Thomas Edward

Brown said of his garden—not boastingly, as against others, but confidently, as of his own experience :

‘ A garden is a lovesome thing, God wot ! . . .
The veriest school
Of Peace ; and yet the fool
Contends that God is not.
Not God ! in gardens ! when the eve is cool ?
Nay, but I have a sign,
’Tis very sure God walks in mine.’

An assurance which should bring with it the equal assurance that all this is of God’s grace and not of our merit, and a gradual striving, however imperfect, to render that garden less unworthy of the guest. Or rather, a gradual surrender to what seems more and more truly God’s Truth, with less and less feeling of self, whether in self-exaltation or in self-depreciation, as Professor Bosanquet says very truly :

What is aimed at in true religion is not to be preoccupied with yourself at all ; not to be preoccupied with your own weakness or littleness, any more than with your own goodness or cleverness.’

And again, quoting from Henry Bradley, hear reiterated the vehement expression of mysticism :

‘Where reason tells thee “thou art outside God,” then answer thou, “No, I am in God, I am in heaven, in it, in him, and for all eternity will never leave him. The devil may keep my sins, and the world my flesh. Strive in God’s will, his life shall be my life, his will my will ; I will be dead in my reason that he may live in me, and all my deeds shall be his deeds.” ’²

Yet, though faith may more and more emphatically repudiate all direct dependence upon history, it may at the same time more and more warmly welcome history’s indirect services in the characters of *παιδαγωγός* and physician.

In the first character, history arrests our attention ; it performs the office which Dr. Skrine so truly attributes especially to the miracle ; it excites our wonder, and makes us thirst to know more. Few pictures in all literature are so vivid as are the best from the historical books of the Old Testament, from the Gospels and from Acts. And passing beyond these into later Church history down to modern times, we may trace, I think, with something like historical certainty, how much of the comparative victory of Christianity as a whole is due to its

² Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, p. 293, note.

superior ethical and spiritual qualities; and, on the other hand, how the weaknesses which have always beset our religion are responsible for those many failures which go far to tarnish the general victory. History applies to all creeds Christ's practical criticism: By their fruits ye shall know them; and while the test is generally encouraging to us, it is not so exclusively encouraging as to dispense us from serious searchings of heart, and from daily efforts to purify our creed, even as the God of our worship is pure. Every fresh interest which history can arouse in the Christian figures of the past, every fresh proof that their lives were intimately bound up with their creed and that the essentials of that creed form one continuous thread through the ages, continuous in itself and organically separate from other creeds, however much it may owe to them in detail—every fresh contribution of this kind must necessarily attract some fresh minds, if only a few, towards Christianity, and confirm others in the reverence they already feel. History may thus be our schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ.

And again, she may be our physician; unable, indeed, to help us in any appeal that lies outside her province, but ready with antidotes against others who would confuse us with their own irrelevant appeals. When we are told that our present beliefs are insufficient, and that we must further assent to a string of propositions highly metaphysical and to most people frankly unintelligible, in default of which assent we shall without doubt perish everlastingly; when it is urged upon us that these propositions must be both true in themselves and indispensable to salvation, because it is certain that we inherit them in a direct line from the apostles and from Jesus Christ, then history steps in and reassures us. The assertion may be true, but it is certainly unprovable by any law of historical evidence; those who believe it believe it mainly because it seems consonant with their conception of the fitness of things; we, therefore, have an equal right to disbelieve it, because it does not thus fall in with our own preconceptions, and because there is a gap of at least a generation in its pedigree; that is time enough, as history tells us, for a movement to change its direction very seriously, and for evidence to become very seriously distorted.

But in all this, we are told, we are neglecting tradition; and tradition is a stronger basis for the Catholic theory of Church and Sacraments than written testimony. Yet certainly not only tradition, but even what ought to have been the purest and most guarded tradition, has failed to save the most traditional of all Churches from the most grievous errors. The so-called Donation of Constantine—by which that emperor was supposed to proclaim to posterity how Pope Silvester I had cured him of leprosy, and how he himself, in gratitude for this, now bestowed upon the Popes the whole sovereignty of the West—is a document which no Roman Catholic scholar ventures to support as authentic; in that Church, as in all other Churches, the story is now told only with a laugh or with a blush. Yet it was inserted, at Rome itself, in the semi-official collection of papal biographies, probably during the pontificate of one of the best and greatest Popes, Gregory I. Why did not Gregory repudiate it? Mgr. Duchesne, probably the greatest of living Roman Catholic historians, can only surmise that Gregory treated it as a fairy-tale not worth notice in any way. Yet it obtained absolute credence under the authority of a Church which had more opportunities than any other for controlling such credence; and it remained practically undisputed until the verge of the Reformation. So also with a series of forgeries even more glaring, if possible—the False Decretals. They remained practically undoubted all through the Middle Ages, but historical scholarship began to examine them in the thirteenth century, and for more than 300 years now they have been confessed as forgeries by every scholar who has a reputation to lose. It was not documentary evidence, it was not historical evidence in the ordinary sense, which lent so long a life to falsehoods so astounding, it was the tradition of the Roman Church.

And in that Church the greatest scholars have always been least anxious to set tradition against ordinary historical evidence. But it may be said: Can we not safely rely on oral tradition of only 30 years and 30 such years? The Apostles' minds so indelibly impressed with the exact sayings and intonations of their Master, their every word and every action controlled by that incalculable weight of responsibility which lay

upon them as the only sure and authoritative channels of Christian truth, to all which advantages we must add the direct assistance of the Holy Ghost. There can be no comparison, it may be said, between the tradition of those 30 years and that of any other generation in history. Let us therefore take account of all these pleas, and of the further most certain plea that illiterate folk have a far more retentive memory than the literate, and can often relate long speeches, over a considerable stretch of time, with astounding accuracy. Yet there are limits to this accuracy, limits to the Apostles' sense of exact responsibility, limits even to the extent to which the Holy Ghost thought it wise to control them; and these limits are, from an historical point of view, very narrow indeed. What can be simpler than the words in which Christ instituted the most solemn of Christian sacraments? What moment could have been more fateful, or more consciously fateful, than that moment of institution, sealed by the final warning: *This do in remembrance of Me?* Thirty words, pronounced at that moment to men so receptive and so responsible! Yet what, in fact, were those thirty words? No man knoweth unto this day: it is as if God had purposely concealed them as He concealed the sepulchre of Moses, lest, knowing the exact letter of that unique pronouncement, we should idolatrously worship the letter and lose sight of the spirit. It is expedient that we should not know Christ's exact words, in order that the Comforter should come unto us. Three of the Gospels, and St. Paul in I. Corinthians tell us the words, but no two rehearsals are the same. Indeed, there are only two brief phrases—six words in all—common to all four accounts: *This is my body*, and *my blood*. So inexact is even the purest tradition, in a case where we cannot be accused of hypercriticism in expecting historical certainty.

But, it may be said, all four do agree in the two phrases *This is my body* and *my blood*; that is all that really matters to us, in these six words we have the whole sacrament. That is not true: common-sense tells us that the meaning of those two phrases must depend very much on their context, and the Holy Ghost has denied us the exact knowledge of that context. And historical sense (which is, after all, only common-sense applied to the study of historical documents) may suggest that

the inspired writers who gave us so little certainty in this simple case may be leaving us in equal uncertainty on many other historical points. All those who study the growth of tradition in cases where we can check it by parallel documentary evidence must have noticed this crystallizing tendency. At first, the tradition may be manifold and formless; gradually it assumes a more coherent form; details which do not fit into that general form either split off altogether (sometimes becoming thus a nucleus for rival traditions) or as coaxed into conformity with the general mass, which finally becomes far more unified and coherent than anything which could be traced at first. The main controlling force in the growth of tradition is a craving for more dogmatic certainty. It has something of the strength, still more of the weakness, of that selective process in science which Mr. Hardwick described to us yesterday. And this, after all, is only one form of the inextinguishable appetite for knowledge which characterizes all normal minds. In the pursuit of such dogmatic certainty, inconsistencies are gradually smoothed away; gaps are filled; and we have at last a coherent story unquestioned except by those who may have taken pains to study the forces which helped to fashion it. And those forces, it will be found, act not only upon dead matter but also upon living evidence; a witness, and a very honest witness, will gradually convince himself that he ought to testify as the rest seem to be testifying; tradition is far more liable to be warped by crowd-psychology than written evidence is, and it is generally the written evidence which enables us to measure the distortions of the other. Let me give briefly two examples of this from Franciscan history.

If we know more of Francis than of any other mediaeval saint, or indeed than any other man of the Middle Ages, this is due mainly to two circumstances. The first is, that a collection of intimate anecdotes was made by a group of his closest disciples, headed by Leo, his secretary. This collection, though we have it in only a mutilated form, colours two out of the three official biographies, and had such vitality that it survived (though it only just survived) the deliberate attempt of the authorities, a generation after St. Francis's death, to destroy all earlier records and leave to posterity one single

official biography, that of St. Bonaventura, which smooths down or omits many of the most important episodes, and is therefore comparatively colourless. If that had succeeded, we might have known less of St. Francis than of St. Bernard; but the survival of Leo's papers, even in a scattered and sometimes altered form, has not only saved us from this, but left us almost unique materials for studying the growth of legend and the growth of a Church—for, in some ways, the Franciscan Order became a Church within the Church. Our second advantage, very much smaller, but again almost unique, is that the crowning miracle of Francis's life—that of the *Stigmata*—was described in an official letter to his disciples by a man of great ability, Brother Elías, literally within a few hours of the saint's death.

Now, that letter plainly tells that these wounds, answering to those of Christ on the cross, appeared *non diu ante mortem*; and the implication is, only on his deathbed. Two contemporary chronicles tell us the same, *in morte ejus—à sa mort*. The same is definitely asserted by Cardinal Jacques de Vitry, in a sermon preached before a Franciscan congregation perhaps only four years after the Saint's death, and certainly not very much later. Yet, within a short time, the accredited story within the Order, and the one which is still told by orthodox historians without a hint of doubt, is that the wounds appeared two years earlier, during a retreat in the wilderness of Monte Alverno, which certainly had marked a religious crisis in St. Francis's life. But how had so remarkable a phenomenon remained secret for two years? The answer was, it had not remained secret; and we find a growing stream of little stories how this or that intimate disciple had seen, or touched, and had been commanded to keep silence. So far everything is normal; it is the story of the growth of other legends. But the exceptional thing is that the Alverno story is definitely vouched, in Leo's own handwriting, on a tiny scrap of parchment of undoubted authenticity. He was one of the saint's most inseparable intimates on Monte Alverno, during what we may almost call his Master's Agony in the garden, and he tells us, in two words, that the *stigmata* were there inflicted.

Now, Leo survived Francis by a great many years, and

this was very likely written at the very end of his life. But, whenever written, I must frankly avow my conviction that the writer was hypnotized by the growing legend. That the Franciscans and the public, for some years at least, believed the wounds to have appeared only in Francis's last days, would seem documentarily almost certain. But it was most natural that some should connect it with his Agony on Monte Alverno; most natural that first one, then another, should remember some little rebuff or coldness—for Francis was a changed and suffering man in those last years—and should explain this by the master's anxiety to hide his secret conformity with Christ. When once the tide set strongly that way, it was natural that Leo, searching his own recollections, should find support for the theory, and should fall in with the rest.

My second instance must be given still more briefly. The so-called Portiuncula Indulgence has a mass of early evidence against it. It is true this evidence is mainly negative, of a sort dangerous to press except where it is almost overwhelming; but I cannot help thinking it is almost overwhelming here, and that Sabatier (I say it with all respect) has treated it uncritically. Here, again, our difficulty is that we have a most improbable story for which Leo is said, on good authority, to have vouched. But here he speaks not as a personal witness, and his temptation to hypnotism was even greater.

Now, everything we know of Leo points to an extremely honest man, by no means afraid of inconvenient truths, and full of precious first-hand information. Yet if I am right, even this man could not resist the quiet pressure of beliefs around him—a pressure as unfelt as that of the 30 tons of air which lies on each of our heads as we sit here—yet as necessary to take full account of in any really scientific historical enquiry. The historical student must not forget how much of his duty is negative.

If time permitted, I think I could justify this on utilitarian grounds, and show that this cold and critical attitude may help to save us from Dean Inge's doubts as to human progress. But I would rather end in the words of one of our most remarkable living philosophers, Dr. McTaggart, who had been speaking to an audience of young Cambridge students on the search

for truth. He concluded with a warning and an encouragement which may here be quoted in full :

‘ The crown of our thirst and fasting (for truth) may be the opened heavens and the Beatific Vision. It may be nothing but the thirst and the fasting itself.’

‘ No great inducement, perhaps, all this? And no inducement is needed. There are those who long for truth with a longing as simple, as ultimate, as powerful as the drunkard’s longing for his wine, and the lover’s longing for his beloved. They will search, because they must.’⁴

⁴ *Dare to be Wise.*

MIRACLE AND SCRIPTURE

By B. W. BACON, LL.D., D.D., Professor of N.T. Exegesis in
Yale University.

WE listened yesterday to a grandly conceived outline of the change in our conception of man’s place in the universe brought about by the advance of astronomy, biology, geology and kindred sciences. The effect of it upon religious thought, of which we have all been more or less conscious, was then brought home to some of us at least more effectively than ever before, and particularly as respects the new conception of God and Law, and the new conception of miracle. Probably no part of Mr. Hardwick’s admirable paper gave keener satisfaction, however, than its closing sentences, in which the anti-mechanistic trend of recent discovery was pointed out. The collapse of a mode of thought which once seemed to make of the universe a closed system, eliminating personality and free will as illusions, interpreting God and man alike in terms of matter and energy; has brought a sense of relief to the spirit, as when some oppressing incubus of darkness is lifted with the morning light. Science becomes ‘exact’ by virtue of abstraction. It is often the remainder from which the abstraction has been made—the unsifted residuum, so to speak—which contains the substance of supreme value.

Nevertheless, I cannot wholly sympathize with the application which some immediately make. It is not permissible to revive the old simile of the Bridgewater Treatises, and talk of the possible supervening of a new system of law and natural causation, as in the case of the clock so constructed that after

a given period it would begin to run in a quite different way, or that of water, which to the inhabitant of the temperate zone has properties that might seem miraculous to a native of Sierra Leone. The sight of a man walking across a frozen lake would seem to the African 'miraculous' just so long as he attributed it to a new kind of causation, that of 'personal' or 'spiritual' intervention, and no longer. As soon as the observer 'understands' the new mechanism, or the new law (that is, correlates it with previously experienced phenomena) the idea of 'miracle' is banished. This is what Hume means by saying that if at any time convincing testimony to an alleged infraction of natural law were brought, the scientist would merely amend his formula by giving a broader definition to its terms. This, I take it, is also Mr. Hardwick's meaning when he declares that not the specific results of scientific discovery have been most fatal to the traditional idea of 'miracle,' but the general extension of the scientific *method* and *habit of mind*. For example, my auditors, if informed on unimpeachable evidence that an entirely lifeless corpse had been resuscitated in a London hospital, would no doubt use the adjectives 'amazing' or 'wonderful' quite freely; but if they used the word 'miraculous,' they would be careful to explain that it was only in a poetical or accommodated sense. We should expect to see the word 'miracle' in the newspaper head-lines, in very large type. But we should expect with much more assurance to read in the paragraph underneath about some new and ingenious application of artificial respiration. The fact is that the crumbling of a given scientific system does not lead us back to the old ideas of a capricious universe, or of miracle in the old sense of intervention (whether from supernal or infernal regions) of powers not intelligible in terms of the earthly order. It always leads forward toward an ever wider and wider generalization in terms of human reason. We are glad when the 'closed system' of mechanistic materialism breaks down, not because we expect now to escape into the limbo of the irrational, but because we expect an enlargement, a wider horizon, for the 'reign of law.' We shall not cease to make abstractions and to reason from them as 'exact.' We shall only look upon them as first steps in a continuous scale. Scientific method and the

scientific mind will be to us not a creed outworn, but something to which the Apostle's words apply: 'Whereunto we have already attained, by that same rule let us walk.' To science we shall look as the great interpreter of creation: for it is science that has admitted us to the divine Reign of Law. She has been one of those who have taught us to look up and see

' One God, one law, one element,
And one far-off divine event
To which the whole creation moves.'

The official programme places the subject 'miracles' in yesterday's schedule under the heading 'Modern Conceptions of the Universe,' instead of in to-day's under the heading 'Modern Historical Methods.' It seems thus to suggest that the question is one of science and philosophy, a field to which I am a comparative stranger, instead of a question of religious psychology and the laws of testimony, with which I am more familiar. However, Mr. Coulton has just given us abundant proof that whatever be the case in the question of 'miracle' in the abstract, the question of 'the miracles' is pre-eminently a question of oral and written transmission, which can also be studied scientifically. For we have come to mean in modern times by 'the miracles' only those in the canonical books of the Old and New Testaments, regarding them as forming a class by themselves. Or rather we confine ourselves to a still smaller group, for we exclude the wonders which the Biblical writers attribute to evil powers, such as the 'miracles' of Pharaoh's 'magicians' and those worked by the 'witchcraft' of Simon Magus. Now the breaking down of the narrow mechanistic-materialistic conception of the reign of law has undoubtedly given larger room for 'miracle' if we are content to use the word in a frankly adapted or poetic sense. But in the sense intended by the Biblical writers, the true historic sense of the word 'miracle,' there is no such effect. On the contrary 'miracle' in this sense is already obsolete. An explained miracle is no longer a 'miracle' at all. It may be still 'wonderful,' to a diminished extent 'surprising.' It has become entirely *credible*. But it has lost its *evidential* character, and its evidential character was the only element which to the Biblical writers gave it value. Psychical therapeutics

and the phenomena of faith-healing in all ages make most of the healings of Jesus credible substantially as related. They still prove that for which *He* appealed to them, the saving power of God made available by faith. But in so far as they have thus been made credible they cease to prove that for which they are adduced by the evangelists, and by modern apologists who follow them in seeking after a sign. It is almost pathetic to see how the great Biblical archaeologist, Dr. Edward Robinson, could suppose he was promoting the cause of Biblical apologetic in showing how it was quite possible after 'a strong east wind blowing all the night' for those who knew the shoals of the northern extremity of the Gulf of Suez to cross almost dry shod. Israel's great deliverance there (if you made some allowance for dramatic heightening of detail in the stretching out of Aaron's rod and the like) became quite credible. It ceased to be 'miraculous,' and became merely 'providential.' And those who had learned to see God in the providential better than in the miraculous, in the normal and continuous better than in the 'gaps' of His universe, naturally thought the discovery did God service. They were quite unprepared for the storm of denunciation that arose from those who depended on the 'gaps.' But all the same the 'gappers' (if I may use the term) were quite right in saying the biblical writers were not talking of a 'providential' storm, but of a 'miraculous' intervention.

To-day everyone is on the side of the 'higher system of law.' The collapse of mechanistic materialism is welcomed because it seems to leave room for the 'supernatural.' Not, however, the 'miraculous' in the genuine, pre-Copernican sense. Not in the sense of the intervention of supernal (or sometimes infernal) agencies, who set aside the course of nature by the fiat of will or caprice; but in something like the sense Horace Bushnell would give to the term in his *Nature and the Supernatural*, a book whose aim is to draw a somewhat elastic boundary line between these two provinces at the point where personality emerges.

To-day we are all more or less conscious that it is no longer the biblical miracles that carry the doctrine, but the doctrine that carries the miracles. Consequently we are much more concerned to prove them credible than evidential. We imitate

the Alexandrian school of allegorical interpreters who were so convinced that every part of Scripture must be full of divine meaning that they allegorized even the genealogies. To-day we hear it soberly proposed to treat the account of the bodily ascent of Jesus into heaven and session 'at the right hand of God' as a historically veracious record of real events, because it may be said to 'stand for' the triumph of the spirit of Jesus over the power of death. And there are clergymen, I believe, who really think that they have thereby shown that the unknown author whom we call St. Luke was quite correct in what he intended to say! Fortunately for the Church (or let us rather say providentially) the Alexandrian method broke down of its own extravagance. It became speedily apparent that the real authority of Scripture was lost in the effort to defend it, because with this license of fancy anything could mean anything. Alexandrian allegorization was superseded in the fifth century by the great Antiochian school of historical interpretation. Commentators and preachers such as Chrysostom and Theodore of Mopsuestia, if they used a Scriptural phrase or narrative in a different sense from that intended by the writers, did not hesitate to state that such was the case. They saved biblical interpretation from worse charges than mere fancifulness by the straightforward and honest principle that the meaning of Scripture is that really intended by the writers in and for their own age.

Mr. Coulton has shown us that the fancied security of isolation can no more be maintained in the sphere of history than in that of astronomy, biology or geology. There was a time when the stories of miracles in the canonical books of Old and New Testament could be imagined to have a totally different origin and character from those of contemporary literature, even the Apocrypha. It could be held that in this particular department of knowledge, which marks the historian, the sifting of testimony, the biblical writers had been providentially preserved from the errors of all their contemporaries, and even of the great fathers of the Church who succeeded them. This view could be held in spite of the fact that the Scripture writers manifestly share the now obsolete ideas of their time in matters of astronomy, biology and geology. Even

in so near a field as the miracles of magic and witchcraft it has been thought possible since the time of Wesley¹ to build an inner rampart capable of defence when the outwork was abandoned.

There certainly are still a large number of very eminent scholars and theologians who draw this line of discrimination between the miracles of canonical and uncanonical literature. Moreover, they are far from being all of the Roman faith, which does not press men to such narrow limits either as respects books to be included in the canon, or as respects the cessation of miracles at a particular time. But Protestant divines who believe that Scripture testimony is invalidated if the canonical writers are admitted to have shared the misconceptions of their age, and of practically all religious literature down to the nineteenth century, have a supremely difficult task. It will not be found easy to draw a consistent line between the miracles of canonical and of all other contemporary religious literature, including the Apocrypha, nor between those of magicians and apostles. Nor will it be found easy to discriminate between those of the first century of our era and all which followed it, as well as most, if not all, that went before. The difficulty lies no longer in the field of physics and philosophy, but in that of psychology, history and the transmission of oral and written testimony.

Since the matter is still *sub judice*, I must leave it in the hands of the historical critics, merely reminding you that the mere healings and psychic phenomena which Paul refers to as 'spiritual gifts' in common use and largely shared in by himself do not now furnish (if they ever did) the real apple of discord. They are no longer 'miracles' for us, because since the advance of knowledge in the sphere of nervous pathology and psychotherapy, we do not put upon the phenomena (which still occur under similar conditions) the same interpretation as antiquity. Indeed, we cannot too often repeat that a mere wonder or unexplained occurrence, however surprising, is not a 'miracle' (in the biblical sense) without the evidential inter-

¹Charles Wesley was, I think, the last believer in biblical miracle to maintain that those of magic and witchcraft must stand or fall together with those of the servants of God.

pretation. It is not the fact that an earthquake happens that makes it miraculous to our first evangelist or the author of Acts, but that it happens at such a time and in such a way as to make the inference unavoidable that it was the intervening act of a personal, superhuman power. Such healings as that of the woman with the spirit of divination at Philippi, where we have the direct attestation of a first-hand witness,² are no longer incredible, if they ever were; but they become credible only as they cease to be 'miracles' in the sense intended by the writer. The case of Eutychus, who (as the same writer relates) was restored to life by Paul after he had been taken up 'a corpse'³ is equally apposite. No modern observer would see in the recorded words or action of Paul a parallel to the story of Elisha's restoring from the dead the son of his widowed hostess. But we cannot do full justice to this writer's real meaning without admitting that he believed himself to have witnessed the miraculous resuscitation of 'a corpse.' The problem of the historian, in whose hands the matter now lies, is to determine what weight of evidence the documents really afford us in regard to alleged occurrences of a kind which show no likelihood of ever becoming credible in the sense of the healings—stories of the withering of the fig-tree at Jesus' reproof, or of the walking on the sea, or changing water to wine. Is the attestation such that we should look for their explanation in the realm of the still unexplored forces of physics and chemistry, or in that region which affords an almost unlimited range or parallels, the region of religious literature and legend both canonical and uncanonical?

But if the application of the ordinary principles of modern historical research to Scripture and Creed shall result—as seems so inevitable—in breaking down the distinction on this score between the sacred historians and other religious writers of their time, if we find that they accepted uncritically testimony to miracle which we would not, and even interpreted as miracle events of their own experience which to us would at most be only providential, what becomes of Scriptural authority? In

²Acts xvi, 16-18 belongs to the so-called We-sections of Acts, extracts from the diary of a companion of Paul.

³Acts xx, 7-12. Not the word νεκρός in verse 9.

what sense can Christianity be any longer described as the great 'historical' religion?

Whatever be the decision of scholarship after sifting of the attestation in regard to individual miracles, two things I think we may say are already determined, and with these considerations I must close.

First, the question of miracle in the true, historic sense of the word, the scriptural and 'evidential' sense as already defined, is NOT *sub judice*. It is already determined. Even those who still defend miracle do not defend what the writers meant on whose behalf they take up the controversy. All of us together, conservatives and radicals alike, have moved beyond their point of view. The question, then, is only of the extent to which we are willing to apply to the canonical writers the principles of historical criticism which we should apply to the sacred records of other faiths, and should expect their adherents to apply to ours.

Secondly, it is necessary to restate the Doctrine of Sacred Scripture which was formulated in post-reformation days to off-set the Roman doctrine of an infallible Church as the ultimate standard of faith and practice. In a very real and vital sense Christianity is a great—the great—historic faith, since it develops out of the past by true conformity to type. There is a 'continuity of Christian thought' which reaches back not to the pages of the New Testament only, but of the Old Testament as well. But in what sense shall we employ the term? If we say that our fidelity to the historic faith depends upon ability to furnish valid proof of the particular facts recorded by the canonical writers in their whole extent, then you force us back upon the dilemma of the post-reformation dogmatists. It will be hopeless for the average man to pass judgment for himself upon the evidences. He will be compelled to rely as regards all critical questions on authority—either the authority of an infallible Church speaking through its mouthpiece, the Pope, or the authority (not quite infallible) of a body of experts in textual and higher criticism. Those who take the latter course come astonishingly near to reinstating that authoritative body of whom Jesus said that they used the key of knowledge to close the kingdom of heaven, enter-

ing not in themselves and hindering those that would. But surely there is another doctrine of Sacred Scripture besides that of the scribes reinstated by those of the post-reformation age who had forgotten, or else had never known the distinction between 'religions of authority and the religion of the Spirit.' Is it not a commonplace to say that the whole career of Jesus was one long struggle against the scribes, against the effort to transform the faith of the prophets into the religion of the book? Is it not self-evident that the life-conflict of Paul was against the enslavement of the Christian brotherhood by this same legalistic religion of written precept, the religion of the scribe and the law? Did he not stand for the freedom of the Spirit against the letter that killeth, the freedom wherewith Christ has made us free? How, then, does our New Testament solve this problem of the authority of the past, this continuity of the faith?

Whether the Fourth Gospel be written by an Apostle John who became the disciple of Paul in his old age, or by some great Unknown Elder at Ephesus, the definition of Christian authority as against that of Moses, which we find in the dialogue between Jesus and the scribes who charge Him with violation of the Sabbath in the fifth chapter, is most profoundly true. After appealing to the inward witness of the Father in human hearts, where His teaching and life find confirming echo, Jesus draws the contrast between the right use and the scribal use of the Bible. Exposing the futility of the hope to receive immortality as a reward for obedience to a system of written rules, he exclaims: 'Ye search the Scriptures because ye think that in them ye have eternal life. And they are they that testify of me; and ye would not come unto me that ye might have life.'

This is not a doctrine of Sacred Scripture such as one meets in Philo, nor in Josephus. It is not the scribal or rabbinic doctrine. Neither is it, we must confess, the doctrine of the second century Fathers nor of the post-reformation dogmatists. But it is a doctrine which really corresponds to experience, and which emphasizes the true values and not mere incidentals. The fourth evangelist makes Jesus speak as an incarnation of the divine Logos, that eternal Wisdom of God which was His

agent in creation, in revelation, and in redemption. He offers 'the life which is the light of men,' or, as he labours to describe it in the First Epistle, 'the life which was manifested, even the eternal life which was with the Father and was manifested unto us.' In the Scriptures one can come into contact with this eternal life of God in man, and be kindled by it. It is not outward attestation of Pope or scribe that gives it real authority. Its witness is within. Not a magical elevation above and outside the knowledge of its time makes Scripture our perpetual and sufficient guide, but the fact that we find in it a record of religious experiences that may be eternally self-verified within every soul that will put them to the test.

B. W. BACON.

MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF MORALITY

By PROF. F. B. JEVONS, D.Litt., Master of Hatfield College, Durham.

I.

ON the theory of Evolution man, as a physical organism, has been evolved from some lower species of living being; and embryology reinforces the theory by showing that the organism in its pre-natal state passes through stages corresponding to those through which the line of its ancestors passed in the course of their evolution. As a moral being, also, man has been evolved; and in his conceptions of Morality at the present day the stages of his moral evolution may be discerned. Man, even as an animal, like his immediate ancestors, belonged to the class of social animals; and it is in the relations of the individual to his fellows that his morality is manifested. He is born into a community, and it is only as a member of some community that he can survive in the struggle for existence. Every community of social animals has its ways and customs, which exhibit themselves in the conduct of each of its members. Morality, as its derivation from the Latin *mores* shows, has to do with the ways and customs of the community. The term 'ethics,' from *ἔθος*, habit, implies that the customs of the community are the habits of its individual members. Deviations by the individual from customary behaviour always have

been, and still are, discountenanced by society: they are 'tabooed.' The mere fact that they are deviations, unwonted departures, from custom is enough to cause a shock of surprise even in civilized man. In primitive man it caused not merely surprise but alarm and fear: departure from wont and custom was taboo because it was felt to be a danger to the community—and the danger was the more alarming because it was mysterious. No one could say exactly what the danger was, but no one could doubt the danger, for the community, that is, everyone except the transgressor, felt it to be dangerous. On occasions of such transgressions of wont and custom, the community, therefore, is divided: it is divided against the offender; and, as he is a member of the community, the community is divided against itself. What is more, the offender is divided against himself, for though he has violated the wont and custom of the community, he is still a member of the community. Its customs have hitherto been his habits; nor do they wholly cease to be so because he has on this occasion violated them. They still operate on him, still are part of him, and he is divided against himself.

II.

What ensures compliance with the customs of any community is the fact that the community insists on compliance. That is plainly true of communities which are still governed by custom and in which as yet laws and law-givers are unknown. And it is also true of societies in which customs have passed into laws: a law, which it is no longer the custom to observe, ceases, in all but name, to be a law. The difference between a custom which is not yet a law and the custom which has come to be a law is two-fold. A law-giver is an essential part of the conception of law; and a custom becomes a law when the community comes to have a ruler: his business is at first to expound the customs, but eventually his expositions come to be conceived as laws enunciated by him. Or a custom may become a law when it is attributed to the person who first reduced the custom to writing and who was afterwards regarded as the author or giver of the law. Thus the *mores* of a society, the 'ethics' of its members, come in a large measure to be the laws

while continuing still to be the customs of the society; and infractions of the law are punished still with the assent and approval of society, but now by the action of its officials or magistrates. Further, on the analogy of those customs which have been incorporated in the written law, customs which have continued without being so incorporated are regarded as unwritten laws, and violation of them are believed to be subject to punishment by the Divine powers. Thus the morality of a civilized society differs from the wont and custom of an uncivilized community in that it is not only felt as a restraint but regarded as a restriction laid upon the behaviour of the individual by a law-giver, human or Divine, in virtue of authority inherent in him. Moral behaviour, whether merely customary or conceived as imposed by a law-giver or ruler, is essentially conduct regarded as imposed from without upon each and every member of society—and imposed by authority. It is because, or in so far as, behaviour, moral behaviour, is external that the sanctions and authority supposed to enforce it are imagined to be also external. But fear, however necessary a ruler may find its use if he is to enforce his laws, is not the only spring of human action. Love also is operative in man in every—even the earliest—stage of his evolution; and the love of man and wife, of parent and child, is not a mere matter of external behaviour, it cannot be imposed by any external commandment, or enforced by any authority whatever. Moral behaviour, in fine, is the outcome of fear; morality is a restraint upon the individual; but besides the behaviour imposed by authority and proceeding from fear, there are the actions which proceed from love.

III.

Such terms as 'the laws of morality,' 'the moral code,' 'the sanctions of morality,' all imply that the individual tends, in the absence of constraint from without, to pursue his own gratification or pleasure. Pleasure, indeed, may be, and by some systems of morality is, condemned absolutely. But, inasmuch as all men do seek their own pleasure, it seems to some moralists better to base morality on that universal tendency. They are the Hedonists or Utilitarians; and they seek

to show that the pleasure or happiness of each is not fundamentally incompatible with that of society as a whole. Eventually, however, they are forced to admit that in this world, as a matter of fact, the two may be and often are mutually obstructive. Consequently they are further forced to summon in aid of their theory a conception of the next world as a place in which future punishments and rewards will prove that it was worth while for a man in this life to forgo, or rather to postpone, his one and only real purpose throughout, *viz.*, self-gratification. Thus we come back to the old conception of a Divine law-giver; but we are now enabled by the Hedonistic or Utilitarian theory to see the purpose of the Divine enactments and of the sanctions attached to them: that purpose is the ultimate happiness, the perpetual and untainted pleasure, of each and every individual, the unalloyed gratification of every self. So the wheel comes round in full circle: it started from self, and, when its revolution is complete, comes back to self. The self, on this hypothesis, starts in pursuit of pleasure and ends in the full and complete enjoyment of pleasure—in being happy for ever and ever. What more could any self wish for? What more, indeed, can any self wish for? According to Bishop Butler it is both reasonable and according to nature that a man should pursue his own interest. The ‘general desire that a man hath of his own happiness’ Butler terms ‘self-love’; and in Sermon VIII he lays it down that what must finally determine a man’s action is self-love—the self, in the last resort, when ultimately it comes, if ultimately it should come, into conflict with conscience, can only act from love of self.

IV.

All systems of morality involve restraints imposed on the selfish behaviour of individuals—restraints imposed on the individual by the society to which he belongs, and enforced, or supposed to be enforced, by its law-givers, human or Divine. The assumption common to all systems of morality is that the individual thinks only of himself and can only be influenced by considerations of self-interest: in no other way can an external authority ‘get at’ him. As a matter of fact, how-

ever, not even so can a power which is external to him 'get at' him : it may, and to some extent does, determine his behaviour, his outward actions ; it may make his self-interest to lie in this course of behaviour rather than that ; but, even so, the appeal is from selfishness to selfishness. The assumption, in fine, on which the employment of restraint, and the conceptions of law and authority are based, is the assumption that selfishness is the one foundation of all human action. That assumption, however, is false. The simple truth is that man is capable of acting, and does sometimes act, not from selfish fear, but from unselfish love. It is manifest that actions in which unselfish love realises itself are not subject to command, that it is an absurdity for any authority, human or Divine, to say, 'Love me, or else, in this world or the next, I will torture you till you do love me.' The attempt to exact love in obedience to threats and commands is an appeal to selfishness and proceeds upon the assumption that fear—not love—alone is operative on and in man. That morality which is based upon the commands of authority and the threat of punishment necessarily excludes from its purview the operation of love, and, what is more, is essentially incompatible with it. What is done from fear is done from selfishness ; and selfishness thrives only at the expense of love. Fear feeds on selfishness, lives on it, and dies only as it dies.

But the morality which trades on fear, in the name of authority and by means of its sanctions, is (perhaps it will be said) directed against selfishness. True ! and it is directed by selfishness : it is the defence erected by selfishness against the selfishness of others. Theirs, however, cannot be condemned save by the condemnation of one's own ; nor one's own justified without the justification of theirs. From the vicious circle of self—in which morality is entangled—morality can offer us no escape.

V.

Man is divided against himself—divided between love and selfishness—and society which resides in its members, as they reside in it, is itself therefore scarred and rent in all directions, that is in every one of the members in which it resides. An

ideal society, a kingdom of heaven, would have the unity, in which society as it exists on earth is indeed lacking though not wholly deficient. How, then, is unity to be achieved? To some Christians at the present day it appears, as to writers in the Old Testament before them it seemed, as if the fissures with which society, like its members, is rent, could be simply squeezed out and society re-united by pressure from without. God is, then, conceived as a power operating from the outside, as an external Law-giver, Judge and Avenger, while in man there is naught but what is vile. Other Christians there are at the present day who are determined by the influence which from an early date has been exercised on the teaching of the Church by Aristotle, and according to which the good that all men naturally seek is Happiness. I need not here dwell on the fact that the happiness which each man naturally seeks is his own, or that the happiness so sought proves on examination to be pleasure, the gratification of self. I will instead call attention to a fact which should indeed be of greater importance to Christianity than it has actually proved in the past. It is that the word for 'happiness' is nowhere to be found in the Greek Testament: where the English word occurs in the Authorised Version or the Revised Version it is a mistranslation, as a reference to the Greek will show. The absence of the word cannot be a mere accident: if all the writers in the Greek Testament, I will not say shun it, but simply ignore it, there must be a reason for their ignoring it or for their ignorance of it. And the reason, which starts to the eye the moment we reflect on the absence of the word, is that the word 'happiness' does not occur in the New Testament because it was not used by Jesus. Perhaps, however, it will be suggested that its non-occurrence is merely a matter of terminology, solely a question of the vocabulary that happened to be available. But on investigation it will be found that not only the word but the idea connoted by the word 'happiness' is brushed aside by the teaching of Jesus Himself. That becomes plain the moment we recall the Beatitudes: those who hunger and thirst, are reviled and persecuted, cannot be called 'happy,' but they are declared by our Lord to be 'blessed.' His revelation is that blessedness not happiness is the goal to be striven for

by those who would follow His teaching; and blessedness for man is impossible without love, is indeed identical with love—love for God and for one's fellow-man. By it alone is unity, at-one-ment, possible. And the blessedness of God consists in loving: 'God is love,' and, as love, is felt within the heart of man. What in the heart of a man conflicts with such love as he has for his fellow-man is selfishness, the desire for self-gratification, for pleasure, for his own happiness. Love 'seeks not her own': systems of morality are all concerned with the attempt to mark off *meum* from *tuum*, to discriminate my rights from yours, to distinguish your duties from mine, to give to every self that which is his own. The assumption common to them all is that we are selves, not persons; mutually exclusive, not members one of another. On that assumption, on the view that we are fundamentally and essentially atomistic, impenetrable, our relations to one another or to any being whatever, are *ex hypothesi* external; and our relations to one another accordingly are treated by moral systems as being external. That selfishness exists, that men so far as they are selves are selfish, is undeniable; and on that undeniable fact are all systems of morality built. But in man, and in the essence of men as members of society, there is also love—love of man and wife, of parents and child, of man for his fellow-man. That love is not an external relation between atoms—atomistic selves—which are impenetrable and of their very nature mutually exclusive: it implies, as the condition of its mere existence, interpenetrability, interdependence, a unity between those who are members one of another—a unity which, however imperfect, is not only susceptible to decrease, but also capable of increase. In man there is love as well as selfishness. Systems of morality are concerned with the defence of self against other selves: they postulate selfishness as their *point d'appui*; but for it they never would have come into existence; and without it they would have no reason for existence, no possibility of existence. Their function is not the eradication of self, but the control of self from without. Of love, however, the tendency, and when it becomes conscious of itself the aim, is not merely to suppress but to make an end of selfishness. That means—since we are not atomistic, im-

penetrable selves, but members one of another—making an end of selfishness in the society in which we reside and which resides in us. And an end is to be put to it only by long-suffering : only by patiently enduring the selfishness of others—and not as codes of morality teach, by seeking to punish it—can we overcome it. Only so far as love in us overcomes our own selfishness, can we hope to endure the selfishness of others, and by enduring end it. Not by threat of punishment is man's salvation to be procured ; not by the infliction of penalties, but by long-suffering it is that love does its perfect work.

VI.

That long-suffering which is part of our conception of love, which is implied by our experience of it, which we count on in the case of those who love us, and which we ourselves show to those we love, so far as we do indeed love them, is part also of our conception of the divine love, because it is part of our experience of that love. And the long-suffering which God endures is the consequence or counterpart solely of the selfishness of man. That selfishness is sin. It is sin not because it is the transgression of a commandment, or the defiance of authority, but because by it we increase the suffering both of man and of God, our Father, and make the suffering of our Saviour to be of none effect. Here however we may commit the error of identifying pain with evil—a mistake which is the counterpart and accompaniment of identifying blessedness with happiness or pleasure. There is much pain in the world which, as far as we can see, is not the outcome of selfishness, but is an opportunity or occasion on which either selfishness or love may manifest itself. Such pain neither love nor selfishness can evade ; but by it and on it one or other of the two may grow, indeed must grow—one or the other converts it to its own use and purposes. In the one case what was simply pain becomes evil, in the other it is turned to good : the existence of pain is postulated indeed by the occurrence of evil, but pain, so far from being of necessity accompanied or followed by evil, is an opportunity for the manifestation of love. When, however, pain is allowed to be the occasion for the assertion

of selfishness, what was an opportunity for good becomes the occasion of evil. In evil and sin selfishness manifests itself : in love and long-suffering the blessedness of man and of God consists. Between men, as members of society, that is as members one of another, there is some degree of unity; some degree of unity there is also between man and God. What makes the unity imperfect is the selfishness in man; what makes the unity always and for ever possible is the long-suffering, that is the perfect love, of God.

VII.

In modern society Christianity fails to appeal to large classes. For its failure there is a reason; and we may be put on the track of that reason if we note that the failure of Christianity coincides with a revolt against authority. On that coincidence we shall probably all be agreed; but from it different conclusions will be drawn: on the one hand that authority must somehow be strengthened and restored, on the other hand that the fundamental basis of society is not authority, but the love which, imperfect though it be, the members of society have for one another. In England it is in the industrial world, and as the result of the economic forces at work for the last hundred years, that the revolt against authority has come about—and the agents of the revolt have been the Trade Unions. The movement began, indeed, or rather first displayed itself, as a question of wages and of the claim, made by labour and strenuously resisted by those in authority, that workmen should be allowed to combine in trade unions for the purpose of defending themselves against the tyranny of the capitalist—a tyranny felt by the workers a century ago to be intolerable and admitted now by all to have been horrible. But though the movement in its first shape was in appearance merely concerned with the question of wages, in fact it was, as is now becoming manifest, something more: the industrial problem is now, and from the beginning was something more than a question of wages simply; it is beginning to be recognised as a moral question. The worker no longer claims, no longer professes to be satisfied with advancing wages; he has become conscious that he is something more than a mere 'hand' in a

factory, something more than a mere tool in an industrial machine. He has become aware of his personality, conscious that he is not a 'hand' or a tool, but a person; and that, as a person, he as much as his master is a member of that society in which and for the sake of which both alike have their existence. Modern industry is condemned by him because it outrages his personality: it condemns him to submit to regulations and arrangements imposed on him by others who claim to be his masters and to exercise authority over him. His view, on the other hand, is that society is based not on authority, but on the mutual co-operation of its members; that no one, and no section, of them is 'master' of the others, or can have 'authority' to bid them do his will and pleasure. He and they, they as much as he, are fellow-labourers: each is indispensable to the other, but that indispensability is reciprocal—to neither does it give any authority over the other.

Thus the revolt against authority proves to be the outcome, both logical and emotional, of the fact that we are all members—not masters—one of another. This may throw some light on the question why the revolt against authority has synchronised and largely coincided with the failure of present day Christianity to retain its hold on the men of this country. Jowett in one of his letters said:

'The Churches are so worldly and so much allied to the interests of the higher classes.'

And the reason why they have failed to retain their hold upon the men of this country, and are beginning to lose their hold upon the women, may be that the Church is now substantially as in the past it has been wholly, on the side of authority, and that it still prefers to assume the tone of authority rather than to speak with the voice of love. In so doing it has forgotten the truth which labour is now re-discovering for itself, that we are all members—not masters—one of another. During the last hundred years the labourer has succeeded in creating and developing his trade unions in the face of the bitter opposition—the cruel and unjust exercise of 'authority'—on the part of those who enjoyed the wealth and made the laws of the country. The labourer has succeeded because from the first he has understood, or rather has felt, that for the sake

of his fellows a man must be prepared to sacrifice self. For a century he has not only felt that truth, but has repeatedly acted on it; he has learnt that he and his fellows are members one of another, and he has learnt that lesson in the school of suffering and not from the teaching of the Church. A Church that bases itself on authority cannot countenance revolts against authority. But some of its members may perhaps be led to ask themselves whether religion, pure and undefiled, is based on authority, is something imposed from without, and engaged in enforcing the codes of morality whereby selves seek to protect themselves from one another, or whether it is the expression of love—of a love which cannot be imposed by any authority or enforced by any code of morality, which seeks to escape from the trammels of self and, so far as it succeeds in escaping, constitutes the bond which unites the human personality and the Divine.

A Church may insist that it is based upon authority; its clergy may preach that God demands obedience to the authority of the Church, with the result of turning many hearts from God. If so, let us ponder the words of Jowett in one of his letters to a lady:

‘My dear child, you must believe in God, whatever the clergy say.’

THE EVOLUTION OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS

By CANON GLAZEBROOK, D.D., Author of *The Faith of a Modern Churchman*.

THE subject put down for this morning is so large that Professor Jevons, with all his mastery, has wisely confined his paper to a part of it. He has traced, with admirable clearness, the history of morality as a coercive force. First the custom of the human hive, obeyed by instinct; then, when the hive becomes self-conscious, a code of rules formulated by a law-giver, and therefore external; then a law whose authority is divine, but external still, and therefore provoking reaction; then the Christian conception of an inner principle of love, combating and overcoming selfishness; then the reaction of

ecclesiastical Christianity, which transformed Christian love into a new external law; and lastly an instinctive, largely unconscious, return towards the teaching of Christ on the part of millions who reject his name, but have some dim idea that brotherhood may take the place of authority, love the place of law. Having the happiness to be largely in agreement with Professor Jevons, I propose to make but one remark upon his paper. I wish to point out how his third section, which speaks of the effect of converting custom into law, was anticipated by St. Paul. In a wonderful chapter, the seventh of Romans, he gives his own experience as typical of that of mankind. The innocent child acts upon impulse, untrammelled by conception of right and wrong. He is happy, free and beautiful, because unconscious of evil. But the growing boy soon learns that impulses must be checked. The law which says 'Thou shalt not,' while it baulks his desires, teaches him to look within and realise their nature. 'I had not known lust, except the law had said thou shalt not covet.' The first effect of this experience is revolt. The impulse which was innocent while unconscious, when it is checked and thereby aggravated and made self-conscious, becomes lust. Sin becomes a power in the soul. 'When the commandment came, sin sprang to life and I died.' Thus begins the life-long struggle of a divided will. The man who has learned that the true realization of self is possible only in the spiritual, wrestles with the early habit which sought realization in the material. So we have the cry, 'Oh, wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?'

Behind St. Paul's picture of the individual stands the larger figure of early humanity—a simple race, innocent as the South Sea Islanders 200 years ago were innocent, because unconscious custom was their guide. But custom and impulse cannot guide a community beyond a certain point. With social progress comes the need of formulation. The acceptance of law means that some impulses are checked, that some spirits are roused to revolt, that some acts which passed as natural are reprov'd as crime, that some men are condemned as rebels against society, or sinners against God.

A civil code, like the Roman, speaks of crime; a religious

code, like that of Israel, speaks of sin. To both alike St. Paul's remark applies: 'Sin is not imputed when there is no law.' Law, which teaches men to recognise sin, which rouses revolt and multiplies transgression, is in fact the great educator of mankind, a schoolmaster to bring them to Christ. For it is all the while leading them to seek the realization of self, not in the material and temporal, but in the spiritual and eternal. And so the sense of sin, the misery which comes from recognising the conflict between our duty as spiritual creatures and our impulses as animals, though it looks like a degradation which mars the fair face of a primitive existence, is in truth a troubling of the waters by an angel of healing. That is what enables us, in spite of all the sorrow in a sinful world, to look upon human history with hopefulness. Through the long ages which reach from the earliest recorded time to our own, we can see law doing its work, forcing on the struggle between spirit and flesh, and so securing the slow 'victory of the spirit.' A very slow victory! The world as a whole is yet very far from the Kingdom of God; but still, for mankind as for each individual, there is a divine answer to the question: Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?

You will recognise that St. Paul, if I have interpreted him truly, supplies both a supplement and a criticism of Professor Jevons' view of the function of law. But I may not enlarge upon that. My main object is to suggest some thoughts which are complementary to those to which we have listened with so much interest. We have been taught how to regard morality objectively—as law and its breach. Let us now look at it subjectively—as sin and the consciousness of sin.

Let us start, as the syllabus bids, with the evolution of man's conceptions of sin. Your time and my knowledge will not allow me to go further back than early Israel. It will take us long enough to ask of successive ages these two questions: What is the nature of sin? and What is the cause of sin?

The view presented by the history of the judges and early monarchy may be summarized in a few words. Three principles seem to determine the early conception of sin. (1) It is only actions that count, intention goes for nothing; words are mere breath, ignorance is no excuse. (2) Moral relations do

not extend beyond the limits of kinship. An Israelite could not sin against a foreigner. (3) The wrath of Jehovah does not visit acts which are not breaches of his people's custom. A sin, in fact, is a deed which involves either disobedience to Jehovah's oracle, or encroachment upon his rights, or a breach of such moral rules (and they were few) as his people recognise.

The great prophets of the eighth and ninth centuries elevated men's conceptions of God and duty. They taught that moral duties came before ritual, and that pride and impiety, luxury, greed and cruelty were offences against God. They thus began a movement from the outward to the inward which was continued in the exile. The collapse of Israel as a political community, and its conversion into a Church, was favourable to personal religion. Some of the best psalms and the wisdom literature show how far some of the Jews recognized sin as a principle rather than an act, an attitude towards God rather than the observance of ceremony. But tradition proved too strong when emphasized by the sufferings of the Maccabaeon age. In the reaction which it caused, an anxious correctness of behaviour towards God, combined with a licensed hatred of all men who were not Jews, made morality once more obedience to law rather than a spirit of life. Sin was not selfishness, the negation of love : it was little more than the breach of a set of external commands which began, 'Thou shalt not.'

Then came the revolution. Our Lord's teaching about sin is given in four immortal phrases. When He said to the astonished Pharisees : 'Not that which entereth into the mouth defileth the man, but that which proceedeth out of the mouth,' He made his definition of sin depend, not upon mere action, but upon character and intention. The second step was to determine the standard by which character and intention were to be measured. 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbour as thyself.' The third step was to change the test of love from negative to positive. The great Rabbi Hillel had already said, 'Do not unto others what ye would not they should do unto you.' That useful but uninspiring rule became a living principle when it was transformed by a simple change : 'Do unto others as ye would they should do unto you.' The final step was taken when, in the great

vision of judgment, the Son of Man was made to say to those whose goodness had been merely negative: 'Inasmuch as ye did it not unto the least of these my brethren, ye did it not unto me. Depart from me, ye cursed.'

In pursuance of these principles Jesus gives a wholly new classification of sins. The most heinous are those which are most directly opposed to the principle of love. Such are pride and cruelty, the oppression of the weak, the misleading of the ignorant, and the selfishness which is content to do nothing when there are deeds to be done. In the second class we find sins of impulse and passion. Dante was the true interpreter of his master when he placed Paolo and Francesca in the second circle of the *Inferno*, but hypocrites and false counsellors in the eighth, and traitors in the ninth. In the third place come sins of ignorance. 'He that knew not his Lord's will, and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes.' For sins against ritual, as such, there is no place. Their case is removed to another court, where they are to be judged by the law of edification. 'The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath.'

Need I point out how widely and how constantly ecclesiastical Christianity has departed from Christ's conception of sin? It would take hours to exhibit in detail the contrast between Christ's teaching and the ideas which lie behind the asceticism of the fourth century, the brutality of the twelfth, the carnival of the Renaissance, the religious wars of the sixteenth century, and the rival movements of the nineteenth. Taking all that for granted, let us ask what are the reasons of these contrasts.

The most obvious is the influence of the Old Testament, misunderstood by ignorance and misapplied by superstition. A decadent age, like the fifth century, or a barbarous age like the twelfth, or an adolescent age like the sixteenth, could find authority in its pages for all those lower conceptions of sin against which the revelation of Christ was a protest.

This was because those generations learned by nature, and were taught by tradition, to regard the cause of sin as one or other generation of Israelites had done. Before the exile, the general answer to the question, Who caused man to sin? was, God caused it. Even the prophets who insist most on

man's responsibility are firm in ascribing to God the origin of the offences which he punishes. The exile, reacting against that view, found the source of sin in Satan, whose existence the logic of events appeared to demand, or in the fall of Adam, or in the inherent corruption of matter. As about the nature of sin, so about its cause, the Christian teaching made a revolution. Not from the Gospels, but from St. Paul (as I have tried to show) we learn how a new path of thought was opened.

But the Church soon turned aside from that new path. For many centuries it was left untrodden and blocked up by the growths of patristic and mediaeval speculation. It was easy for the generations which followed St. Paul to accept and emphasize the Hebraic conceptions of sin to which his mind sometimes returned. His great conception of an ordered spiritual progress, which (just because it was new) was imperfectly formulated and hard to understand, found none to welcome or develop it until our own age, trained in the philosophy of evolution, was able to receive it with intelligent sympathy. For us it is not hard to believe that the progress of man, whether individually or in societies, depends upon his will to realize himself in the spiritual rather than in the material sphere. That progress, we believe, is God's ordinance; and every relapse, every instance in which the will declines from the higher to the lower, is a sin.

Augustine did not believe it, Aquinas did not believe it, Calvin did not believe it, the authors of our ninth article did not believe it—and all for the same reason. They were all bound fast to the fall of Adam and original sin. They all assumed, in defiance of natural history and commonsense, that natural desires are in themselves sinful. Some of them travelled backward the path which the Jews had trodden, and instead of attributing sin to the flesh, or Satan, or Adam, ascribed its origin to the will of the Creator who had predestined the bulk of mankind to eternal misery.

Nor were the theologians alone. As we were reminded in Mr. Hardwick's paper, the materialist scientific teachers of the nineteenth century, whether they believed in a God or not, held a doctrine which is essentially the same as that of the early Hebrews. For, according to them, the power (whatever it was)

that produced man determined his actions and yet punished them with a pitiless rigidity of consequence. Probably John Stuart Mill would be surprised, and perhaps annoyed, to find himself classed with Amos: but in point of fact Amos was the more advanced thinker, for (in defiance of logic) he asserted man's responsibility.

The dawn of this century was brightened by a double reaction. While science, as Mr. Hardwick told us, renounced its false materialistic metaphysics, and acknowledged a spiritual principle in the universe, theology learned enough from science to lead it back towards the teaching of Christ and St. Paul. In a remarkable report issued in 1916 by a joint committee of which Bishop Gore was the leader, representatives of all the English Protestant Churches pronounced that sin lies only in the will. That was not a complete statement. But it clears the ground of a vast accumulation of patristic and scholastic hay, wood and straw, and leaves it open for a new erection of gold or jewels upon the one foundation laid by Christ.

Consider one or two of the implications of that pronouncement. If sin resides in the will, all lists of sins, classified according to a traditional estimate of their heinousness, are superseded, and we can replace them by an estimate based upon the principles of our Lord Himself.

If sin resides in the will, it is when man wills to identify himself with his lower nature in opposition to the higher.

If sin resides in the will, it is because the will alone can make that breach of love which separates him alike from God who is his Father, and men who are his brothers.

I do not know enough of the modern Labour movements to venture upon a criticism of Professor Jevons' assertion—which sounds rather paradoxical—that the proclamation of a class war is really a vigorous though rather tactless expression of a desire for brotherhood. I would gladly believe it to be so. If it be, then it may be said that not only Christian theologians and leaders of science, but also millions to whom science and theology are equally strange, are feeling for a Christian conception of social order, in which morality means not obedience to an external law of conduct, with suffering for

sanction, but the identification of man's will with the will of God; and in which sin is not this or that act, but the attitude of mind which turns man away from beholding the face of God his Father and from active benevolence to his brother man.

Revived and enriched by eighteen centuries of experience, the Christian conception of sin is able to embrace and correlate the doctrine of vicarious suffering, which has long been a stumbling block, but a stumbling block which cannot be removed, because it is founded deep in the religious thought of most nations. In its crude form, though stated with all the eloquence of St. Paul or Deutero-Isaiah, the belief that divine justice demands suffering to balance sin, but the suffering need not be that of the sinner, revolts the modern conscience. Yet under the crude form lies a truth which the modern conscience, no less than the ancient, finds to be indispensable: and without it no conception of sin can be other than superficial. If there is any principle as to which good men of all creeds are at one, it is that all redemptive service done for mankind has its root in sympathy. And sympathy in its full sense means not merely feeling *for* another, but feeling *with* him, sharing his pain, his weakness, his sorrow. The rich man who lives among the poor in a city slum; the pure and refined woman who shelters the prostitute; the missionary who settles among a colony of lepers, knowing well that sooner or later he must contract their loathsome disease; the patriot, who challenges death in the hope that even his murderers may thereby be made free; all these, and such as these, without the glamour of martyrdom, do offer themselves as a sacrifice on behalf of men and women who will never be conscious of their debt, unless they are redeemed and their eyes opened. And this is no exception to the rule. Look where we may upon human life, past or present, we find a law that he who would uplift a fellow man must bow down to his level: he who would relieve suffering must in a very real sense share it. What is the reason of the law? we long to ask. There is no answer. That law is part of the mystery of pain which baffles our thought. Yet there are two features of the law which soften its awful sternness. One is the truth that sympathy, like mercy, blesses him that gives as well as him that takes. Which of all the martyrs of humanity

would wish his sufferings annulled, on condition that his achievements were blotted out?

The other, and more important, feature is this. This law of redemption, though it cannot solve the mystery of pain, enables us to acknowledge the mystery without impugning the divine justice. For it is one thing to affirm that pain is so acceptable to God that one man's pain may excuse his fellow's sin. It is another thing to recognise an universal law, of which the Incarnation offers the supreme example, that he who would redeem his brother must share his pain. Those who have learned to believe that this law is inherent in the divine nature as well as the human have acquired a new motive for shrinking from sin: for they understand that it involves a measure of suffering, not retributive but sympathetic, not only for their brethren on earth but also for their Father in heaven.

INSPIRATION AND INFALLIBILITY

By the Rev. ALFRED FAWKES, M.A.

THE notion of Inspiration is an early and an obvious one. It is akin to that of breath, or breathing. Inspiration, in the active sense of the word, is the breathing of life into, in the passive it is the introsusception of the life so communicated by, a recipient; and in each case it proceeds from an agent which possesses and has the power of transmitting this life. So the earlier of the two Creation stories tells us that 'the Lord God breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life'—*inspiravit spiraculum vitæ* (Gen. ii, 7, *Vulgate*); breath and spirit, or life, being regarded as one and the same thing. In Job xxxiii, 4, we have

'The Spirit of God hath made me,
And the breath of the Almighty giveth me life.'

Its withdrawal is death:

'If God gather unto himself his spirit and his breath
All flesh shall perish together' (Job xxxiv, 14);

and its incoming is resurrection: 'the breath came into them,' says Ezekiel (of the dry bones), 'and they lived' (xxxvii, 16). And the Psalmist (civ, 29):

'When thou takest away their breath they die,
And are turned again to their dust.'

When thou lettest thy breath go forth, they shall be made,
And thou shalt renew the face of the earth.'

2. The word Inspiration is used, in particular, to denote a more than ordinary power, or degree of life, in the inspired person or work. So in Job :

'There is a spirit in man,
And the inspiration (or Breath, R.V.) of the Almighty giveth him
understanding.' (xxxii, S.).

We speak of an 'inspired' poem, or poet, or leader, or orator, or artist: and an apostolic writer (II Timothy iii, 16) describes the qualities which belong to all Scripture which is *θεόπνευστος*, or inspired by God; it is also 'profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, for instruction which is in righteousness.' Above all, when, on the evening of the first Easter, Jesus came and stood in the midst of his disciples, 'He breathed on them'—*ἐνεφύσησεν*; it is the same word as that used in Genesis ii, 7, lxx, and this (St. John xx, 22) is its only appearance in the New Testament—'and saith unto them, *Λάβετε πνεῦμα ἁγίου*. Our English translation, 'Holy Ghost,' used with the definite article, suggests theological conceptions which are not found either in the text, or in the Vulgate *Accipite Spiritum sanctum*. It would be an anachronism to see in the words a reference to the Third Person of the Trinity of the later creeds.

As a recent commentator observes :

'Ces précisions ne sont pas dans la pensée de l'auteur, qui ne songe pas à la procession du Saint-Esprit, ni aux sacraments ecclésiastiques de la confirmation et de l'ordre. Comme le Créateur a soufflé sur le premier homme, afin de lui communiquer la vie naturelle (Gen. ii. 7), le Christ glorifié souffle sur ses apôtres, pour leur communiquer le don de vie éternelle qu'ils doivent transmettre à toutes les âmes de bonne volonté. Ce tableau symbolique ne demande pas à être interprété au moyen de syllogismes trop rigoureux.'¹

And though the word has often been used in a loose—*i.e.* a material and mechanical—sense, the prophet being compared to the lyre and the Spirit to the *plectrum*, or his inspiration held to be a divine mania, or frenzy, in which he is passive and, as it were, driven by the wind, its literary associations have kept it in touch with its proper signification, and made the transition easy from the false meaning of the word to the true.

¹ Loisy. *Le Quatrième Evangile*, p. 912.

3. Now this inspiration, in the sense of possessing or being possessed by the Spirit, is in the New Testament the distinctive note of the Christian: 'if any man have not the spirit of Christ, he is none of his.' These words must be taken not in a metaphorical, but in their strict and literal sense. The thing declared itself. To have the Spirit of Christ was not to be what we now call, somewhat vaguely and colourlessly, 'a good man,' but to possess such gifts as those enumerated in I Cor. xii—'the word of wisdom, the word of knowledge, faith, healings, workings of miracles, prophecy, discernings of spirits, divers kinds of tongues, the interpretation of tongues.' The spiritual man led another life than his own; he thought other thoughts, spoke other words, acted under another impulse and direction: the atmosphere of Apostolic Christianity was electric; it was more unlike our own than we can conceive. But, even in our Lord himself, the supreme type of the *πνευματικός*—'the authority which he claimed was that of the Spirit of God'²—the notion of inspiration, or speaking in the Spirit, did not (it is clear) include that of infallibility. 'He that is not against you is for you'; 'he that is not with me is against me'; 'I and the Father are one'; 'the Father is greater than I'; the important, but discrepant, sayings on Divorce recorded in Mark x, 1-12, and Matthew xix, 3-12:—all these are conceived by the Evangelists as pneumatic utterances, and as authoritative on the pneumatic level. But it is clear that none of them is conceived as formally infallible; because in each couplet it is impossible to harmonize the two.

4. In the theological schools, however, if the notion of Inspiration did not actually pass over into that of Infallibility—or formal immunity from error of whatever kind—it came very near doing so. The Bible was regarded not as a record of life and as a means of grace—which it is—but as a divinely guaranteed handbook of history and ecclesiastical dogma—which it is not.

The Reformation emphasized this: the sacred writers were described by Protestant theologians as amanuenses, or copying clerks, writing to the dictation of the Holy Ghost. The study of Scripture has corrected these extravagances in the Reformed

²*Acts of the Apostles.* Foakes Jackson and Kirsopp Lake, I, 285.

Churches; but the official Catholic teaching remains what it was in the sixteenth century. The Vatican Council, indeed, sharpened the edge of the Tridentine decree. *Spiritu sancto inspirante conscripti, Deum habent auctorem*: the Sacred Books have God for their author; this is unquestionably the meaning of that famous phrase.

Their inspiration resided, it was held, in their authoritative statements of what were believed to be facts. Scripture, as such, was inspired in this sense of the word; it contained an enormous number of propositions in every conceivable subject matter; and these propositions were infallible—*i.e.* exempt from error in whatever sense and of whatever kind. One of the questions, indeed, discussed by theologians is whether it is *de fide* that Tobias' dog wagged his tail on his return home, as the book of Tobit (xi, 9, Vulgate) relates. The veriest sceptic need not doubt it; dogs are accustomed to show their satisfaction in this way.

5. The vigorous, if misapplied, logic of the schoolmen saw that an infallible teaching presupposed an infallible teacher, or exponent; and that the infallibility of Scripture postulated that of the Church. But 'The answer of the Church to enquirers—which is to take refuge in its own authority—can only (says Pattison) be practically tendered where there is an infallible living authority, as in the chair of St. Peter.'³ When in 1870 the Vatican Council extended the infallibility of the Church to the Pope, the definition was as necessary in logic as it was false in history: it was the final step of a process in which the conclusion inevitably followed the premises in which it had all along been contained. Surprise has sometimes been expressed at the uncompromising attitude of modern Romanism towards Biblical science; a Church in whose Rule of Faith Tradition and its own authority certainly bulk larger than Scripture could afford, it might seem, to tolerate a certain latitude in this particular field. Father Tyrrell, with his usual acuteness, points out why this is not so.

'Nothing that Fathers, Councils, or Tradition have said of the Church's Infallibility is half so strong as what they have said of the Infallibility of Scripture: and, if the latter conception has to be gravely

³*Sermons.* Mark Pattison (p. 214).

modified, the former cannot hope to escape a corresponding modification.⁴

In this connection the Encyclical of Leo. xiii, *Providentissimus Deus* (1893), the Decree of the Inquisition *Lamentabili sane*, followed by the Encyclical of Pius x, *Pascendi Dominici Gregis* (1907), and the various *Responsa* of the Biblical Commission, should be consulted. Catholicism lives on its presumed infallibility, and *Un prêtre détruit rarement l'autel dont il vit*.

6. It is of the first importance to distinguish the two notions, Inspiration and Infallibility. That of Inspiration is real, spontaneous, spiritual—it lives and moves. That of Infallibility, place it where we will, is an Idol of the Theatre, to which nothing in the world of reality corresponds. 'I am satisfied (says Dr. Arnold) that Church authority, whether early or late, is as rotten a staff as was ever Pharaoh King of Egypt: it will go into a man's hand to pierce him.'⁵ To the unsophisticated mind the former, Inspiration, is luminous and intelligible, while the latter, Infallibility, is obscure and meaningless. But for the sophisticated of a later age, who live far from the sources and roots of life, formula takes the place of thought and convention that of reality. To get at the notion of Inspiration requires a certain imaginative effort and a certain sense of the actual. Both are instinctive to the natural man, but both presuppose powers which have been to a great extent lost in our artificial civilisation; we must throw ourselves back into the mind of a past that has gone out of sight and memory; and to do so requires an at least elementary process of observation, comparison and reflection. To this persons who live on their daily paper and on the weekly religious organ of their sect are unaccustomed and unequal. Such people find the repetition of a catchword easier than the exercise of the rational activities of life.

8. The claim to infallibility is sometimes urged with a certain truculence: 'then began he to curse and to swear.' People of a certain temperament never think; they always know. And, like Lord Peter in *A Tale of a Tub*, they back their pronounce-

⁴Letters of George Tyrrell (p. 81).

⁵Isaiah xxxvi, 6. Cf. Stanley's *Life of Dr. Arnold* (p. 360).

ments by strange oaths. The Vatican definition of Papal Infallibility ends, according to precedent, with the clause: 'If any man shall presume to contradict this definition (which may God avert), let him be anathema.' And a well-known Catholic apologist of to-day silences opposition with the sweep and swing of a bludgeon: 'I belong (he tells us) to a Church which happens to know.' Well, he says so, and it says so. But, though it is perhaps a coincidence, when the distinctive assertions of this Church 'which happens to know' deal with matters of ascertained or ascertainable fact—*e.g.* with history, or science, or criticism—they are with few exceptions demonstrably untrue; and this disinclines us to accept them when they pass over into transcendental subject matter—speculative philosophy or theology *e.g.*—where they cannot be tested. It is of course conceivable that this Church 'happens to know' in this latter province; but it is certain that it 'happens not to know' in the former. And plain men are of the mind of Falstaff's tailor. They must have better security for Sir John than Bardolph—and for Catholicism than its apologists. They 'like not the security.' The special pleading of controversialists dealing *e.g.* with such a case as that of Galileo *versus* the Inquisition, or Pascal *versus* the casuists can only be described as impudent. It recalls Mr. Sludge the medium, who, when he is detected, pleads first fault.

'Just this once!

This was the first and only time, I'll swear.'

So that what it comes to is—that, whereas we expected to find a guide who would always lead us right, what we do find is a guide who has an ingenious rather than a plausible excuse to make every time he leads us wrong. Better surely the noble words of the Pope in *The Ring and the Book*. His judgment may be mistaken—he knows it. If so:

'What other should I say than "God so willed!
Mankind is ignorant; a man am I:
Count ignorance my sorrow, not my sin."'

9. If, however, a statement is made often enough and loudly enough, people who do not think for themselves—and they are the enormous majority—are persuaded that there is something in it. This is the secret of advertising: and advertising no doubt pays, or enterprising tradesmen would not advertise.

Well, there are Churches and Church parties which court publicity for their wares by similar methods, and (for all I know) with similar success. Ours is not of their number: it is a Church which, desiring to know, is content to learn. In religion, as elsewhere, we acquire knowledge by the natural use of our faculties; and it can be acquired in no other way. How much of what is called religious controversy is rather political than religious! *Toutes vos démarches sont politiques*, said Pascal to the Jesuits of his time. And, at best, to believe on authority is to live on the extreme fringe of life, and at second hand. This is dangerous; there are penalties attached to believing wrongly which we do not escape because we are ignorant or deceived. For our beliefs have an ethical side; there are beliefs which a man ought not to hold, and holds at his own risk. And the penalty of this particular belief—that in Infallibility—is that those who hold it fall out of the world movement. While, as a wise man reminds us,

‘The wish to be carried in another’s arms, to be led blindfold, to be delivered from one’s inevitable responsibilities is more natural than supernatural; and is one on which a priesthood of any kind is naturally tempted to play.’⁶

10. The figment of Infallibility was the keystone of the legal conception of Christianity which came in with the disappearance of the spiritual gifts of the first age, and the sudden increase of the community when the little flock became a World-Church. It is to be regretted that so much of the discussion of this important subject has been diverted to the side-issue of Papal Infallibility. This is part of a larger question, the Infallibility of the Church; whether we understand by the word Church the teaching and ruling hierarchy, or the *consensus fidelium*. On this point the whole controversy, not only between the Church of Rome and the Reformed Churches, but between criticism and tradition—I had almost said between civilisation and barbarism—turns.

11. The intellectually unregenerate love hard lights and strong colours. They ‘cannot bear to doubt’; they demand a greater certainty than our human conditions allow of; they are intolerant of those half-lights and of that haze on the horizon which nature is never without either in thought or in things.

⁶*Letters of George Tyrrell* (p 268).

Even among Protestants Infallibility has come to be associated with Scripture and its traditional interpretation. It saves us a trouble which we were never meant to be saved—the trouble of thinking. I remember a somewhat dogmatic Evangelical bishop of whom it used to be said that the difference between him and the Pope was no more than this—the Pope never *could* be wrong; but Bishop Baring never *was*. The representatives of the Oxford Movement, in particular, took for granted that Christ ‘must’ have provided his followers with *some* infallible guide to truth; the only question was, where was this infallible guide to be found? ‘Must’ is a dangerous word to use in connection with the Divine action. We do not know what God ‘must,’ or ‘should,’ or ‘could’ have done; but we do sometimes know what, as a matter of fact, He has, or has not, done. And the result of this gratuitous assumption on their part was that the most consistent of them ended in accepting the Church of Rome as this infallible guide. No other Church was bold enough to claim infallibility; judgment therefore went by default. So *e.g.* we find Cardinal Newman speaking of our Church as ‘the City of Confusion’—what Pattison calls ‘the mere mechanical association of the unthinking members of the Catholic Church’—hypnotized that great dialectician—and of the ‘stammering lips of its ambiguous formularies.’ And one of our own Church papers deplores what it calls our ‘Lack of Guidance’; and complains that

‘The Churchman who desires to know the teaching of the Church is obliged, in default of any clear guidance from the leaders of his own Church, to find in the Roman Communion the definite guidance which his own Fathers in God ought to furnish.’⁷

This writer does not indeed use the word Infallibility, but what he demands is little, if at all, short of it. ‘The Bishops,’ he tells us, ‘are either the organ of the Holy Ghost, or they are nothing’! ‘Either—or’—this foolish phrase is responsible for more than half the fallacies which haunt the human understanding. There is an alternative. The bishops are highly placed officials; excellent in intention, less excellent, perhaps, in action: in other words, they are respectable, but limited, men.

⁷*Memoirs*, p. 210.

⁸*The Challenge*, November 3rd, 1916.

12. And the Church of Rome, for which some of us have the admiration of those who see a mixed multitude from without, is a *terra incognita* to English Churchmen: one hears the most grotesque statements made about it in Convocation and even in Parliament, by preachers and politicians, not only in the clerical but in the lay press. No body in Christendom is less like—shall we say?—the Anglo-Catholic Congress. It can exploit fanatics, but to no Church is fanaticism as such more foreign; it uses dogma and theology, but it uses them for ulterior ends, and as pawns on the chess-board: Kings, Queens, Castles, Bishops, Knights—all count for more in the game. I do not say that these ulterior ends are bad; they are certainly not believed to be so by those who pursue them. But they are political first and religious second; the Latin mind is positive, and sees concrete values more readily than ideal. I remember a Consultor of the Inquisition, who was also a member of the Commission appointed by Leo XIII. in 1896 to consider the question of Anglican Orders, saying to me that, if Rome thought that ‘good could be done in England’ by the recognition of these Orders, no theological considerations against it would be allowed to stand in the way. Under Pius IX., indeed, two so-called ‘pious opinions’ were raised to the rank of defined dogmas—the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin, and the Infallibility of the Pope. But the Pontificate of Pius IX. was as exceptional in the intellectual order as that of Alexander VI. was in the moral. ‘Should the need arise, another Leo (wrote Newman in 1874) will be given us for the occasion.’⁹ The phrase seems prophetic: Leo XIII., who was in the line of the greater Pontiffs, succeeded Pius IX.

He was a more normal Pope than either his predecessor or his successor.

As a rule the Popes are chary of committing themselves; their infallibility, like the talent hidden in the earth, is rather possessed than used. To take a recent instance. Were the important condemnations of Modernism by Pius X. in 1907 infallible utterances? It is, I believe, open to question; it has been argued by Catholics, who accepted them without hesita-

⁹ *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*, p. 101.

tion, that they were not, because it is doubtful whether they satisfy the conditions laid down by the Vatican Definition. Well, if in the case of so authoritative a Pope as Pius X., condemning a system which he described as *omnium haereseon collectum*¹⁰—an aggregate of all the heresies—it is doubtful whether he did so infallibly, then Infallibility seems to be rather ornamental than serviceable. One hears of ladies who possess diamonds of great value, but who keep them at their banker's, and wear imitation ones for safety's sake. The Popes seem to act in much the same way. For the temper of Rome is legal and political, not theological or moral. We have seen two notable examples of this in our time; the silence of Rome during the moral crisis of the late war, and its failure to condemn the recent assassinations in Ireland. What are we to think of an Infallibility which denounces Modernism, but does not denounce Murder? Even in theology, with the rarest possible exceptions, the Popes have followed, not led, opinion. They were frankly not interested in ideas; and proscribed only those which seemed dangerous to their political interests; they were restrained, ordinarily, both by indifference and by fear of schism from straining their authority too far. The long disputes between the Dominicans and the Franciscans with regard to the Immaculate Conception, and those between the Dominicans and the Jesuits in the matter of Grace, which came to a head in the Congregations *De Auxiliis* (1598—1607) are cases in point. A distinguished Anglo-Catholic leader, the Bishop of Zanzibar, has perhaps a certain glimmering of this when he tells us that

‘The modern Romans make as free with the Vatican Definitions as do the Liberal critics with the Nicene Definition. They interpret them in accordance with the modern mind. It is perjury.’

And, he continues,

‘The Hensons of the Roman Church sit on their thrones too, ruling their dioceses. Rome and Lambeth have alike surrendered to the forces of Liberalism. May God save them both!’¹¹

A pious hope which recalls the shrewd remark of the Jester in *Ivanhoe*. ‘Sir Knight, I forgive you as a Christian,’ says

¹⁰ *Ecyclical Pascendi*, 1907.

¹¹ *The Christ and His Critics*, pp. 6, 9.

Rowena. 'That means,' comments Wamba, 'that she does not forgive him at all.'

13. What, then, is the function of authority in religion? The right of Private Judgement has often been loosely and inaccurately stated. 'A moment's reflection will show us,' says Dr. Salmon in his masterly *Lectures on Infallibility*, 'that our beliefs, true or false, have not been arrived at by our powers of reasoning, but have been handed to us by authority, or caught up from sympathy.'¹⁵ But, though they are not in the first instance generated by reason, they are bound (he continues) to justify themselves to reason; and the confidence which we have in them depends on the constant examination to which they are subjected. In particular, the teaching of the Church—by which I do not mean the clergy, or even the bishops, who are only its exponents, and may be its inaccurate or unreliable exponents, but the community on its religious side—is the normal means of the religious instruction of mankind. But the title of this teaching to our respect is proportionate to its willingness to submit to correction. The tyrannous *ipse dixit* of a Church which claims Infallibility, and suppresses criticism whether by temporal or spiritual penalties, is as little worthy of credit as the news which is published in the press of a despotic country; or, shall we say, of a democratic country under a Defence of the Realm Act?—where no one is permitted to deny what it is in the interest of the Government that the people should believe. An act of judgement must be the foundation of all our beliefs; in this sense Private Judgement is not so much a right as a condition of thinking. But no judgement, private or corporate, secular or religious, is infallible. Infallibility, if one may put it so, is a theological Mrs. Harris. Mrs. Gamp, you will remember, constantly quoted this lady, but she never produced her. And *de non apparentibus et de non existentibus eadem est ratio*. 'I don't believe there's no such a person,' was the conclusion arrived at by Mrs. Gamp's friends. No: in religion, as elsewhere, we must be content with that homely certainty which suffices to govern our practical decisions in all the most important affairs of life.

¹² *The Infallibility of the Church*. George Salmon, D.D., p. 64.

To ask for more is to want better bread than is made with wheat.

‘An infallible Church does not mean a Church which makes no mistakes, but only one which will neither acknowledge its mistakes nor correct them’ (p. 111).

14. Far other is the life principle of religion. ‘I am come that they may have life, and that they may have it more abundantly’: where this life is, there Christ is found. For religion is an atmosphere in which life as a whole is lived, not a special department of experience: it is a Universal, not a Particular; a temper, not an institution or a creed. Hence its power of adaptation: the gifts of the Spirit, as the first age knew them, ceased, that the Spirit might remain. ‘It is of all things the most susceptible of variation,’ says Rothe: this is why it has been, is, and can remain the fine flower of our varying and successive civilisations—*i.e.* of the embodied rational and moral life of mankind. It finds expression in a Paul, an Aquinas, a Francis of Assisi, a Luther, a Wesley—might not the list be extended to a later time? What types could be further apart? Yet each in his own order spoke as the Spirit gave him utterance.

15. The Christian religion, then, is inspired, because it is living and life-giving: but its content is not infallible, because it varies and will continue to vary. ‘In a higher world it is otherwise: but here below to live is to change; and to be perfect is to have changed often.’¹²

We may sum up in the words of a writer in the *Quarterly Review* (October, 1889):—

‘The root of the matter is that there is no royal road to certainty, no organon for the summary extinction of doubts. As much in the sphere of religion as in the social and political domains infallibility and perfection are mere dreams of the imagination. Conviction of the truth does not become ours at the command of some external authority. It grows by contributions from many sources; from the testimony of the past, from spiritual intuition, from personal experience, from conscientious following of the light, from the influences exercised over us by our fellowmen who are eminent for their goodness. It never ceases to grow as long as we are faithful to what we have attained; and, though in this world it can never obtain a logical completeness, the humble and patient will always find it sufficient for their practical need. We may well leave to ecclesiastical Utopians the vain quest for a Church whose voice will silence all disputes, satisfy all doubts, and impose unanimity by an authority beyond contradiction.’

¹² Newman, *Essay on Development*, p. 40.

MODERN POLITICAL IDEAS

By Sir WILLIAM ASHLEY, Ph.D., Vice-Principal of the University of Birmingham.

THE general subject of this Conference is the relation between modern ideas and traditional Christianity. I am going to speak of some of the most modern ideas with respect to political society. But having set them forth, with only a passing word of comment, I propose to leave them there. '*Je ne propose rien: j'expose.*'

I suppose if we had been asked a quarter of a century ago to formulate the intellectual position of most of those in this country who regarded themselves as 'progressive' thinkers, it would have been something like this. The State, we should have said, was the whole community, the whole of the population, organized politically, *i.e.*, with a machinery of institutions which enabled it to exercise authority within certain geographical boundaries. The 'functions' of the State, we should have said, were not simply 'negative': to 'maintain law and order,' to keep the ring within which individuals worked out their own salvation or damnation. We believed we could show, both theoretically and empirically, that it had a 'positive' function: in the phrase of Aristotle, to promote 'the good life' of the community. Theoretically, because on analysis the State appeared, not as the mere contrary of the individual, involving simply a deduction from his freedom, but rather as the presupposition, the necessary condition, for true individual liberty. Empirically, because the self-regarding activity of individuals had visibly brought with it gross and intolerable evils, which had compelled the State to assume the task of control. As to how far that regulation should go, we were not unanimous. Relatively few of us contemplated so complete a control of the nation's economic life as our socialist friends advocated; and we differed widely as to the merits of particular proposals. But I think I am right in saying that the general presumption, in what I may call the progressive camp, was on the side of the State.

This was a frame of mind which was not necessarily asso-

ciated with belief in 'democracy,' or, at any rate, with a belief in democracy of the parliamentary type. The State, *i.e.* the community organized governmentally, or, turning the formula round, the government as the organ of the State, might have the duty, and therefore the right, to control the individual, because it stood for community interests. But it might quite conceivably be held to represent the deep and permanent interests of the community, and hence justly claim a 'divine right,' without being constituted by a popular vote. This, of course, was the view of Hegel and of Prussian idealists after him. The State, in their view, was incarnate in the monarch; though it was the silent implication that the monarch would be guided by the highest available political wisdom, which meant, in practice, by a highly trained and public-spirited body of officials.

But in this country, as in France, at the time—a quarter of a century ago—to which I am referring, the High State doctrine had, I need hardly say, come to be interpreted in a parliamentary-democratic sense. I say 'parliamentary-democratic,' because there are methods of government which have claimed to be democratic without being parliamentary. The Bonapartist doctrine of the *plébiscite*—which quite honest men have held—was that the true desire of the nation could assert itself more genuinely by a vote conferring supreme power on an individual than by the election of a representative assembly. But speaking broadly, the English mind, and more and more the mind of Western Europe generally, conceived of democracy only in the form of parliamentarism. To this result had contributed the working success, so far, of English parliamentary institutions, as well as all the larger currents of political theory. And all these currents of political theory seemed logically to lead, not only to government by a representative assembly, but also to universal suffrage as the method of constituting such an assembly. This was so, even though those whose official creed these theories formed were slow in making complete application of them. Thus Whiggism was, in effect, for a century an oligarchic system of government; but Whiggism based itself on the doctrine of government by consent; and the obvious corollary would seem to be that all the

governed should be given some means of signifying their consent. Similarly Benthamite Utilitarianism was the creed of middle-class 'intellectuals' who, in their hearts, believed that the rule of the middle classes was as perfect as anything human could be; yet it seems obvious that, to ascertain whether you are pursuing the greatest good of the greatest number, it is advisable to learn what the greatest number feel about things. Thus, I repeat, the current of opinion, however slowly, was setting, not only towards an extension of the powers of the State, but also towards the vesting of the powers of the State in a single assembly, elected on an ever wider and wider franchise.

Acquiescence in this general result was assisted, among serious thinkers on the theory of government, by the vogue of two ideas. One was the Austinian conception of Sovereignty: the idea that there must, in the very nature of law, be ultimately somewhere some one 'sovereign' person or body. The other was the Rousseauite conception of the General Will: the idea that somehow—it was commonly assumed, by means of parliamentary elections and divisions—there did emerge from the welter of party welfare, and the indifference and ignorance of large sections of the electorate, a single 'general will' which had a natural claim on our obedience. In England we used to call this 'the will of the people.' Each side in politics claimed to voice the will of the people, when it got a majority in the Commons, by whatever conjunction of arguments and circumstances; and the other side always tried to explain away any particular election which went against it, as not really representing the nation. The assumption on both sides was that, if only you could be sure it was the *Vox Populi*, it should, for practical purposes, be treated as *Vox Dei*.

The Great War has had two outstanding effects which, on the surface at least—I will not hastily say whether it is also so at bottom—are opposed to one another. It enormously extended the sphere within which the State has actually exercised authority. And, whether under its almost mythological name of Dora in this country, or under other names in France or Germany, we must allow that, on the whole, the State in these new rôles was remarkably successful. To-day it is the popular

thing to ask for 'decontrol': we are properly shocked by the waste of public resources of which some of the new Government departments have been guilty; we cry out for the demobilisation of the 'new armies' of the Civil Service. Doubtless, if we had been a good deal wiser than we were, and if, in particular, the gift of organization had been more common, the work both of control and of direct State enterprise could have been carried out more economically. Still, it was in fact carried out with a degree of success which few in 1914 could have anticipated. I can say this the more feelingly because I have to confess that on more than one Government Committee of enquiry on which I sat, especially with respect to the food supply, I viewed with hesitation and concern extensions of State control which have, in the sequel, turned out to be salutary and effective. They were effective because public opinion was on their side. And, within the range of material possibility, they were almost as effective in Germany: almost, though not quite, for fortunately we in England had time to take advantage of German experience and avoid some proven mistakes. And, whatever may happen in this country in the economic sphere, there is one direction, that of education, in which the war expedited an extension of State action which I suppose we all regard as permanent, and the magnitude of which few of us realize. I mean the extension of compulsory education from children to adolescents.

But, on the other hand, the war brought with it fresh doubts in this country as to the *theory* of the State, precisely because it was in Germany that the High State doctrine was most consciously and consistently held, in a spirit and with consequent applications which seemed to many of us dangerous to the higher interests of civilisation. That the State has an unlimited claim on our allegiance can only be held if we grant that, in some sense, the State is always in the right, that it is the supreme organ of Reason. It was interesting to see during the war how mediaeval ideas which might seem to be securely buried emerged in several directions. Thus there were many good Protestants, many convinced Agnostics, and even Atheists, who found fault with the Papacy, because it did not come forth as the Voice of the Human Conscience, regardless of the policy

of particular States. This reminds us of the view of Auguste Comte that the function of the mediaeval Papacy, in idea and often in fact, was to stand for elements of human nature which the political State disregarded.

To-day the State—and, in particular, the parliamentary democratic State—is being assailed, or at least criticised, all round us. It is a confused battlefield, with several armies fighting each for itself and falling into strange alliances and inconsistencies. It is beyond my power to schematize it, if for no other reason, because we are too near. Speaking broadly we may say that, in this country, 'capitalistic' influences generally are 'out' for 'decontrol.' They point to examples of Governmental incompetence: they argue that only by free enterprise can trade be revived and the country's affairs put on a secure economic basis. But it is to be noticed that, widespread as these views are throughout the 'business world', they are given organized expression most persistently by the representatives of the big industrial combinations. When these speak of freedom for 'private enterprise,' what they mean is the freedom of what the general public calls 'trusts.' Now I am not one of those who think either that all trusts can be abolished, so long as the present system of private property is allowed in substance to survive, or that, as things are, they are necessarily maleficent. On the contrary, I believe that they represent a natural stage in industrial evolution, and that they can be made of great public service. But they certainly have the power to injure the community; and it is hard to see how they can expect to retain a large measure of freedom—such as I should myself desire—unless they submit to such a degree of State supervision or limitation as will reassure the public.

But, at the same time as 'Capital' is criticizing 'the State,' as if its control were inevitably mischievous, there is much attack upon it from the side of 'Labour': to some extent in this country, but much more abroad. From the revolutionary Socialist camp the cry is heard that 'the State' itself is the enemy, and must be abolished. This is not a new cry: it was raised in the period 1865—75 by the Bakunin School of 'Anarchists.' Their name did not of course mean that they were in favour of permanent disorder, but that they believed

it possible to replace authority and coercion by the free association of voluntary groups. It was indeed only an extreme and Utopian form of Liberalism, in the original sense of that term. Anarchism as a doctrine receded behind the rising flood of State Socialism of the Marxian type, and the label 'Anarchist' has almost ceased to be worn. But it survived in the background, especially in Latin countries; and it contributed one element to the new phase of Socialism known as Syndicalism, when it came to the front in France in the nineties. With Syndicalists anti-State doctrine was bound up with what, from their point of view, was a pessimistic view of parliamentary democracy. The State, they said, is simply the political form taken by the dominating material powers of any period. These powers to-day are Capitalism and the Bourgeoisie—two terms, in their vocabulary, for the same thing. Since Capitalism, they proclaimed, could only be overcome by a revolutionary cataclysm destroying all separation into classes, it followed—indeed in their vocabulary it was only another way of saying—that the State also was to be abolished. It might be urged that democracy was capable ultimately of transforming the spirit of government; that since the 'proletariat,' to use their term, either already comprised, or was destined ere long to comprise, a large numerical majority of every nation, it could in time capture the State machinery and use it for its own purposes—purposes justifiable as being those of the great majority. Their reply was that real democracy could never be established so long as Capitalism remained: that it could always manipulate or falsify the popular vote by means of the party system, party funds, and a tied press; and that 'democracy' under such conditions was a middle-class fetish, or rather hypocrisy.

What I suppose most of us here would say—and certainly I should say so too—is that a chief ground of complaint on the part of revolutionary socialists against modern democratic government is simply that it does not expeditiously abolish private property in the instruments of production. We should hold—at least I do—that this delay is not in the last resort due to any secondary influences such as Capitalism may exert, but to the simple fact that the great body of the people has not yet, for quite sufficient and worthy reasons, been converted

to revolutionary Socialism. But it is true, is it not? that for many sober observers of by no means socialistic views the actual working of parliamentary democracy has brought with it a certain sense of disillusionment. Indeed, the disillusion in the camp of the progressives is often not very different in its results from the initial prejudices of conservatives. Compare for instance the many instructive studies of the Boss in American politics with Mr. Bodley's book on France. Most of us, at any rate—perhaps President Wilson is a happy exception—find it increasingly difficult to idealize existing democracy. The process by which the 'general will' is elicited, even if we personally agree with that supposed will, are such that, in its character as general will, it loses some of its hold upon our respect.

But to return to the French syndicalists. They believed that in the syndicates, *i.e.*, the trade unions, now at last getting under way in their country, they could find, in the first place, the potent instruments of social revolution, and, in the second, a substitute for the State itself. Instead of the Sisyphean task of converting a sufficient majority of the electoral majorities in the several geographical constituencies, let 'the workers,' said the theorists of syndicalism, have recourse to 'direct action' by means of the general strike: the general strike for particular limited purposes to begin with, and as a means of propaganda; and at last, the final general strike, when the time was ripe, for the complete overthrow of the existing social order. In the new era that would then open, each industry, they declared, would be governed not by a central State department, but by its own body of workers—the railways by the railwaymen, the mines by the miners, &c. To the questions how the interests of the several industrial groups were to be mutually adjusted, and how the interests of the community as producers were to be reconciled to the interests of the same community as consumers, it was for some time thought to be possible to give an answer by pointing to the *Bourses de Travail*, equivalent roughly to the Trades Councils in our larger cities, and by the sanguine expectation that national problems could be solved by some sort of federation of *Bourses*. But when the *Bourses de Travail* themselves broke up, the theorist of the movement

took refuge in the doctrine that the future could take care of itself. It was represented as disloyalty to the proletarian cause to distract attention from the immediate duty of revolution to the controversial issue of reconstruction; and their literary champion, Sorel, was quick to invoke the authority of Bergson against a paralysing rationalism.

It may be asked what of national interests other than economic. But it must be remembered that, according to the strait Marxian doctrine of economic determinism, there are no interests—intellectual, artistic, religious, international—which are not governed by economic causes. Once Capitalism was overthrown, all other good things, it was supposed, would necessarily be added unto us.

Guild Socialism, as a theory of social organisation, is simply the English form of syndicalism. In its main idea it is quite unoriginal. But it differs from French syndicalism in that it is not, to any substantial extent, a working-class movement. It is a movement of middle class intellectuals and their following among ardent middle class youth; and being in its origin a much more consciously and systematically thought-out thing, it does not dispose so easily of the idea of the State. Its leading exponent to-day is Mr. Cole; and his latest view, as expressed in his *Labour in the Commonwealth*, is as follows. When the great social revolution has taken place, it will be necessary to set up two national organizations side by side, with equal claims on our respect and obedience. One will represent all the citizens as Producers, built up by delegation from the great industrial unions which will by that time have swallowed up the present multitude of craft unions; the other will represent the same citizens, but as Consumers or Users, and elected by geographical constituencies. He speaks of these two bodies as two 'Parliaments.' To the community as consumers or users of wealth, divided into geographical areas and represented by the Consumers' Parliament, he proposes to leave the name of 'State'; but the State, in this proposed new and limited sense, will be freed from all the old attributes of absolute or universal sovereign authority: it will be merely 'a functional expression among other functional expressions of the common will of the men and women who compose the

Commonwealth.' But I fail to see why, if the bilateral system he sketches is ever set up, it will be appropriate to give the name 'State' to one side of it. The only justification for doing so would seem to be the consideration that, so long as all women are not employed industrially, it will be difficult to represent them in a Producers' Parliament; so that the national constituency which would return the Consumers' Parliament would be, to that extent, the larger. But I do not recall that Mr. Cole raises this point: a point which, it may be remarked in anticipation, is of some importance in relation to the Soviet system of Russia. And whatever names we employ for the two parallel organizations, there is the obvious possibility that the same nation organized syndically and geographically may speak with two voices. In the book I have referred to the problem is disposed of in one short sentence: 'Matters affecting producer and user alike, Guildsmen want settled by Joint Agreement made by the two bodies.' Then surely 'sovereignty' will be exercised by the two bodies in conjunction; or, if you choose so to put it, by the community in its two capacities. Each will have sovereign authority until its decisions are questioned by the other; and the country will be governed in effect by a Bicameral Legislature, with some method of Joint Voting or Delegations or Suspensive Veto or Referendum or other device for preventing deadlocks. Whether the term 'State' then continues to be used will be a mere matter of nomenclature. Perhaps it will smell sweeter under the name of the Commonwealth or the People.

Mr. Cole, it may be remarked, differs from the French syndicalist or the out-and-out Marxian, by recognising the existence of other interests than economic; interests which have, or should have, appropriate 'functional' organizations. And to explain these other organizations, as well as to give a philosophical basis for the syndicalist part of his scheme—the self-governing industries or guilds which are to take over the conduct of economic activity—he and others have begun of late to work in ideas which come from another quarter and to which I have not, so far, alluded.

The famous German legal philosopher Gierke wrote, now many years ago, a vast work on the history of *Das Deutsche*

Genossenschaftsrecht, the German law of association. In 1900 the late Professor Maitland translated a chapter of this work with an arousing introduction. Gierke's point was that, in the uncorrupted Teutonic conception of things, every body of persons, in fact accustomed to act together, constituted a real entity, with a common will other than the sum of the wills of the individuals constituting it. He contrasted their natural right to recognition as entities, arising from the very fact of uncorrupted Teutonic conception of things, every body of personality,' or 'incorporation,' was dependent on a definite authorization or grant by a sovereign body. In this latter orthodox legal view he saw the effect of Roman jurisprudence, foreign to the Teutonic spirit, and therefore baneful. I am inclined to think that Gierke's doctrine, buttressed though it was by astounding learning, was only a ponderous half-truth; and that differences between degrees of association are of as vital importance as the common possession of an associative character. Maitland, however, set about applying the idea to explain the nature of various bodies, which, though not yet legally recognized as corporations, the law was becoming compelled to treat, openly or by means of a fiction, as real entities or persons. Up to this point the interest was legal or administrative: and I do not suppose Maitland meant to imply that the fact of existence was itself a moral justification for all and every such entity. But the conception was speedily utilized by writers in want of new arguments for old contentions. Thus the late Dr. Figgis used it to support the claim for 'freedom' for the English Church on the ground that it had acquired a real personality apart from the secular State. And Mr. Cole has followed him in using it as a support for his Guild Socialism. His last book on *Social Theory* is no more than a few sentences of Maitland's exposition of Gierke made the basis of a whole Sociology. Therein he has done some useful work: it is necessary to break down the misleading simplicity of the antithesis between the State and the Individual, and to recognize that individuals are related to the State (or whatever we call the supreme authority) not only as physical individuals but also as members of groups, most of them of several groups of various sizes, significance, and degrees of associateness,

though each with a more or less pervasive life and purpose of its own. But however much we recognize the existence of 'functional groups,' in my judgement the problem of the State will remain. For, to repeat what I have said before, the double question has still to be faced: first, of those general community interests which are not necessarily identical with the immediate separate interests of particular groups; and, secondly, of the adjustment within the same community of group interests which are bound to be more or less divergent at first sight or on the surface.

During the last three years, revolutionary theories as to the State have been put into effect by Soviet Russia, and ideas which might previously be disregarded as speculative eccentricities have leapt into the saddle and ridden mankind. I can speak of Bolshevism only very briefly, and I shall deal with it only as a political theory. I shall not now consider either the moral questions involved in the methods of its establishment; or the question of fact—how far the actual system of government tallies with the literary or official theory. On both these subjects we are at present very imperfectly informed. Nor shall I discuss the question of what I may call economic psychology—*viz.*, whether mankind, in Russia or elsewhere, is able to dispense with the stimulus to production provided by private property and competition, or what degree of external coercion in other forms may be necessary to replace the coercive forces which have been removed. The experiment is now being tried: and *solvitur* or *non solvitur ambulando*. But on the theory of Soviet government we are adequately informed by the text of the Soviet Constitution, together with the commentaries provided by the writings of M. Lenin before and since its promulgation. The most instructive is M. Lenin's elaborate reply to a pamphlet by Herr Kautsky. For the last thirty years Kautsky has been regarded as the most orthodox and certainly as a very well read and—as most Socialists have thought—rather fiercely honest exponent of Marxian doctrine. He has defended the pure doctrine against Socialist 'Revisionists' like Bernstein; and during the war he had the courage to hold himself aloof from the Majority Socialists supporting the German Government.

Of late he has severely criticised the Soviet Government on the ground that it is not democratic. Socialism, he maintains, can only be permanently built on a democratic foundation. As usual with European Socialist pamphleteers, he appeals to the utterances of Karl Marx. M. Lenin replies by accusing Kautsky of misrepresenting Marx: Marx, he declares, not only invented the term 'the dictatorship of the proletariat,' but meant by it just what M. Lenin means. With these questions of Textual and Higher Criticism we need not concern ourselves. Before writing this paper I have been looking into the controversies of the period of the Pilgrim Fathers; and in Lenin's pamphlets I find myself in the same atmosphere as in John Robinson's—the atmosphere of belief in verbal inspiration. The key to the divergencies between equally able men, then and now, in interpreting their sacred text is commonly to be found in the mistaken assumption of consistency in the authority cited. It is as easy to construct two or more Karl Marxs as it is to construct two or more St. Pauls: because each man took up different positions at different times of his life, or even in different moods. The real question for us is not what either of them said, but what teaching commends itself to our judgement. And whatever Marx may have said or meant as to 'democracy,' Lenin quite clearly throws it over—for the same reason and in the same sense as Syndicalists and the cognate schools of revolutionary Socialists before him. Democracy in the form of parliamentarism, in a society still mainly capitalistic, can, he declares, only be the instrument of the Bourgeoisie. The Russian Constituent Assembly, like the Duma before it, was only to be tolerated so long as it was a useful instrument in the political, pre-economic, stage of the Revolution. As soon as the demand for it had served its purpose, and as soon as the revolutionary forces were sufficiently strong to seize power, they were justified in dissolving it. They have replaced it by a Soviet Government which, Lenin asserts, is a higher form of democracy, since it represents the nation in its economic aspect, which is primary and fundamental, and according to those constituencies which are alone natural and appropriate to an industrial society, *viz.*, occupational groups. The groups, however, be it observed, are not

—at any rate in form—the same as the syndicates or guilds of French and English thinkers. They are not trade unions, but electoral constituencies made up of the workers in particular industrial establishments or clusters of establishments.

From representation at any stage of the hierarchy of Soviets, all 'capitalists,' big or little—defined as all who employ labour for the sake of profit, including therefore every peasant who employs anyone outside his own family—are excluded quite openly and avowedly by the Constitution. A Proletariat Dictatorship is not, in Lenin's view, something to be apologised for: it is necessary in a period of transition, and ultimately it will disappear only because the Bourgeoisie and Capitalism will disappear. Accordingly these two clauses appear in the following order in the Soviet written Constitution:

23. The Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, recognizing the equal rights of all citizens, irrespective of their *racial or national* connections, proclaims all privileges *on this ground* to be in contradiction with the law of the Republic.
24. Being guided by the interests of the working-class as a whole, the R.S.F.S.R. deprives all individuals and groups of rights which could be utilized by them to the detriment of the Socialist Revolution.

Among these rights are not only the franchise, but also, it would appear, freedom of speech, freedom of public meeting and freedom of the press.

In the happy days in the future, when all classes shall have been destroyed and there are no longer separate class interests, everyone, it is implied, can be given an occupational franchise (though the case of women engaged in their own domestic work will present a difficulty). And when that time comes, universal socialism will have put an end to international rivalry; everyone in the country will be secured in the exercise of all the rights which it will be for the social good that he shall enjoy; and then, according to Lenin, echoing a certain famous passage of Marx, the State (*i.e.* as we have known it) will disappear. Apparently all that will be needed will be a central technical department, which will inform the community as to the best methods of production, and a central statistical department which will announce what ought to be produced and what is the arithmetical quota for each citizen. Everybody will be so satisfied that

external coercion will hardly be necessary. Meantime, however, there can be no doubt of the 'sovereignty,' in the completest possible sense, of the present Soviet authority (or of those who exercise power in its name). Workshop autonomy having been tried and having failed to maintain production, it has been replaced, not surreptitiously but ostentatiously, by a central administrative control which reduces the share of the workmen, alike in production and distribution, to a consultative voice that may easily become nominal. M. Lenin has announced that the workshops are to be militarised. The so-called 'Taylor System of Scientific Management,' which many English employers have so much admired, and which is at the very opposite pole to workshop self-government, has hitherto been detested by organised labour in this country and America, simply because it converts the workman into a machine, content to do what 'scientific' management prescribes. That system M. Lenin's government has openly taken over wholesale—of course, in purpose, merely as a policy for the 'transition' period. It remains to be seen whether the object of 'enlarging the output,' now that it is no longer aimed at in the interest of Capital but in the cause of the Revolution, will secure willing acquiescence.

And, finally, M. Lenin describes it as a ridiculous fiction that the Soviet has not the support of the majority of the Russian people. I observe that, in the Note of the Soviet Government printed in yesterday's papers (August 27th, 1920), it is remarked that 'Soviet rule . . . is only able to exist by the will of the working masses.' But of course much turns on the meaning given to 'the working masses' by the Soviet Constitution and by the practice of those who control the elections. I cannot think it is proper for other countries to demand that Russia shall be ruled by a Constituent Assembly, if that is understood to involve an election on the old lines of geographical constituencies. Even the League of Nations could hardly dictate a form of government. But I do think it would be expedient for the Soviet rulers to call together such an assembly, elected on an occupational basis, as would demonstrate that the present Government has the support of 'the great masses of the nation'—if indeed that be the case.

THE DANGER OF BIBLICAL INFALLIBILITY

By the Rev. MAURICE PRYKE, B.D., Vicar of Bradninch.

IN this paper I propose to consider the attitude towards the Bible of 'the Christian in the street' who attends service at his parish church more or less regularly. If it be found that that attitude is a quaint mixture of boredom and reluctance to question openly any statement made by the Biblical writers, we shall have to ask what are the causes which have led to this jumbled confusion of ideas, who is mainly responsible, and how can a more reasonable position be arrived at.

For the natural man inspiration and infallibility are one and the same. Talk about degrees of inspiration leaves him cold, and he is impatient of the scholar's nicely calculated less or more. If he is orthodox, the thought of the thin end of the wedge haunts him continually. Once begin to criticise, and he asks, Where do you expect to end? Touch Noah's Ark and you imperil the foundations of religion; question the story of the swimming axe and the truth of Christianity is at stake.

Again, the natural man has an ingrained respect for the specialist, and he regards the writers of the Bible as specialists in their own subject, men whose statements it is almost impious to question.

The natural man (and still more the natural woman) is conservative to the backbone. The Moody and Sankey hymn, each verse of which ends with the refrain, 'It was good for Paul and Silas and it's good enough for me,' expresses to a nicety the attitude of many pious souls.

Loyalty is a great virtue, but it has its dangers. Some people's loyalty to the Bible engenders a spirit of wholesale credulity towards its statements which puts into the shade even the trustful ingenuousness of the amateur spiritualist. We have all met the type of old lady who asserts defiantly that far from doubting the ability of the whale to swallow Jonah, she

would accept unflinchingly the statement that Jonah swallowed the whale if the Bible required it.

Moreover, loyalty to the Bible is connected in some way not very clearly defined with loyalty to God. I shall not soon forget my gardener's triumphant contribution to a discussion on the Flood Story: 'Well, anyhow, God put these stories in the Bible and so, whether they are true or not, He meant us to believe them.' This question of perverted loyalties brings us to the root of the matter. Destroy these and you may destroy something of real value. Take heed lest in rooting up the tares you root up the wheat with them.

I feel it is almost necessary to apologise for bringing such elementary matters to the notice of members of this Conference. Our difficulties, however many they may be, are not with the Old Testament. But my reason for doing so is a growing conviction that the gulf between the Biblical scholar and the average man (even where in matters unconnected with religion he is an educated person) is still far wider than is commonly recognized. I am confident that one of the chief services which those members of the Churchmen's Union, who do not themselves claim to be experts but who have become familiar with the established results of critical enquiry, can render to their fellows is to help to bridge that gulf. It is our task to act as middlemen between the scholar and the man in the street. The task is urgent, because while many within the Churches are content to hold unthinkingly to the traditional ideas, an increasing number are growing restless and dissatisfied. These are rooting up with impatient hands the field of their old beliefs. Too often tares and wheat are burned indiscriminately in the fires of the awakening intelligence.

Much of course may be said against disturbing with ungentle hand the simple faith of those advanced in years. But the hand need not be ungentle, nor is it perhaps too much to say with reference to some upholders of an infallible Bible that they are Christians rather in spite of their beliefs than because of them. Moreover, the members of an average congregation are not all of one age, and it may well happen that an undue tenderness for the *anicula Christiana* will result in the permanent alienation of the younger and more progressive elements.

I am of course not unaware that youth and orthodoxy of the severely traditional type may sometimes be found together. Only the other day a leading light in one of our Church training colleges, after setting out with commendable fullness the modern view of the composition of the Hexateuch, concluded his answer to an examination question thus: 'These are the views of scholars; I still prefer to believe that Moses was the author of the whole!' But on the other side must be set what can only be called the scornful impatience of the great majority of young men and women outside the Churches with what they regard as the churchgoer's unwillingness to accept new knowledge and to welcome light from every quarter.

It is not difficult to account for the present widespread confusion of thought with regard to the Bible. Anyone who will study the condition of things 50 years ago cannot fail to see how considerable has been the movement in the right direction; nor is it to be expected but that the process of popularising the results of the scholar's researches should be relatively slow. Yet things ought to be moving faster than they are, and it is to be feared that the parochial clergy now, as in days past, are responsible for much needless delay. Not long ago a rescue worker complained bitterly to my wife that she had never yet met a parson who was not either shocked or impatient at her difficulties. About the same time I had a talk with a more than ordinarily intelligent young school teacher who had held a commission during the war, was an experienced worker for the Church Army, and a keen student of psychology, but who confessed to me with bated breath that 'he was afraid he was frightfully unorthodox, but there were some parts of the Bible he didn't quite like; especially the bit in the Revelation, where the writer threatened anybody who adds anything to what he has written.' An instance of a less pleasing kind was that of the man—a pillar of the C.E.M.S. and at least nominally educated—who seriously assured me that the story of the extermination of Amalek was an excellent warrant for the wholesale massacre of the German nation.

In this connection the reports of Convocation can only be called melancholy reading. When the Dean of Canterbury asks ingenuously (with reference to the question of a revised

psalter): Was it to be held that the Holy Ghost inspired a certain verse of a psalm and then stopped? And when a proctor who, according to the *Church Times*, is making his mark, affirms that the demand for an expurgated psalter is due to a desire to keep the whole Word of God from the people and to hide truths of which the officials of the Church do not approve, can it be wondered at that the mind of the ordinary man is in a muddle?

Now a Church which is doing its duty cannot afford to leave its members muddled on vital questions. The idea of an infallible Bible is not merely a harmless idiosyncrasy, it is one of those beliefs which 'a man has no right to hold, and holds at his own risk.' Identify inspiration with infallibility and you make the Bible a happy hunting ground for the Robert Blatchfords who wax merry over Elisha's bears, Balaam's donkey, and of course 'Jonah and his annoying whale.' An infallible Bible leaves us no choice between wholesale credulity and blank scepticism. It renders us powerless in face of the argument that the Bible is an immoral book. It makes impossible the acceptance of new truth except we have recourse to the fantastic arts of allegorical interpretation. Worst of all it presents us with a conception of God which is chaotic and therefore worthless in face of the problems of daily life. As Mr. Lenwood (of the London Missionary Society) reminded us last year, to go with an infallible Bible to Hindu or Mohammedan is to be beaten at your own game. As Miss Hetty Lee has shown us in the June number of the *Modern Churchman*, to take an infallible Bible into the classroom is to be met either with excuses for God, or with the hope that He has improved, or in some cases with fierce denunciations of His cruelty from baby lips.

These instances scarcely augur well for the religion of the next generation unless, and this is the *crux* of the whole matter, we can smash utterly the un-Christian idea of an infallible book and substitute for it a reasonable view of the Bible's origin and inspiration.

Good work in that direction is of course being done. Books on the right lines are numerous, and in not a few cases the teaching now being given to children will not have to be un-

learned. I think, however, that much more might be done through sermons (not to mention the conference and the study circle). The ordinary members of our congregations do not read even the popular books which are written for their benefit. Why cannot the clergy speak more plainly? Whenever the attempt is made the results are not such as to discourage further experiment.

The first thing to be done, as a worker in one of Vickers' factories wrote to me the other day, is to get rid of the idea of the Bible as a single book. We scarcely recognise, perhaps, that such a notion is still adhered to by millions of otherwise intelligent people. Given such a belief, the outburst of a self-styled materialist at a conference composed mainly of Sunday School teachers to the effect that 'all the evil in the world comes from man's absurd reverence for the Bible,' had more to be said for it than the scandalised vicar was willing to allow.

When men have learned to test the permanent value of the Old Testament by the measure of its conformity with the Spirit of Christ, much will have been gained. All our work should be constructive in its ultimate aim. The need for the positive emphasis in teaching cannot be over-estimated. It is far more important to build up in the popular mind a true conception of inspiration than to fulminate incessantly against the follies of an infallible Bible. Indeed, when dealing with children, positive teaching of the right kind will not raise the question of infallibility at all. The true view will be taken for granted; inspiration will appear less as a dogma and more as a discovery which the children make for themselves, and the words 'not infallible' will become superfluous.

Yet while, as one of our wisest teachers has told us, 'we should all be on our guard against denials,' there can still be little doubt of the need at the present for plain speaking, which shall be destructive not of faith but of error. The bugbear of the thin end of the wedge does not alarm us. The wedge must be driven home; true and false ideas of God and goodness must be clearly separated; only so can the Bible have its true value for the men of to-day. The wrongly identified conceptions of inspiration and infallibility must be distinguished beyond pos-

sibility of further confusion. But in all this it must be evident that we are the friends and not the foes of the Bible. The more we learn the less inclined should we be to destroy merely for the joy of smashing. Discrimination is not irreverence. Determination to reach the truth and to accept the best as the truest does not lead to the disparagement of the imperfect and the relative. Yet we have no belief in infallibilities, and for us the sole test of an inspired writer must be found in his power to inspire.

As regards the Old Testament, controversy is becoming less acute, and there is good hope of ultimate agreement. But in the case of the New Testament the outlook is still far from reassuring. Many who no longer dispute the decisions of scholarship with reference to the book of Genesis still retain their belief in the practical inerrancy of the Gospels and in the infallibility of the Church. Yet truth demands that we reject the theory of infallibility no less decisively in the latter case than in the former.

To take a much used example : the evidence for the Virgin Birth as a fact of history can be judged by scholars, and by scholars only. No pronouncement by an infallible Church, no cut and dried theory of an infallible Bible can render the truth of the story a whit more certain. Here the assertions of a Church which 'happens to know' do not affect the situation one way or the other. Unlike one of the parties in a famous correspondence, we cannot base our faith in Christianity upon the non-discovery of a papyrus in which the story is disproved. Nor with the same nimble opponent of Modernism can we consent to speak (with reference to the evolution of dogma) as though the Holy Spirit by 'deft arrangement' and 'imperceptible guidance,' 'through the most secret avenues and in the most subtle and impalpable manner possible,' had obtained in every instance precisely those results which He desired. Here the case is one not of guidance, but of compulsion exercised upon men without their knowledge. To attribute such an action to the Holy Spirit is tantamount to an accusation of pious fraud. When, we are told by the same writer, that 'a Faith which does not involve taking risks is no Faith at all,' we heartily concur, for, as one of our number has recently

reminded us, 'in thought no less than in action we must be ready for adventure in reliance upon the Spirit of God.' But the risks to which we are called are of a character different from those which confront the believer in an infallible Church. For him it is a question of an initial leap into the arms of certainty. For us the way leads along the road of experience, where progress is often slow and the path hard.

May not the inspiration of the Bible be found not least in this, that the writers of Old and New Testaments alike were men fired by the spirit of adventure in their search for God? What they tell us of their discoveries makes us eager to follow the same quest. Their voices call to us across the centuries, and we cannot but obey the call. We, like them, have in part already found that of which we are in search. God is both our Leader and our Goal.

And when all is said we too may claim to be of the number of those who 'happen to know'; albeit in our case the claim to knowledge is made not with reference to particular events of past history, but on the sure ground of present personal experience. To affirm with regard to any particular event recorded in the New Testament that it must have happened precisely in the manner described is for us impossible. On the other hand, we assert with unwavering conviction that God is Love and that God's character and purposes for man have been revealed to us in Jesus Christ. If even here we do not care to speak of an infallible certainty, we are prepared to adventure our lives on the conviction that these things are true, and to accept the consequences in the spheres of social, national, and international life. Our appeal is to a certainty which is cumulative; knowledge grows more certain with the growing years. The company of those who know increases with the passing of each new day into the treasure-chambers of eternity. Its members are recruited from simple and learned alike, for in the 'things that count' the testimony of the humblest disciple is of equal weight with that of the keenest intellects, and the only aristocracy recognised in the Kingdom of Heaven is the aristocracy of love.

HISTORY AND THE OLD TESTAMENT

By the REV. J. M. CREED, M.A., Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge.

A WEEK or two ago I was talking with a friend who has been examining Scripture papers in the Cambridge Senior Local from a number of secondary schools, and he expressed his surprise at the examinees' ignorance of the best-known heroes of Bible history. It was not merely that so obscure a person as the Queen of the South was variously identified as Bathsheba, Beersheba, and Beelzebub, but some of the candidates appeared to draw but a hazy distinction between the personalities of Elijah and of Simon Peter. And I cannot help thinking that my friend was right when he added that ten or fifteen years ago such ignorance on the part of candidates for the Senior Local, who offered Scripture, would have been almost inconceivable. The fact is that in education, as elsewhere, forces which have been long at work have suddenly come to a head; the old methods of imparting both the religious and the literary traditions of our civilization are in open question; there is general uncertainty as to what is, and what is not worth defending, and divided counsels are imperilling the future of religious education and of liberal culture alike.

For the early Church, for the mediaeval world, and, until quite recent times, for the modern world, the Old Testament fulfilled a function which it is no longer able to fulfil to-day. When Tertullian surveyed the vicissitudes of human history, he looked back so far as the times of Ninus, the mythical founder of Nineveh. 'Beyond Ninus,' he says, 'the stylus among you heathen does not generally reach. From the Assyrians at the earliest the annals of history begin to open. But we,' he adds, 'who read divine annals are masters of the subject from the nativity of the universe itself.'¹ There is a fine confidence about that sentence. Latin Catholicism was advancing in the strength of youth to the conquest of the world. But if the Church was in one sense young, in another it was very old. It had scriptures which antedated all profane

¹ *De Pallio* c. II. Quoted Harnack, *Expansion of Christianity*. E.T. vol. I, p. 354.

literature, and outlined the history of the race. Such was the generally accepted view in the early Church, and though it did not pass without challenge, there was no overwhelming refutation. Learned men such as Julius Africanus in the third century, and Eusebius in the fourth, constructed chronicles of universal history within the Biblical scheme, while the same Bible enabled the simple believers to place themselves in the divinely ordered scheme of universal history. The ideas of the Patristic Age passed over into the Middle Age and became the presuppositions alike of religion and of civilization. The cleric, the lawyer, the soldier, the builder—they all knew at least something about the history of man. They knew that he had been originally created, blessed and happy, some five thousand years previously; they knew that he had fallen from his high estate; they had an idea of a dim ante-diluvian period; they knew that Noah and his family had been preserved in the ark from perishing by the waters which had drowned the rest of the race; they knew something about the call of Abraham, the history of the chosen people and the life of Jesus of Nazareth, the King of the Jews. The Bible provided them with a scheme of universal history. Nor was the scheme affected by the Revival of Learning and the Reformation. The Renaissance was essentially a return to the spirit and the literature of the ancient classics, combined, in Northern Europe especially, with a return to the literature of primitive Christianity. The appeal was to documents. Hence Erasmus writes:—

‘The aim of my work has been to revive in our generation a literature, which has been almost buried; to awaken a world, which pays too much attention to Jewish ceremonies, to care for true evangelical piety; and to recall the academic study of Theology from those subtle discussions of empty quibbles into which it has fallen, to the original sources of Divine Scripture.’²

And however wide might be the gulf in other respects between sixteenth century Catholicism and the Christianity of the New Testament, the two did not differ in their outlook on the early history of man. The Old Testament still provided Christendom with a general outline of universal history. And it continued to perform this service during the seventeenth and

² *Ep.* dlxiii, (Leyden, 1706).

eighteenth centuries. Bossuet opens the *Discours sur l'histoire universelle* with the creation of heaven and earth.

'That,' he says, 'is where Moses begins—the most ancient of historians, the most sublime of philosophers, and the wisest of legislators.'

A little further on,³ after a discussion of the chronological inconsistencies between the Greek historians and the Bible, and between one Greek historian and another, he is content to sum up his argument for the Biblical chronology by reminding the Dauphin that the Church allows him liberty to adopt the chronology of the Septuagint, instead of that of the Hebrew Text. The Septuagint chronology dates the creation in the year 5,872 B.C. Dr. Johnson, it may be remembered, apparently still held in 1772 the opinion, which he erroneously attributed to Leibnitz, that all languages could be traced back to Hebrew. Boswell at any rate implies this. Leibnitz in point of fact had been the first to break completely with the theory, inherited from the Fathers of the Church, of the Hebraic origin of all languages. It was not until the nineteenth century that the whole scheme fell in under pressure of scientific advance, archaeological discovery and literary criticism of the Old Testament itself. The text of the Old Testament as it stands, no longer serves to-day, as it has served in times past, to put men into touch with universal history and with the cosmic order. Liberal Christianity has not as yet got much beyond registering this negative conclusion. The traditional view is undermined, and the Old Testament is not yet organically related to a new construction of the history of man. Hence the chaos in religious teaching.

I should like to submit to the consideration of this Conference that there are three factors to which we must do justice, if we are to succeed in reorganising the Modern Study of Religion.

The first is the vital importance of the Old Testament. It is certainly not superfluous for any one who believes the Old Testament to be of any importance at all to say so; for when the Old Testament is alluded to, people have a habit of assuming a patronising air, which, to me at any rate, is thoroughly

³ *Op. cit.* Septième Epoche *fin.*

irritating. For I do believe that the Old Testament is quite strong enough to stand on its own legs, and that for anyone who wishes to understand the Christian religion some acquaintance with its contents is indispensable. The Old Testament is indispensable to the student of Christianity for this reason—that the fundamental terms and conceptions of the Christian religion have their origin in Old Testament religion. The Kingdom of God, the Word of God, the Covenant, the Ecclesia, the Christ—all these ideas took form and substance in Old Testament soil. It is sometimes said to-day, and often suggested, that Jesus Christ superseded the Old Testament. I do not know of any evidence which supports this view. He certainly disapproved of the way the Rabbis interpreted the law of Moses, and He said that the law of Moses itself on divorce was a concession to the hardness of men's hearts; but He believed His Father to have been also the God of Abraham, of Isaac and of Jacob, and He anticipated that those patriarchs would be among the elect in the Kingdom of God. There is a sense in which the Gospel is universal, but it is not universal like the multiplication-table. It is intensely coloured by local feeling, national traditions, and the teaching of the Prophets. Gentiles, it is true, would also come from north and south and east and west to sit down with Abraham and Isaac and Jacob in the Kingdom of God—but that was a paradox, not a commonplace. One cannot help suspecting that the unconscious aim of de-Hebraising the Gospels is in part responsible for the really rather 'ordinary' presentation of the Person of Our Lord, which is so common to-day. We tear Him from His historic setting and appropriate such parts of His teaching as commend themselves to our sentiments for the time being. In this nervous attempt to save the universality of the Gospel, we sacrifice its characteristic force. It is true that Jesus of Nazareth was greater than the Hebrew environment in which He moved, but His Gospel was also a greater thing than the platitudinous ethics of twentieth century journalism. We conclude then that the Old Testament is of vital importance, for it provides the indispensable background of the Incarnation. The attempt to abstract Christianity from history proceeds from a deep misunderstanding of the nature of Christianity itself.

But it is not less important that we shall do justice to a second factor which the Modern Study of Religions has brought to light. The Old Testament is a unique creation, but it is not an isolated phenomenon, which stands out of relation to all other religious systems and beliefs. We may regard Sir James George Frazer's three monumental volumes on *Folk Lore in the Old Testament* as inaugurating a new epoch in Biblical study. We are here shown how Old Testament religion came into existence in relation to practices and beliefs which have their counterpart among all peoples. There is nothing unique in the possession of a cosmology, or of a flood-story, or of sacrificial worship. Similar practices and beliefs are to be found almost everywhere, and the Bible thus has points of contact with primitive religions in general. We can no longer regard Christianity as a closed religious system to be accepted or rejected *en bloc*. Christianity is not distinguished from other religions by possessing a reliable account of the beginnings of the world and of man, as opposed to the myths of other people. From a historical standpoint the flood of Noah is neither more nor less true than the flood of Deucalion. The Bible presupposes a background not very dissimilar from that of other peoples. The uniqueness of the Bible lies in the unique reaction of the Hebrews to the religious and ethical teaching of the prophets. One example may be given. It is a well-known fact, attested both by literary evidence and by archæological discoveries, that the Semitic peoples, like many other races, practised human sacrifice. Philo of Byblus, in a fragment preserved in Eusebius⁴, tells us that there was a custom among the ancient Phoenicians that in times of danger their rulers should surrender their favourite children for sacrifice. The practice was referred back to the example of Kronos or El. Before he became a star, El had been a Syrian king, and when enemies threatened his land, he had dressed his only son in royal robes, and sacrificed him on an altar. There are traces in the Old Testament that this religious practice had been shared by Israel with her neighbours. It is very gruesome, but it is a fact that human beings have, in

⁴ Philo of Byblus *ap.* Eus. *Pr. Ev.* I, 10; u. 40 c. Müller F. H. G. 3, 570 f.

all sincerity, believed themselves called to make this sacrifice. In historical times human sacrifice was generally discountenanced in Israel, not—and this is the significant fact—because advancing civilization had left religion behind, as we may conjecture usually happened, but on religious grounds. It was a divine voice which stayed Abraham from slaying his only son; there was a religious conviction behind the words of Micah⁵:

‘Wherewith shall I come before the LORD,
And bow myself before the high God?

Shall I give my first-born for my transgression,
The fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?
He hath showed thee, O man, what is good;
And what doth the LORD require of thee,
But to do justly, and to love mercy,
And to walk humbly with thy God.’

The cruelty of primitive religion yielded in this case, not to scepticism and satire, but to a deeply fruitful ethical religious faith. Biblical study is thus entering upon a new phase. The Bible no longer shares with Herodotus the distinction of being almost the only source of our knowledge of the ancient Eastern world. There are now many other streams to tap. The Old Testament remains the record of a distinctive religious creation which came out of the interaction of Israel with her neighbours.

The recognition of this second factor which the modern study of religions has brought to light ought to help us in dealing with the third and most pressing factor in the present position—the actual religious divergences among men to-day. I think it may be said that the great Evangelical missionary effort of the last century started at any rate with that conception of the Christian Religion as a closed system, which we now see to have broken down. The Bible was accepted as a Book supernaturally inspired in all its parts, and it was generally assumed that the conversion of the heathen must take the simple form of abandonment of their old religious system and acceptance of the Biblical system in its place. It is probably not easy to over-estimate the historical significance of

⁵Micah vi, 6.

that missionary effort. The contact of one civilization with another, and the contact of one religion with another, usually mark turning-points in history. The last century has been a turning-point not only for other peoples, but also for Christendom. The missionary movement has not only helped to stir life among other races, it has reacted on the missionaries themselves. The missionary to-day is coming to realise that the process of conversion is less simple than was once supposed. Men do not change their religion as they change their clothes. In order to preach at all the preacher must first find points of contact with the people to whom he preaches. This fact carries with it the inevitable corollary that the new religious attitude which the missionary calls into being cannot be considered out of relation to the religious stage which preceded his arrival. The Christianity of Uganda will not be identical with the original Christianity of the Church Missionary Society, any more than the Christianity of the Church Missionary Society is itself identical with the Christianity of Pope Gregory. In the introductory chapter of his *History of Melanesian Society* Dr. Rivers speaks with high appreciation of the work of the Melanesian Mission, and at the same time he reminds us that since the time of Bishop Patteson it has been the policy of the Mission to preserve, as far as possible, native institutions. This policy is probably not exceptional. It is clear that to many missionaries to-day, Christianity is not a closed system, but rather a historic spiritual force, capable of entering into relations with existing institutions and of transforming them. It is remarkable how closely this change of practical policy corresponds with the theoretical change which modern Biblical study has introduced into Christian theology. I have neither the time nor the knowledge to develop the point, but is it not possible to find here the germ of a new theological method?

These then are the three factors, of which, as it appears to me, we have to take account.

First, Christianity is a concrete historical religion, and the Gospel of Jesus Christ, whether we like it or not, was conditioned in its form by the Old Testament soil from which it sprang.

Secondly, although the Biblical Revelation of the Divine is in some sense a unique organic whole, yet it is not a closed isolated system. It has points of contact with primitive practices and beliefs, which have been moulded in a unique way by prophetic teaching.

Thirdly, as the Christian Religion was conditioned by circumstances in its first appearing, so it is conditioned by circumstances in all ages, including our own. The Kingdom of God is not the only true and valuable idea in the world, though for those who accept it, it is the supreme principle.

This line of thought appears to bring us back to the age-long problem of the One and the Many. Neither must be allowed to obscure the other. We must not so contemplate the One that we forget the manifold manner of His working, nor must we, in analysing the differences between age and age, between people and people, forget the unity of the race and the oneness of God. Nothing is more characteristic of our time than its deep conviction of the uniqueness of each stage of the historical process; we are learning to think of mankind as one whole within which individuals and groups act and react one on another, giving birth to new and unique combinations and harmonies. It is a conception from which Theology still has much to learn; for, while it serves to strengthen our conviction of the uniqueness of the historical Christian Religion, it forbids us to rest placidly in any inherited synthesis as the final statement of absolute truth. And yet we may fairly question whether the historical method of approach is of itself sufficient to meet the claims of religion, for it is the most significant movements of history which appear to carry a reference to what men have felt to be eternal and unchanging. Each age, each people, each person, is unique, but they all combine to make a unity in virtue of their common relationship to an eternal order. This antithesis is certainly present in the teaching of Jesus Christ. We have already seen how genuinely the Gospel is conditioned by the unique circumstances of its appearing, but we can scarcely question that Jesus Christ moved men because He brought them into contact with Someone greater than circumstances. The keen interest in the life and occupations of men which is so note-

worthy a feature of the teaching recorded by the Synoptic Evangelists is always controlled by the thought of the Father in Heaven, Whose Kingdom was to come and Whose will was to be done, as in heaven, so on earth. The Christian does not create the object of his worship, but becomes aware of something which is already there. St. John truly interprets the evangelic message when he says: 'We love Him, because He first loved us.'

THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT

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THE conflict between social obligation and individual liberty meets us at every turn in modern life, and not least in connection with religious questions. The problem of authority in religion depends upon it. It is related to questions of ecclesiastical organization and discipline, and so to the problem of reunion, of which the urgency is at last being recognized. In a different form it is raised by some of the most fundamental questions of ethics. And in modern politics it rages over the whole field.

As we consider it, it seems to me to be important that we should recall as vividly as possible the great length of time during which man has existed upon the earth, and remember that it is only for the trifling matter of a few score centuries that what we call civilization has existed. As recently as three thousand years ago the individual had very little chance of winning any recognition for his private claims as against those of the community. The first men and women came into existence as members of social groups, and from the earliest time life can have had but little meaning for them except in relation to that membership. From that beginning right onwards to comparatively recent times, this social factor in human life is of outstanding importance whether we are investigating religion, or ethics, or politics. Primitive religion was a tribal affair, and was bound up with rules and observances on which

the welfare and even the survival of the tribe were thought to depend; consequently, if any member of the community ventured to think for himself, and tried to put his peculiar ideas into practice, he became at once a source of danger to his fellows. For his action might cause offence to the god of his tribe; and inasmuch as the relations of the deity were with the tribe as a whole, the divine vengeance would fall upon all collectively. The free-thinker had therefore to be restrained for the sake of the common good. And as with primitive religion, so, in the region of ethics, primitive rules of conduct were tribal in their outlook and purpose. They aimed at prescribing such a manner of life as would promote the survival of the community; and this statement is not the less true because we must add that early notions of what kind of conduct *would* promote the survival of the community might easily be, and sometimes were, mistaken.

Agnes came and went, and at length it began to be recognized that an importance attached to the individual for his own sake, and not merely on account of his value as a member of the tribe. Responsibility for his own actions became more and more concentrated in himself, instead of being shared by all his relatives; individual culture took its place side by side with the preservation of the community as one of the aims of human activity; the rights of conscience claimed respect in matters of conduct; the rights of criticism and private judgment claimed recognition in matters of belief. The process was a slow one, although, indeed, in comparison with what had gone before, its whole course up to the present time has been short; and it was one of struggle. Individual responsibility was established without much difficulty; but the rights of individual conscience and criticism have had to fight hard for existence, and the community has often summoned all its forces to destroy those whose assertion of them went beyond what had been at the time conceded—nor even yet has it ceased to act in the same way on occasions. It is important for our purpose to note that the insistence by Christianity on the importance of the individual soul in God's sight was in line with the new tendency, and the two have continually reinforced one another, but the process which we are considering was

already many centuries old at the time when Christianity was founded.

It was natural that the protest in behalf of the rights of the individual as against those of the community should often be carried to an extreme point. But while on the one hand it has become impossible ever again to ignore the individual's claim to freedom, yet on the other hand the claim of society has never been abrogated; and it is as impossible to construct an adequate doctrine of authority in religious belief, or an adequate system of ethics, if we ignore the social factor in life, as it is if we ignore the individual. The order in which the two factors have appeared, and the enormous preponderance of the time during which the first held sway, are to my mind in harmony with the fact that in our modern civilization the social factor still is, and must always be, basic, and the importance of the individual can only be properly appreciated when it is viewed against a social background. It seems to me, therefore, that the charge of being anti-social is the most fundamental and the most damaging that can be brought against any institution or doctrine or system, now or at any other time; and if it can be upheld, the institution or the doctrine or the system stands self-condemned. Yet I hasten to add that ever since the value of the individual was first acknowledged, the other charge, of failing to do justice to individual rights, is only a little less damaging than the first. And the task confronting us is to contrive that our institutions and doctrines and systems shall be so constituted that neither charge can rightly be laid against them. The difficulty of the task is admitted by all serious students in the field of politics, and it is certainly not less in the fields of ethics and religion; but the problem, surely, is one to the solution of which modern Churchmen, just because they are modern Churchmen, should be forward to devote themselves.

My intention in this paper was to put forward some suggestions in regard to the three particular matters which I have already mentioned—authority in religion, ecclesiastical organization, and the foundations of ethics; but limitations of time have compelled me to confine my remarks to the first of them.

The act of belief is possible only for an intelligent human

being, and it is one in which the whole personality is concerned. It finds its natural expression in conduct, so that in normal cases a man's conduct gives the only trustworthy indication of what he really believes; but whole conduct can be controlled, both positively and negatively, by the force of other persons or of circumstances, and so may in particular cases fail altogether to express the personality of the agent, belief on the other hand is in its essence completely outside the reach of such external control. To assert the possibility of a man's belief being simply imposed upon him by an outside authority is, to my mind, to misunderstand altogether what the word 'belief' means. Whatever the outside authority can do in the way of submitting statements of belief for his acceptance, it is always *for his acceptance* that they are so submitted; and however loudly he may shout the prescribed words, it is futile to talk of his believing what he says until this personal acceptance has taken place. We agree that if anyone is brought up in a Mohammedan country, the son of Mohammedan parents, he will probably be a Mohammedan himself by force of circumstances. But those words 'by force of circumstances' must not be taken to imply that this personal acceptance has been dispensed with. What they do imply is that there has been an enormously strong invitation to him to accept a certain creed, and that no alternative has been presented to his judgment, but unless this invitation has been met by the active response of his personality which I have called his acceptance of the belief, we are not entitled to call him a believer in Mohammedanism.

Again, we misunderstand the nature of belief if we do not perceive that it presupposes an intelligent understanding of the words used to express it. A great deal passes for belief in one thing which is in reality belief in something quite different; and often the believer is as much deceived in the matter as other people. If a child is taught by his father to say the Creed before he is able to understand it, it is ridiculous to assert of him that he believes it. If he recites it in church, his father may fondly imagine that he believes it, and he may even think so himself; and this is the more likely because there actually has taken place in his mind an act of belief,—but

belief in what? Surely in his father's truthfulness and in nothing else. When he says, 'I believe in the Communion of Saints,' the state of his mind would be more correctly expressed by the very different words, 'I believe that my father, who taught me to make this statement, is a trustworthy man.' To give another illustration: if I hear someone express a scientific fact with which I am not familiar in technical language which I do not understand, then I cannot rightly be said to believe *it*, though I can trust *him*. If I tell you at this moment that when two binary quadratics are apolar the points which represent them in the Argand diagram are harmonically concyclic, there are probably a certain number of people among my audience who are quite willing to trust me and admit that I may perhaps know what I am talking about, but of whom it would be a misuse of language to say that they believe what I said, because the words which I used were unintelligible to them. A little reflection will convince you that this criticism applies to a good deal of what passes for religious belief, not only in the case of children, but in that of adults, and not only in Christianity, but in some of its modern substitutes.

Believing, then, is an act taking place in the secret recesses of a man's personality, whereby he definitely though not always consciously pronounces the verdict, 'that is true.' In order that any proposition may be believed, it must present itself at the bar of the man's own judgment, and there make good its claim. In this process, what can outside influences do? They can, it would seem, do much; for instance, they can urge, or indeed actually insist upon, the trial of a case which would not otherwise have been called; they can give evidence in behalf of the claimant; they can recall past decisions to the judge's mind. Or, to put it rather differently, other people or society as a whole can so urge upon me the importance of a particular article of belief or of an entire creed that I cannot avoid making up my mind upon it in one way or the other; they can tell me why they have accepted or rejected it for themselves, and advise me how best to attain to a discovery of the right verdict; they can point me to the attitude, of acceptance or rejection, which has been taken up with respect to it by

great men in the past or the present. But after they have done all these things, or others of the same sort, the time comes when they must needs stand aside, and wait. 'Now it is your turn,' they say to me; 'what is your decision?'

And when I come to give that decision, the grounds on which I base it may vary widely in their nature and finality. I may give my verdict, 'That is true,' on the ground that the particular truth is for me ultimate and self-evident, as when I believe that I exist; or because it is established by a cogent process of reasoning from premises which I have already admitted, as when I believe that the earth is round; or because I accept as adequate the evidence of my senses, as when I believe that fire burns; but equally I may give the verdict because I place reliance upon the witness of other people, as when I believe that the South Pole has been reached. It is important, however, to observe that this last case is by no means simply a believing on authority which dispenses with the exercise of my judgment, for it is still I who must decide whether or not I ought to trust the witness which is offered to me. And this is the point which is so commonly overlooked by those who speak of the authority of the Church, the authority of the Bible, or even the authority of Christ, as if it was inconsistent with the supremacy of private judgment. Let us consider these in turn.

A man believes, let us say, the doctrine of the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary; and to avoid side issues I will assume, for the sake of my argument, that the doctrine is true. Why does he believe it? Is it because it is self-evident? That can scarcely be maintained. Because it comes to him supported by the evidence of his senses? Certainly not. Because it is the conclusion of an argument of which he has admitted the premises? It may be so, in some cases, but as a rule such a claim would not be made. Why, then, does he believe it? The answer is probably, 'Because the Roman Church, of which he is a member, tells him to do so, and vouches its truth.' Very good—so far: but that is not the end; we continue to interrogate him. How does he know that the Church of Rome is not mistaken? Because the Pope, who is its earthly head, is infallible. How does he know that the Pope is infallible?

Because the Church has told him so. We gently remark that he seems to be arguing in a circle, and beg him to try again. He thinks for a minute, and then tells us that it appears to him to be involved in his conception of God that there must be provided for frail men an infallible guide in religious matters. It would probably be a waste of time to point out to him that a conception of God which involves so surprising a corollary is arbitrary and unwarranted, so we let the statement pass; but we still have another question for him. Assuming that men need, as he says, an infallible guide in religious matters, how does he know that the Roman Church is that guide? Will he be so good as to answer without resorting once more to circular reasoning? He will tell us, I must suppose, that he has studied the facts of ecclesiastical history, and the claims of the rival churches; and that after making the best use that he can of his powers of judgment he is convinced that the claim of the Roman Church is justified. At last! We have run the fox to earth! It is a case of private judgment after all. He believes in the immaculate conception, in the last resort, because it is taught by that Church which he judges—*he judges*—to be the guide that he should follow.

There are two comments which must be made on this state of things. First, we have no business to condemn any man for taking his beliefs thus on the authority of an institution which he trusts. It is an entirely legitimate thing to do. The majority of people have not the ability, even if they have the time, to investigate for themselves all the statements which are offered for their religious belief; and if they deliberately put themselves under the instruction of a Church, they may be doing the wisest thing that is possible in the circumstances. And a Church, it seems to me, ought to recognise the existence of such people by being ready, when asked, to give replies to their questions, in so far as they relate to matters of importance, though of course it need not claim infallibility for them, and indeed may well avow them to be merely tentative and provisional. But this is not to say that the Church can rightly demand, as a condition of membership, the acceptance of these pronouncements by those who, being able to investigate for themselves, have *not* asked for instruction on the points in-

volved. To take an example, it would not surprise us that if a man chose, in the sixteenth century, to inquire what view he should take as to the inerrancy of Scripture, he should receive an answer which led straight to such systems of Old Testament chronology as the one which placed the creation of Adam in the year 4004 B.C., on the 23rd of October, at 9 o'clock a.m., and Eve's eating of the forbidden fruit at 2 o'clock in the afternoon; but even the reasonableness of such an answer at the time was still far from justifying the Church in persecuting those whose studies led them to a different conclusion, and so bringing it to pass in at least one ridiculous instance that a distinguished mathematician¹ made a statement to the effect that although he was firmly convinced, on the authority of the Bible, that the earth did not move, yet he proposed to argue on the assumption that it did. Further, we have seen that it is altogether misleading to describe the position of those who *do* ask to be told what to believe as if no original act of private judgment had been present, at the least implicitly, in the process through which they passed to reach it.

My second comment is that it is astonishing that anyone should insist on the universal incapacity of the individual to decide rightly for himself in a matter of detail, when he is forced in any case to concede to that individual the capacity to perform the much more important and responsible task of choosing for himself a spiritual guide.

I pass on to that other instance of external authority, which is usually regarded as having replaced the authority of the Church at the time of the Reformation—I mean the authority of the Bible. Let us imagine such a cross-questioning as we invented before; I think it is possible to show in this way the necessity of admitting all the claims that have been advanced in behalf of the fullest and freest criticism. The conversation will probably go in some such fashion as this. 'You be-

¹ The Jesuit, R. J. Boscovich, 1711-1787. His statement was as follows:—'As for me, full of respect for the Holy Scriptures, and the decrees of the Holy Inquisition, I regard the earth as immovable. Nevertheless, for simplicity in explanation, I will argue as if the earth moves, for it is proved that of the two hypotheses the appearances favour this idea.' (Quoted in the *Edinburgh Review*, October, 1897, p. 365, in a review of Dr. A. D. White's *A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom*).

lieve this, you tell me, because it is in the Bible. But what has that to do with it? Why should you believe the Bible?' Pious hands are raised in horror, and the answer comes, 'Of course I must believe the Bible; it is the word of God.' 'How do you know that?' 'How do I know that? Why, it says so itself!' Your murmured protest against circular arguments is much less effective this time, for it is taken as conclusive proof that you are an atheist or worse; still, you may be fortunate enough to have met a disputant who will try to avoid it, just to humour you in your strange dislike for so useful a method of proof. 'The Bible is the word of God, of course, because the men who wrote it were inspired; and their inspiration, as you know, is established by a statement in the second Epistle of Saint—What, is the matter? Arguing in a circle again, do you say? Well, let me see; will this satisfy you? I believe the Bible is the word of God because when I read it my soul responds to its religious appeal and recognises that it is true in the highest sense.' 'That's certainly a good reason,' you answer, 'but tell me, do you mean that your soul makes this response to every part of the Bible equally; for instance, to that passage where Samuel tells Saul to kill the Amalekite babies as much as to the thirteenth chapter of I Corinthians?' 'No, I suppose not. It may be that some parts are more inspired than others.' 'Then if I were to quote something written in the Bible, it might prove to be true for you, and it might not—it depends where it came from?' 'Yes, if you like to put it that way.' 'Then how do you decide in any particular case whether you are bound by its authority?' 'Oh, that is easy enough; I'm bound by its authority when it says what is true, but not otherwise.' 'But that means, doesn't it, that you have got to settle for yourself whether you ought to obey it in any particular thing that it says, or not?' 'Hm, yes, I suppose it does.' 'Then I cannot see in what way its authority saves you from the necessity of exercising your private judgment, or dethrones that from its position of supremacy.'

Once more, and more briefly, why does a man accept the authority of Christ? It is because he has already given his consent to the claim of Christ to be his Master. We may say,

with perfect reverence, that Christ Himself has had to stand at the bar for the investigation of His claim, and the verdict has had to be passed in His favour before His teaching can be appealed to as authoritative.

At this point I can fancy someone saying to me, 'Do you really imagine that you have reconciled the opposing claims of society and freedom in your view of authority? Why, it is freedom from beginning to end, and the claims of society have not been so much as mentioned.' Let me point out, then, that I have not been asking you to choose between rival systems, but have been trying to show that when they are analysed all systems alike are seen to demand, and depend upon, the exercise of private judgment; that the act of believing always involves a decision by the individual, which may by no means be shirked, and that the differences relate only to the grounds on which that decision is based. If my analysis is correct, we have no choice in the matter. The most resolute upholder of ecclesiastical or biblical authority is as much a believer in the right of private judgment, though he may not have realised it, as any free-thinker can possibly be. Even the man who, in a paroxysm of intellectual despair, announces that he will never criticise anything or think for himself again, but will humbly believe whatever he is told by the first person or institution that will take the trouble to instruct him, has as the last responsible act of his own judgment made a more comprehensive and far-reaching decision than any other could possibly be, and has implicitly determined the whole of his future thereby. Surely this is obvious enough. Still, whether I am right in this matter of inevitableness, as I think I am, or whether I am wrong, I admit that to find a man's religious authority in himself alone does, on the face of it, seem to be an anti-social conclusion; and I am compelled to examine further in consequence. I think there are at least four things that can be said to show that the conclusion is not anti-social after all.

(1) In the first place, a man's judgment is not a merely individual thing. Just because he is a social being, brought up in a social environment, and the heir of countless generations of men and women who were social beings before him, his judgment is one in which, though he may not be aware of

the fact, social influences are expressing themselves. We recall what was said earlier in this paper about the immense length of time during which every activity of human life on the earth was controlled by social conditions. It is impossible to realise, except by a deliberate and sustained effort of imaginative thinking, the extent to which the sub-consciousness of the individual must as a consequence be saturated, if that word may be used, with the notions appropriate to a member of a community. It is in the region of ethics, perhaps, that this is peculiarly true, and if an example is needed I do not know that a better one can be found than the ideas of right and wrong in speech. The fact that lying is destructive of the social fabric of life was so firmly established in human recognition by long experience that to-day we all, to whatever religious or ethical school we belong, agree that, in general, a man ought not to tell a lie. Inasmuch as the primitive discovery was given religious sanction within or almost within historic times, and the condemnation of lying now comes to us dignified by a place in religious codes, most of us look no further back, and so fail to realise that we have here an admirable instance of the thorough socialisation to which the individual was formerly subjected. This is only a particular instance; and in reality there are countless ways in which the social aspect of life is continually expressing itself in the judgment of individuals, so that the authority of private judgment ought not to be denounced as necessarily anti-social in its tendency.

(2) Secondly, I remind you that it is private *judgment* of which we speak, and not private fancy or private preference. It must be the decision of one who is using the best intelligence he can command, if it is to have our approval and respect; and we demand that such a person, as he comes to give his verdict, will inform himself so far as he can of all the facts that are relevant, and take them into account. The case which he is trying is not *in vacuo*; it has links of connection with, it makes reactions upon, many of the multifarious facts which go to compose the system of social life. The task which he is essaying is not to be compared with that of merely describing one of the pieces of a jig-saw puzzle, but rather with

that of putting it into its proper place. The judgment, therefore, in so far as it is honest and intelligent, cannot but be socially directed.

(3) Thirdly, it has often been pointed out, notably in books like John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty* and Lord Morley's *On Compromise* (and therefore I need do no more than just refer to it here) that the fact of each individual's thinking for himself and criticising established ideas is in itself of very high value to society. By such a state of things the intellectual life of society is kept fresh and vigorous, even when the established ideas which are subjected to criticism are actually true; and it alone makes possible the improvement and progressive development of the intellectual life of society whenever, as has frequently been the case, the established ideas are wrong.

(4) Lastly, I submit to you that variety is one of the essential marks of a civilized and progressive society, while on the other hand it is uniformity which ought to be branded as anti-social. A social group is like a living creature in this respect, that the earlier the stage of its development the more homogeneous it is, and the greater the difficulty of differentiating its parts. The degree of complexity in an organism is a measure of the distance it has travelled along the path of evolution; and, similarly, in the life of a community its progress in civilization runs parallel with, and is interdependent upon, increase of specialisation. Diversity of functions necessarily involves diversity of points of view, and the latter is therefore an altogether healthy characteristic. We hear on every side, and have long done so, that unity, not uniformity, is the ideal in matters of ritual and liturgy, and it is equally true in regard to religious belief. To try to kill individual thought and criticism in the interest of society may be compared with the fatuous proceeding of setting up an Australian tribe of aborigines as the model to be followed by this country in political affairs; or, again, it is as if one should attempt to reduce the human body to a close resemblance to the amoeba. The society or the church which should destroy the free intellectual life of its members would soon forfeit the claim to have any corporate intellectual life of its own.

Collective effort has usually been directed to the task of

bringing backward races and backward individuals up to the level already reached by the majority; but progress beyond that level has always come through the action of individuals in refusing to restrict their thinking within the bounds marked out by the present attainment of society. The development of Hebrew religion was the work of individual prophets like Moses and Elijah, Isaiah and Amos, the prophet of the exile and the author of the book of Jonah—men who asserted the right of private judgment, and could not be satisfied with the religious conceptions which their contemporaries thought to be good enough for themselves. The history of the Christian Church has been full of similar instances of advance made possible by the action of individuals; and the most recent one in our Anglican body is very much to the point. Hardly anyone, I imagine, will be bold enough to assert that the manifesto on behalf of the re-union of Christians issued by the Bishops of the Lambeth Conference a fortnight ago—a document to which we of the Churchmen's Union give so heartfelt and grateful a welcome—would ever have been put forth if it had not been for the persistence with which individual Anglicans have striven, here and there, for a reality of fellowship—fellowship in deed and not merely in word—which went beyond the immediate approval and even beyond the aspiration of their society as a whole.

I conclude, then, that the charge of being anti-social cannot properly be brought against the doctrine of authority which finds its ultimate seat in the judgment of the honest and instructed individual conscience. I have tried to prove that that doctrine is in any case inevitable, being forced upon us by the analysis of the act of belief; but I have tried also to prove that the state of things which it recognizes is one on which in no small degree the health of society depends.

THE RECENT EXTENSION OF PSYCHOLOGY

By PROF. ALFRED CALDECOTT, Litt.D.

AT a very opportune moment Professor Ward, of Cambridge, published a revision of his Encyclopaedia article under the title of *Psychological Principles*¹. We may take this as a competent summary of the achievement of Psychology as it has been understood for nearly three centuries, since Descartes and Locke. Dr. Ward offers no small store of contributions of his own, though in originality his work hardly stands with Fechner, Lotze, Wundt or William James. But it stands alone as a conspectus of what has been done, and almost as to what can be expected, within the limits adopted. That limit was drawn by the reference to Consciousness: though forced to look across its boundary at times, even the leaders did so with a timidity that boded small success. But now we are asked to cease to regard consciousness as the essence of Mind: there is not only a sub-consciousness, *i.e.* a weakening of what had been in consciousness, but the time has come to speak frankly of *Unconscious Mind*. In short, to adopt Mind as our substantive, the being Conscious as adjectival, which may or not be present. As Mr. Bradley reluctantly acknowledged,

‘I think Psychology must make use of unconscious psychological facts.’

Removing this barrier, we peer over new prospects of studying the working of mental life. The ebullient spirits of our younger workers speak disrespectfully of the ‘bankruptcy’ of the old psychology; they anticipate ‘entirely new prospects,’ by which ‘the whole future of the science will be substantially changed.’ This is, of course, too much to say, but it is a sign that no small gain is already accruing.

Taking, then, sub-consciousness as acknowledged by all psychologists, though only reluctantly by some, and extra-consciousness as demanded by the new workers, we note that

¹ Cambridge Press, 1918.

these areas are constituted in two ways: (i) there is mental activity in application to material passed down from consciousness, proceeding concurrently with the small area of conscious activity; and (ii) there is concurrent work upon material that has never been in consciousness at all. Yet in the individual mind these areas are more or less connected, or capable of being connected, and they are more or less accessible from the centre and capable of influencing it. Some parts are pressing to come up; others seem to be lurking in caves and recesses: the search for laws governing accessibility is a principal enquiry. In this way we as individuals are growing structures: we are like trains to which carriages are added and never taken off: we are twenty, thirty years or fifty years long, so to speak.

A complication of extreme interest has been suggested by Freud of Vienna in attributing to a zone surrounding the central area the functions of a censor, interposing a judicial scrutiny upon claimants for admission, studied especially in the processes of dream-life.

The principal result effected below the threshold is the formation of complexes of all kinds: of ideas, of impulses, and of feelings and wishes. A notable example of this is seen in the careful study by an English psychologist, Mr. Shand, of the complication of simple Feelings into Emotions, with impulses attached thereto as executant officers, as no small part of what he describes has undoubtedly taken place beyond the limits of our conscious direction and control.²

In the extension of the study of Mind beyond the limit of conscious perception Psychology is proceeding on lines parallel with those of Modern Biology with its microscopic penetration below the surface of living bodies and their tissues to bacteria, microbes, cells, to chromosomes and gametes within the cells, and to germ-plasm and other conceptions of an imaginary kind; and of modern Physics where ether, atoms, electrons and ions are fruitful concepts beyond the range of direct observation, inferred from results.

Resort to this extended Psychology is already being freely made in two directions: by Medical Science in its treatment

² *Foundations of Character*, Macmillan, 1914.

of mental diseases, and by Educational Science in its treatment of the upbuilding of mind and character in childhood and youth. Is it not incumbent upon those engaged in the Study of Religion to come into line? On the scientific side in the first place, that is to say. Practising engineers do not need to devote themselves to the ultimates of Physics, nor practising physicians and surgeons to bacteria or cell-processes: but they would stand condemned if they did not reap the advantages due to the laboratory observations and the exercise of scientific imagination of the physicists and bacteriologists. So in Religion, whether 'practised' by us in the guidance of our own minds or as the Ministers of a Church, called to be guides to the minds of others, the results of this newer psychology deserve, and indeed demand, a similar attention.

Having said this much, permit me now to enter a *caveat* against what I regard as an illegitimate employment of the study of the subconscious and unconscious mind. There is a rush in some quarters to conceive the unconscious not only as below the conscious level, in quality and value, but as also above it. This claim has been made most forcibly and most conspicuously by Frederick Myers, who assigns to these outer zones not only much that is ordinary and more that is trivial, but the highest achievements of Genius and the greatest capacity for receiving Inspiration, and for religious experience itself. The attractiveness of the claim has been manifest in the way in which a highly reverend Oxford theologian who has this year honoured our Conference by his membership and presence, Dr. Sanday, hastened to make use of it for theology, and in particular as a help in conceiving the relation of the Divine and the human in the personality of Christ. There are many wonderful facts which suggest and support the claim, I acknowledge, and no one can read Myers' chapter on Genius, and William James' writings, without feeling that there is much to be said for it. But I stand with those who contend for the central importance of conscious personality in the life of each individual mind. *There* is the headquarters of our mentality; *there* is the quarter-deck of our ship, upon which the direction of our voyage principally depends. For concurrently with those studies in the Unconscious Mind, the last fifty years have seen also a great advance in the study of Personality, and I am anxious, even

whilst speaking on behalf of students of Religion taking account of the studies in the outer zones, to guard against any obscuring of the primary right to our interest which belongs to that part of the formation of our character which proceeds in the full light of our focal consciousness. We have to recognize that the surrounding area is vastly greater in extent than the focal and sub-focal areas, but I take it that our mental life attains its summit both of energy and of worth in the focus of clear conscious activity and experience. Our success in forming a 'character' of high quality depends upon our power to synthesize a great variety of mental elements, to bring into connexion complexes of almost infinite variety; and it is in consciously achieved unification that we should set the ideal of our contact with Reality in its deepest features; in religious language, our communion with God, in Himself, and as manifested in His world.

It is with great pleasure that we in this Conference of Modern Churchmen note that the august assembly at Lambeth of the Bishops of our Church contained members who are aware of the wider Psychology now opened out. They recognize that there is

'a new knowledge of the extent of psychic powers with which human nature is endowed' (*Report*, p. 117).

One of the eight Committees was appointed to consider this extension, though not in itself but in order to deal with certain quasi-religious movements in which the extension has already been misapplied. Three of these are dealt with: Spiritualism, Christian Science, and Theosophy. The 'findings' of this Committee are judicious and well-balanced, and deserve the careful attention of Churchmen. Here I can only offer a remark on each of them.

As to Theosophy: I do not think that there is much genuine psychology employed, either new or old: it appears to be rather a mixture of ideas of a superpersonal intention than of a subpersonal: to consist of excursions into imaginative and unverifiable constructions rather than into the investigations and interpretations of experience which are the business of psychology.

As to 'Christian Science': There is in this much apparent psychology. Indeed, it may be said to be 'mind-intoxicated,'

for it regards Matter as a thing of nought. But it moves in a direction opposite to that of extension to unconscious mind. It seems rather to exaggerate the old estimate of control of the focal consciousness, bringing all feelings and activities, and indeed all experience, under control of conscious will, to a degree which is inconsistent with what we have been learning about the unconscious. It is therefore drawn into an attitude of quietism; but it is the quietism of withdrawal from psychical realities; it is the dominance of the conscious self set apart in an isolation which resembles that of a king who has no subjects.

As to Spiritualism: here there is a transfer of interest to the subpersonal which goes beyond bounds. Our focal type is subordinated to the life in areas where personality is in imperfect control. We have hypnotism, divided personality, invasions of one mind by another, unconscious telepathy, and the like, as principal experiences, to an extent which threatens to undo the gains of the development of a central and unified personality. In its claim to regard concurrent mental life of lower values as surrounding the personal centrality with what would be superpersonal in value it is, in my judgment, a reversal of what is legitimate and true.

What, then, are the real gains for the study of Religion to be looked for in the extension of Psychology with which we are dealing? Disallowing such aberrations and distortions as those just mentioned, and confining our interest and hopes within the more modest limits of regarding Unconscious and Subconscious Mind as concurrent with the personal levels and as supplying much new material upon which personality can be conceived as working, the principal gain appears to be this. It extends the scope of *science* in our study of Religion. Many gaps and *lacunae* in our knowledge seem to be capable of being filled in; psychical facts which have stood out in isolation attain connection; regularity and system become apparent; the continuity and the unity of the individual mind become more manifest; and therewith the continuity of the individual with the Mind which science conceives to be pervasive of the Cosmos. Our study shares with other Sciences in the increased disclosure of 'second causes'; the forces which are at work in mind are uncovered to our observation in

some cases, to our imagination in others. Laws, not inexplicable miracles, are seen in Mind as well as in Life and Matter. The phenomena of character and conduct, both great and small, are discerned to have 'natural histories' of their own. And here, as in physical sciences, the increase of knowledge calls for a welcome for its own sake, and also for gratitude for the increase of power which it places at our disposal in the building up of our own souls and in the ministerial privilege of assisting in the religious life of all whom we can influence.

As in the study of religions the Christian man in possession of the Gospel as his local faith walks with profound interest and genial sympathy through the luxuriant jungles of beliefs and practices disclosed in the voluminous pages of the *Golden Bough* and regards them all as material for the Christian Faith to purify and control, so the Christian man in possession of the ideals of Character, the Faith and Hope and Love which Christian insight have delineated in the *Au-delà intérieur* of personality surveys with a sympathetic interest the disclosures of the lower levels of the subconscious and unconscious mind which recent psychological studies are spreading out before him. His hope is to bring all these forces, all this complication of structure, under the conscious control of the high personality which he conceives as constituting 'Sonship of God,' and as the seat of the indwelling of the Divine Spirit; himself personal and capable of conscious communion with Divine Personality.

PSYCHOLOGY AND TRADITIONAL CHRISTIANITY

By the Rev. C. W. EMMET, Fellow of University College, Oxford, and Vice-Principal of Ripon Hall.

DR. Marett, in his recently published volume of essays *Psychology and Folk-lore*, suggests that it is necessary to get inside the mind of primitive man in order to understand the material with which the folk-lorist is concerned. If he is studying dances and folk-songs, he must join in the Morris dances and in the folk-songs of his own countrymen, and so

understand the atmosphere for himself. In order to get to the heart of initiation ceremonies, the student should himself be initiated as a mason. Now, this is really what we mean by psychology—the attempt to see from within how religion works. Part of our subject is concerned with comparative religion, which will be considered more in detail to-night, but we may just point out the connection between psychology and comparative religion in the light of Mr. Marett's suggestion. In comparative religion we have often been concerned merely with the history of words and of doctrines approached from without. What we have got to do is to learn to get at them from within, thus combining the approach from the side of psychology and comparative religion. It cannot be assumed that when the terminology is the same the experience which lies behind it is always identical. We need to consider very carefully whether the experience of worship and of communion with God is really the same thing when God is thought of as angry or incomprehensible in character, and when He is regarded as the Father, the God of Love.

This, however, by the way. I wish to consider this morning one or two ways in which the psychological approach modifies our view of traditional doctrines. We contrast it with the authoritarian method which studies texts as providing fixed data, or deduces its doctrines from *a priori* metaphysical principles. Let us think of it with regard to the Eucharist. The history of Christian thought is full of endless discussions of the doctrine of the Eucharist. Most of them are concerned with the deductions which are to be drawn from certain words such as, 'This is My Body,' or with the consideration of abstract philosophical principles such as the relation of substance and accidents. We have not got very far on these lines. To-day we try to approach the subject from the side of psychology. We ask what it is that the sincere worshipper really finds in his Communion, and we discover an extraordinary identity of experience—an experience of the living Christ, realised as present, apart from the various theories of the mode of His coming. We go on to analyze what lies behind this experience, and we see in the Eucharist a rite which is instinct with the personality of Christ. The words, the acts, the elements are

pregnant with associations going back to the most critical and pathetic moment in His life. It is not that by a special divine *fiat* something happens when certain words are used under certain conditions by certain people, but that they are 'effective symbols' in the full sense of the term. On reasonable psychological principles those who approach the Communion rightly are so stirred in mind and heart that they open themselves to the Divine Presence. This does not imply that they create that Presence or imagine it for themselves. They are enabled under the associations of the service to open their minds effectively to the Presence which is always there, striving to manifest Itself.¹

On these lines it seems to me that we can see our way to get rid of certain conceptions which have caused endless confusion in Christian thought—conceptions such as those of 'validity' or 'covenanted mercies.' These phrases inevitably suggest that God has laid down certain rules and conditions once for all, by which He comes to the soul or gives His gifts. Some people, it is true, do not know of these conditions or appreciate their importance and, therefore, in His mercy He is ready to come in spite of their ignorance. This is the idea of 'uncovenanted mercies.' But it is getting more and more difficult for us to-day to accept any such view of the Divine working. What happens when we approach it from the other side? We find that there are certain principles of human nature, ways by which a man may come most effectively into close personal fellowship with his friend. In the same ways he comes into fellowship with the Divine Friend, the Personality Who transcends all other personalities and from Whom our imperfect human personalities derive themselves. These principles are embodied in the Sacraments: they are the result of human experience guided by the Spirit of God and the mind of Christ, but they are not something given from without—authoritative or exclusive in the old sense.

We are bound on these principles frankly to face the question whether the Eucharist is necessarily final. Is it conceiv-

¹ I have tried to develop this point of view more in detail in the article *The Psychology of Grace* in the volume of Essays, *The Spirit* (Macmillan and Co.).

able that the Christian Church may some day find some better means of approach to God? We are bound, I think, to answer that in the abstract this might be so. If Christian experience were to discover some method by which it could realize its fellowship with the Divine more effectively and more certainly than in the Holy Communion, that method could only have been discovered under the leading of the Spirit of Christ, and the Church would be bound to avail itself of it. This, in the abstract; but look at the actual situation. Our Lord chose the very simplest, the most universal and the most fundamental symbols—water, food and drink—in what we may call their elemental forms. We cannot imagine anything more ‘catholic’ than these, and it is therefore difficult to conceive how in practice they could be transcended or improved upon. Further, we must remember that once such a rite as a Christian Sacrament has been established, it gathers round itself all the associations—the telepathic associations if you will—which come from its use by countless generations. Into these each generation enters in its turn, contributing its own quota and, therefore, we should expect that, as the experience of the Church develops, the Christian Sacraments should grow in their power of influencing the mind. A new Sacrament could never have the same power as the old.

It is, however, important to remember that there are both good and bad associations. We cannot assume that all the associations which gather themselves round the Communion are of the right kind. It is, in fact, being realized at the present time that many of the younger generation are so profoundly influenced by the associations of disunion and exclusiveness which are sometimes connected with the Eucharist, that there is a real danger of their casting it aside altogether and trying to discover for themselves some new symbol of the deepest Christian fellowship. It is well to recognize the danger, and it is the duty of the Church to bring it about that the associations of each Sacrament should be those which help instead of hindering the approach of the worshipper to God.

We may apply the same principles to Christian worship in general. We are all familiar with the type of teaching which tells us how angry a king would be if we went into his presence

with our hats on, or if we asked him for something while sitting on a chair. The suggestion is that certain postures or forms of worship are pleasing to God, and have been prescribed by Him as the right ways of approaching Him. The fact is that approaching the matter psychologically, we do find that as a rule certain bodily postures naturally express and deepen the mental attitude. These postures are 'right' exactly in so far as they do this, but no further. The Sabbath and all rules are made for man, not man for the Sabbath. In discussions on Prayer Book revision we constantly meet the phrase 'Liturgically correct.' Now if this implies that God, or the Church speaking in His Name, has laid down certain forms as the revealed and final ways by which He is to be worshipped, we are at once repelled by the conception; but if it simply means that Christian experience has found that it may best express itself in a certain sequence of confession, praise and prayer, a sequence which is aesthetically valuable precisely like the contrasted movements of a symphony, we shall then be ready to profit by the experience of bygone generations. We shall remember too the associations which attach themselves to phrases and forms of prayer, hallowed by constant use, but we are not prepared to allow the last word to be spoken by those who insist on liturgical correctness in a merely antiquarian sense.

There is much which might be said as to the bearing of psychology on the conceptions of grace, conversion, inspiration and the like, but I have only time for one or two suggestions as to the relation of psycho-analysis to Christian practice, and particularly to the practice of confession. Psycho-analysis, with its stress on the mischief worked by hidden and unrealized 'complexes' and on the therapeutic value of bringing these things into the light, vindicates the principle which lies behind confession in so far as that confession is not formal or perfunctory, but does bring with it a real exploring of the secrets of the conscience at times when the mind is obviously diseased. It implies a confessor who is not primarily the holder of a particular office, but is able to treat the soul with the sympathy and with the knowledge shown by the best psycho-analysts. The same principle applies to the question

which has come before us on several occasions during this Conference, as to whether it is wise to disturb people by raising doubts. I would suggest that in very many cases there is already in the cupboard a skeleton of uncertainty, and that the fear of new ideas is due to a censorship which is trying to hide the existence of this skeleton. Repressed in the minds of many who are regarded as simple believers are questions and uncertainties which they are afraid to face, and these work themselves out in all kinds of unexpected and disastrous ways. The bringing to the light of sins, of shame, of doubts, and the power which Christianity possesses of dissolving these things, carry with them an extraordinary sense of freedom and of new life. We all need to be liberated from our obsessions. One cannot help feeling that such a man as Samuel Butler suffered all through his life from some complex which was never set right, and that he just missed his real work of service for that reason.

A last word on the general principle. Experience shows that it is impossible to talk about psychological explanations without it being supposed that we are reducing it all to subjective imagination. Are we not explaining religious experience by auto-suggestion?

Now I would not deny that one of the most fundamental questions which needs to be faced by the Christian apologists is precisely this: whether prayer or the sense of communion with the Divine or of power from without are simply projections from the better part of our own sub-consciousness, or whether there is really 'Someone there?' But the question must be argued out on the broadest lines in the light of experience and the testing of results. The answer depends on our sense of values, on our whole orientation to life, and all I want to say here is that we do not draw the sting of the difficulty by any assertion that there is in the Christian Sacraments some external or semi-physical happening, since the people who believe that all religion is due to auto-suggestion will be in no way convinced by such an assertion unsupported by any external or objective evidence. But just now we are looking at the question from the point of view of those who on general grounds are convinced of the reality of God and of the fact of our

fellowship with Him. To say that we can on psychological grounds account for our sense of the Divine presence on particular occasions is in no way to explain away or deny its 'objective reality.' We are only trying to see how God works, how He comes to us, and the value of Sacraments and forms of worship will not be lessened if we find that they are based not on mere external authority, but on the instincts and fundamental principles of the human personality which is itself a reflection of the Divine.

EDWIN HATCH, 1835-1889.

By the REV. CANON W. SANDAY, D.D., F.B.A.*

WE constantly hear of the famous Cambridge trio—the three distinguished theologians who dominated the reign of Queen Victoria, Westcott (1825-1901), Lightfoot (1828-1889) and Hort (1828-1892). The period with which we have to deal is roughly, from 1820 to 1890. When other names are taken in, the *terminus ad quem* stands out very clearly. It is the Age of the Elder Victorians. There were special reasons which made it natural to think of the three men together. They were practically contemporaries; they were personal friends, closely allied in general theological position; they spent their best years at Cambridge, where they exercised a great influence, which from that centre spread over the country. There were other eminent theologians at Cambridge, but they had no rivals or competitors.

At Oxford during the same period there was nothing quite like this, though it would not be difficult to construct several triads of this kind. For instance, there was a homogeneous group at Christ Church, Pusey (1800-1882), Bright (1824-1901) and Liddon (1829-1890); a less homogeneous group, headed by Newman (1801-1890), with whom we may mention R. W. Church, Dean of St. Paul's (1815-1890), C. Bigg (1840-1908), and Mark Pattison (1813-1884); and then, as if to balance the Christ Church group, the three liberals, Stanley (1815-1881), Jowett (1817-1893), and Edwin Hatch (1835-1889). You will see at once from the dates, why it is

* Dr. Sanday died on September 16th. This address delivered in Wadham College Chapel was his last public utterance.—ED. M.C.

that this last name may seem to bulk rather less than most of the others. It was an all too short career. Hatch died at the comparatively early age of fifty-four, when he was but just coming into his own.

And yet in that short time he accomplished much; more in proportion than other lives which have been considerably longer. I think that perhaps, in order to indicate his special place in the history of Oxford and of English theology, I may do best to begin with some summary remarks on the ten names I have mentioned.

And, first, I would venture upon an observation which is perhaps of more importance than it may seem. I have mentioned ten names; and I would say that of these, all but one are associated with some distinct excellence of style. Dr. Pusey alone had no particular style beyond the weight and gravity of his subject matter. In Liddon and Stanley the excellence was obvious and well upon the surface; in Liddon, a certain French lucidity and keenness of edge; in Stanley, colour and movement and something of a temper that might have come down from the ages of chivalry. Dr. Bright was seen at his best in his sermons and shorter papers, in which he showed a real gift of eloquence, conjoined with the exact thinking of a highly trained and accurate theologian: in his longer books the vividness and eloquence are there, but the sentences are apt to be somewhat cumbrous and involved. The style of Dean Church was also rather elaborately built up and slow in movement, suited rather for contemplation than to describe action, but always marked by distinction and elevation, which came from width of view and refinement of insight and feeling. Mark Pattison's was essentially a strong style, nervous and incisive. I would myself place at the head of the list, of course Newman, but also Bigg and Jowett. Of Newman so much has been written that I need not stop to particularize. A Scotch friend of mine once asked me if he was not a little wanting in pith. I thought the remark threw more light on the nationality of the speaker than on the subject of the criticism. But I should like to pay a special tribute of admiration to the other two, Bigg and Jowett. Jowett had great beauty of style, and Bigg had a singular skill in condensing what he had to say into the

simplest and fewest words, always with a touch of the vernacular in them. Hatch's heart was in his work and his style was determined by the character of his work. I used to think it quite ideal for the production of long dictionary articles and books that were of the nature of long dictionary articles: it was always massive in construction, orderly in development, and lucid in exposition.

It is time that I applied a higher test, the test of learning and science. And here I may say at once that it was Hatch's great distinction that he had both learning and science, along with independence and originality. These last qualities were innate, but he would have had still more of both learning and science, if a longer life had been granted to him. This is really the gist of what I have to say in a nutshell.

By no means all the great names I have mentioned were really great in learning. This (that they were great in learning) may be truly said of Pusey and Bright; but not of Liddon, not strictly of Newman, not of Stanley or of Jowett. In the case of Dean Church it was not quite so much learning as wide and extensive culture. He had also the wisdom that comes from a balanced mind and extensive culture. Dr. Bigg probably would have been a really learned man if all his best years had not been spent in school-mastering. In any case he was a wise one. He was always profoundly human. Perhaps Mark Pattison was most typically the man of broad and varied learning. He left behind him one illustrious disciple who had a great influence in Oxford, Ingram Bywater.

I have said that Hatch had both learning and science, and that he would have had more of both if his life had been spared. It is always to be remembered that he died at the comparatively early age of fifty-four, and that his earlier years were more taken up than most men's with routine work and the work that is necessary to earn a livelihood. I never knew a more industrious man. I doubt if he took any exercise at all except that which was involved in going backwards and forwards to his work. In any case what he did may well put most of us to shame.

And then I spoke also of his independence and originality. Almost every subject that he handled he built up practically

from the foundations. I should say that he was bolder and more disinterested than even the great Cambridge trio. It is true that Westcott and Hort built up one subject, textual criticism, really from the foundations; and they did that on a magnificent scale. But that was comparatively neutral ground. Not one of the three, not even Hort—unless it was in unpublished work—can be said to have really launched out into the deep. Would it be very wicked if I were to say that Westcott dabbled in fundamentals? I must confess that, speaking for myself, I used to find that the most irritating thing about him was his incurable optimism. Everything seemed to work out just as he wished it. It was *Candide*—was it not?—that had for motto ‘All things for the best in the best of all possible worlds.’ But the way in which all this came out so neatly was just by means of little ingenuities and not by any broad scientific grasp. The *Introduction to the Study of the Gospels*, is I am afraid, a very poor book; and the words that I have just used seem to me to describe it. It is only fair to add that *The Gospel of the Resurrection* is distinctly better. When I spoke of ‘dabbling in fundamentals’ the phrase should be somewhat discounted. But I am afraid this was not a little pose.

Lightfoot was honest as the day; but he carefully, and even scrupulously, abstained from what I have called ‘dabbling in fundamentals.’ We remember that Hort said of him that his masculine good sense was ‘unaccompanied by either the insight or the delusion of subtlety.’ Hort himself knew only too well these temptations and dangers, and he was at bottom a daring thinker. But in his published work it was strange what a hold ideas once acquired seem to have had over him; one might read the *Hulsean Lectures* through without discovering that he had any doubts on the subject of verbal inspiration.

And then again Newman had a most acute and dexterous mind. But I have often thought that, if he had had any tincture of science, the whole course of English religion in the last century would have been different.

In the matter of science Hatch was really unique. I doubt if there is one besides of the ten whom I have mentioned who can be shown to have had a definite scientific ideal consciously before him. And yet all the time Hatch may be seen steadily

working out in practice a strictly scientific conception, planning out his work on a large scale, going back to origins, collecting his data by laborious induction and testing severely each step as he proceeds. In a sense the drawback to this method is its very thoroughness; and especially at that early stage of the inquiry at which Hatch himself was standing. He could hardly take anything for granted. It seemed to be necessary that everything should be done with his own hand. And for this the time was so short. Give such a method full scope; let it spread itself out over three or four generations, each taking up the work at the point where it was dropped; by such a process a solidly compacted edifice might be reared. The method had in itself the safeguard of continuous self-correction. But what was one man to do in the course of a career unduly compressed and shortened? Here came in the element of weakness.

If I am asked for an example of scientific method at its best, I would point to the very full Synopsis of Contents in Hatch's *Bampton Lectures*. If it is true that *vere scire est per causas scire*, it would not be easy to name a more perfect model. It is quite masterly. The drawback is that this process of knowing by causes must always be extremely difficult. Even if we are assured that all the causes before us are real (*verae causæ*), it is another thing to be assured that they are adequate and complete. Especially in the early stages of a science it must be almost impossible to be sure of this. Here, I imagine, is the chink in the armour of the *Bampton Lectures*. Not quite all the positions taken up have made themselves good.

There is yet a third point that I think should be brought out. We have considered the relation of the greater Victorians to learning and science. We ought also to consider how far they were consciously aiming at reality. Liddon and Stanley were primarily rhetoricians: it was good rhetoric: but I doubt if either stopped to examine himself very severely as to whether he was not trying to make the worse appear the better cause. Pusey and Bright wrote with their eye upon the object, but the object was rather strictly circumscribed. Newman was two things at once: a great psychologist and a subtle dialectician. The subtle dialectician led him into somewhat

devious ways, but he was honest at heart. He wished to tell the truth as he saw it; but he was groping his way by the help of dialectic, and he was apt to be carried away by it. Church and Pattison, perhaps in rather different ways and degrees, also meant to tell the truth, and had ample knowledge and equity of judgment. Bigg was veracious to the core, but, as we have seen, he was rather limited in opportunity. Jowett I should like to let speak for himself by two quotations, which I would preface by saying that I regard the essence of his writings as all contained in the little volume of extracts compiled by Lewis Campbell. The first, from p. 165, of these extracts:

‘No! there is no greater comfort, no stronger motive, than the knowledge of things as they truly are, apart from illusions and pretences and conventions and theological formulas. “Be not deceived,” God is not other than He is seen to be in this world, if we rightly understand the indications which He gives of Himself.’

The second (p. 151), from a private diary:

‘Would it be possible to combine in a manual of piety religious fervour with perfect good sense and knowledge of the world? This has never been attempted, and would be a work worthy of a great genius. . . . Is it possible for me, perhaps ten years hence, to write a new Thomas à Kempis, going as deeply into the foundations of human life, and yet not revolting the common sense of the nineteenth century by his violent contrast between this world and another?’

Those are precious sayings. And that is the real aspiration of the man.

Lastly, in regard to Hatch, I should say that the really dominating influence and motive with him was science, and science—real science—is perhaps the highest form of truth.

Hatch died in the year 1889, and we are now in the year 1920, thirty-one years later. You will naturally ask me how the two times compare with each other. And I am glad to think that I can give a reassuring answer. Especially if we apply the highest test of the combination of science and learning, and their deliberate and conscious use in relation to the problems of theology and religion, the outlook seems to me to be distinctly hopeful. A living friend of my own, who has but lately joined the ranks of the professors, seems to me to combine in high degree the very qualities that were characteristic of Hatch; and I can number off on my fingers at least four or five others of whom I would venture to say much the same. I believe that real progress has been made, and that there is good hope that it will continue to be made.

Hatch and Lightfoot both died about the same time, in the latter part of the year 1889. And I happen to have in my possession a deeply interesting and illuminating article by Harnack, at that time undoubtedly the leading theologian in Germany, on the two scholars. It appeared in the *Theologische Literaturzeitung* for June 14th, 1890. I will confine myself to the part about Hatch, but must needs give also the opening sentences of the article.

'Last year brought the heaviest losses for theological science not only in Germany but also in England. The two most important English Church historians, Hatch and Lightfoot, were both snatched away from us. An irreparable loss; for with both there went down to the grave a wealth of the most solid learning, and both were engaged in the task of preparing a great new book: the one, a *Corpus Clementinum*, the other a comprehensive *Concordance to the Septuagint*, which promised to be the foundation for the study of Biblical Greek. Lightfoot was the most learned and the worthiest representative of the conservative critical school in England. We in Germany in the nineteenth century did not possess any learned man in the conservative camp who could compare with him in range and accuracy of knowledge. . . .

Lightfoot I never saw in the flesh. With Hatch I was united by a close friendship, the enjoyment of which I reckon among the highest privileges of my life. What picture Lightfoot had made for himself of the history of the apostolic age, of the post-apostolic (we should perhaps say sub-apostolic) period and the rise of Catholicism, notwithstanding the extent of his writings, is not clear to me. Hatch's conceptions (or ideas) stand before me in bold outline, and I know that he would have advanced our science as no one else would have done if he had been allowed to write a History of the Christian Religion from its preparatory stages in the Alexandrine Age down to Gregory VII. So comprehensive was the period of which he had the command; and he possessed everything that belonged to the historian of these periods, the most exact knowledge of later Greek in all stages and nuances of its development, and insight into the historical course of things from which no detail was hidden, an expert's knowledge of the Fathers and of the ecclesiastical institutions (both of cultus and of law), a phenomenal memory for the facts and for their treatment in literature, an indefatigable (lit. iron) industry, but above all, along with the most complete critical training, the intuition of genius, the surest insight into the motive forces, the elements of truth and power in history, and a clear eye for rightly tracing the outlines of events in spite of the densest fogs (mists) of tradition and learned legends. To this was added a faculty for singling out the problem among the problems, for stating it clearly; and by the simplicity with which he proposed the question, he prepared the way for the right answer, which was a constant surprise. One who as a colleague had the good fortune to hold intercourse with him will have had the same feeling as the writer of these lines, that whoever conversed with him had the key to the secrets of history, the *sensus veri*. The highest qualities of an Englishman as a man of learning were combined in Hatch; familiar

from personal experience with English, German, French and American conditions, he understood the present time, its forces and its problems; and just for this reason he also knew how to find his way about the past. He had the highest respect for Personality in history; but he also knew that *Institutions* are the proper and immediate province of the historian, and that only in this field is certain historical knowledge to be attained. The history of Institutions he sought to understand not from their accidents but from the most elementary and therefore the most efficient factors. But he did not on that account ever yield to the great temptation of only regarding the coarse and material as a real force. Judgements about things interested him indeed much less than the thing itself: he did not care to work round a thing (*circa rem*); but spiritual forces were for him *par excellence* "things," and in his lectures on Church History he bore the noblest testimony to the power of the Gospel.' (*Theol. Literaturzeitung*, 1890, col. 297 ff.).

I would ask you to notice how this article is at one and the same time an enthusiastic estimate of Hatch and a penetrating sketch of the ideal of a Church historian.

Harnack expresses a very natural surprise that the possessor of all these gifts and qualities should have been only Reader in Ecclesiastical History and not Professor, and that he should have been set to tasks which it is fair to suppose that another man could have done. It was a great misfortune; but I do not see how it could well have been helped. We had at the time an excellent Regius Professor in Dr. William Bright, who was appointed in 1868, when Hatch had only just returned from Canada; and he was indeed little known in Oxford generally before his *Bampton Lectures*, which were delivered in 1880. For all that, it is astonishing how much, in an active career with full opportunity of barely ten years, he was able to accomplish. Think of it. The *Bampton Lectures*, the little but valuable book on *The Growth of Church Institutions* (1887), *The Hibbert Lectures on Greek Influence on Christianity* (1888), *Essays in Biblical Greek* (1889), besides solid and important articles in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* and *The Dictionary of Christian Antiquities*, and the foundations of the great *Concordance to the Septuagint*, completed by Redpath. These altogether covered, as I said, less than ten years, but were worthy of a long life. In thinking of Hatch we say over to ourselves Ben Jonson's famous lines:

'In small proportions we just beauties see,
And in short measures life may perfect be.'

GALILEO, 1564-1642.

By the REV. H. J. D. ASTLEY, M.A., Litt. D., Vicar of Rudham, Norfolk.
 Author of *Pre-historic Archæology and the Old Testament*.

‘He hath made the round world so sure that it cannot be moved.’

—Ps. xciii, 2; xcvi, 10.

A WRITER remarks in the last number of *The Hibbert Journal*: ‘Since the days of Copernicus the universe has widened and deepened beyond the power of the imagination or the mind to grasp. The mass of knowledge which has grown through all these years now surpasses the ability of any intellect to compass or co-ordinate. Man seems but an atom swept along by a complex of forces and laws infinite in number and in power. Yet man claims for himself what he too often is unable to justify—an individual position in the midst of this world; he feels, though he may be unable to prove it, that he is a person. In a way, and in a very striking way, the story of the world is the story of individuals. Social conditions may shape, and racial inheritance may qualify, the expression of life; but Plato and Alexander have influenced the world far more than they did the history of Greece. And Homer’s song has set men singing who never heard his speech. In its most significant form the history of the world or of civilization lies in the history of some dominating and overpowering personalities. What is personality? The more we study it the more we are puzzled by it. Why does one mind or heart move other minds and hearts which come long after the first has ceased to think or beat?’

The writer goes on to apply his subject to our Lord. ‘Nowhere,’ he continues, ‘do we find this so impressively as in Jesus Christ. . . . No age has fully expressed Him, and no age has ever exhausted Him.’

It is in the line of these great personalities, lesser than He, that Galileo has his sure and permanent niche.

The facts regarding his life may be briefly stated: He was born at Pisa in the same year as Shakespeare, February 15th, 1564. His father, Vincenzo, who was a skilled musician, with a good knowledge of classics and mathematics, had been compelled by straightened circumstances and a growing family to enter into commercial life, and for his eldest son’s career he chose the business of a cloth-dealer. Accordingly he forbade the boy to study mathematics, and took every means to prevent him doing so, thinking (as my friend the late Andrew Lang once said in regard to Archæology) that ‘there was no money in them.’ However, the boy early showed a bent in this very direction, and, at the age of nineteen, coming across a capable mathematician, named Ricci, at Florence, to which city his family had removed from Pisa, he attended his lectures, at first surreptitiously, and soon afterwards openly; and it was not long before he became proficient. Meanwhile, the medical studies, which his father had allowed him to begin at Pisa when he found he had no inclination for business, were inevitably neglected.

Being obliged to find a means of livelihood he now applied for every vacant mathematical professorship available, at Bologna, Padua, Pisa and Florence in the years 1587-8; finally he secured a position at Pisa in 1589, which he held till 1592. In this latter year he secured the Professorship at Padua, in the territory of Venice, which was still vacant, and held it for three successive terms of six years till 1610. It was during this period that

his great discoveries were made and the foundations of his fame firmly established.

In 1610 he received from Cosmo de Medici, Grand Duke of Florence, the life appointment to a professorship at Pisa, with no obligation to live there or lecture, and was thus set free to pursue the studies in which the rest of his life was engaged. At the same time it was this appointment which led to all his future troubles, for it brought him into collision with the Jesuits and the other enemies whom his discoveries roused against him, and nowhere but in the territory of Venice was there a government strong enough or that dared to withstand them. Before proceeding to narrate his discoveries and their consequences it may be mentioned here that he survived till 1642, when he died at Florence in a good old age, but blind and deserted by all but a few faithful friends and followers.

Galileo is often compared with his great contemporary, Bacon, (1561-1626) and the comparison is naturally built, as Hallam remarks, on the influence which in the same age they exerted in overthrowing the philosophy of the Schoolmen, and in founding that new discipline of real science which has rendered the last centuries glorious. But while Bacon's chief defect consists in his ignorance of mathematics and his inadequate notion of their utility, Galileo was no moral or political philosopher; their likeness lies in the fact that they would take nothing for granted, in their determination to test every theory by experiment, in the substitution, in a word, of inductive for deductive science. This was Galileo's marked characteristic from his earliest years; for example, at Pisa, when he was a student he made his first notable discovery. In the Cathedral he noticed a lamp swinging suspended from the roof, and remarked that as the swings died away they did not seem to get slower or quicker, and this observation led to the invention of an instrument for measuring pulse-beats, though the application of the principle to the use of a pendulum for regulating clocks was still in the future.

Again at Pisa he was led by experiment to confute the opinion of Aristotle that the velocity of falling bodies is proportional to their weight; by letting bodies of various weights fall from the top of the Leaning Tower he proved that but for the resistance of the air, which varies with the shape and size of the body, all fall at the same rate. Galileo tested everything in Aristotle's mechanics in a similar way, a thing which no one had been daring enough to do before him, and thus dogma was replaced by proof.

But it is time that we came to his great discoveries in Astronomy. In the year 1609 we are told he 'heard of the invention of an instrument in Holland which enlarged the size of distant objects,' whereupon he began to study the theory of refraction, and found that by means of a convex and concave glass in a tube he could magnify objects three-fold. Thus he was not the actual inventor of the telescope, but the first to apply the principle practically. By 1610 he had made his fifth telescope by which objects were magnified thirty-fold, and from this time discovery followed discovery in rapid succession. As an astronomer he trod in the steps of another great contemporary, Kepler (1571-1630), but while Kepler discovered the three laws of motion in studying the heavens, Galileo's discoveries lay more within the realm of actual fact. He first turned his telescope on the Moon, and found her configuration and variations of surface revealed to him; next he examined Jupiter and discovered his moons; then Saturn, whose ring was a puzzle he could not explain; then he confirmed a suspicion already formed that Venus has phases like the Moon; sun-spots next engaged his attention, and he was able to prove

from their movements that the sun revolves on his axis; and finally the study of the tides brought to a climax what had long been simmering in his mind, *viz.*, that the sun is the centre of the planetary system, and that the earth is a planet revolving like the rest on her own axis and round the central sun; that is, that the Copernican system is the true explanation of the universe. Copernicus, it will be remembered, was born at Thorn, in Germany, in 1473; he was a priest and canon of the Church, but made himself master of all the mathematical and astronomical science at that time available. About 1507, we are told, he began to adopt the system of Pythagoras in place of the Ptolemaic. By 1530 he had completed his treatise on *The Revolutions of the Heavenly Bodies*, in six books, but did not publish till 1543; 'perhaps,' says Hallam, 'he dreaded the bigoted prejudices which afterwards oppressed Galileo, and, as a matter of fact, the progress of his system, even among astronomers, was exceedingly slow.'

By the year 1611 the various treatises of Galileo in which he recounted his discoveries and pointed out the conclusions to which they led had brought upon him the suspicions of his old opponents, the Aristotelians and the Jesuits, and he was summoned to Rome, where his great reputation procured him a flattering reception from the then Pope and the authorities of the Church. Encouraged thereby he published in 1613 his *Letters on the Solar Spots* in which he took up a more decided position than he had hitherto towards the Copernican doctrine. 'Even in the time of Copernicus' (1472-1543), says Hallam, 'some well-meaning persons had suspected a discrepancy between the new view of the solar system and certain passages in Scripture—a suspicion strengthened by the anti-Christian inferences drawn from it by Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), but the question was never formally debated until Galileo's brilliant discoveries, enhanced by his formidable dialectic, and enthusiastic zeal, irresistibly challenged for it the attention of the authorities.' Accordingly in December, 1615 he was again summoned to Rome, and again cordially received and listened to, but his imprudent ardour served but to injure his cause. On the 24th February, 1616, the Holy Office characterized the two propositions, that the sun is immovable in the centre of the world, and that the earth has a diurnal motion of rotation, the first, as absurd in philosophy, and formally heretical, because expressly contrary to Holy Scripture, and the second as 'open to the same censure in philosophy, and at least erroneous as to faith'; he was therefore admonished not thenceforward to 'hold, teach or defend' the condemned doctrine. A friend, Mons. Dini, told him 'to write freely, but to keep outside the sacristy.' However, having been thus lightly let off, he seems to have dismissed the caution from his mind. Time went on, and in 1630 he published his *Dialogo dei due Massimi Sistemi del Mondo*, in which he advanced his theories in a form which the Church could not ignore. The interlocutors are three, Salviati, who expounds the views of the author, Sagreda, an eager and intelligent listener, and Simplicio, a well-meaning but obtuse Ptolemæan; unfortunately, in Simplicio the Pope, Urban V., saw himself depicted, and, as he fancied, insulted, and this made the case against Galileo all the harder to meet; the trial dragged on, and at last, in 1633, he was condemned as 'vehemently suspected of heresy,' and in the Church of Santa Maria sopra Minerva was forced to read his recantation of all his opinions. In his heart he knew he was right and must have loathed his perjury, but after all people do not go to the stake for astronomical opinions, and, as has been well observed, who would become a martyr for the proposition that 'two and two make four'? That he rose from his knees and stamped on the ground, exclaiming *Eppur si*

muove, is an entirely apocryphal legend not invented till a hundred years afterwards, but the thought may well have been in his mind.

We may ask, why was it that Galileo was condemned? The Copernican system had been some eighty years before the world, and during all that time had roused no opposition from the Church. It was held by the learned, but had very little affected the minds of the majority of people: its bearing upon the old cosmogony had never been thought out. Let us pause for a moment and consider what the pre-Copernican view of the universe from ancient times to the seventeenth century really was.

The view of St. Paul and of the first Christians did not differ from that of the writers of the Old Testament and of many of the Greeks and of Virgil as expressed in the sixth book of the *Aeneid*.

To them the world appeared as a three-storied building; the lowest story is the realm of the dead; above this the terrestrial world; and over it heaven with its inhabitants. Heaven is a space, from the midst of which Christ appears, within which God dwells surrounded by angels and spirits. There are several heavenly domes, one above the other; Paul himself has been in the third heaven, and in Paradise, which must be considered as situated in one of the various heavens. All this, which to us partakes of the spiritual, was to the ancients part of their cosmogony, the effect of looking out on nature and the Universe with the naked eye, and with a large infusion of primitive animistic ideas intermixed. At the same time the earth, stationary in the centre of the universe, 'made so sure that it cannot be moved,' was but a small place, bounded by the Pillars of Hercules and the Indies.

But for ages before Copernicus and Galileo the Ptolemaic system had taken the place of this primitive view. Ptolemy, the mathematician, astronomer and geographer of Alexandria, in the second century A.D., conceived a new system of the universe, in which the apparent motions of the sun, moon, planets and starry heavens were explained by means of a series of cycles and epicycles, the earth still being considered central. Ptolemy was the greatest astronomer of antiquity, and his system endured for more than 1,200 years, till it was overthrown by the discoveries of Copernicus, confirmed by Kepler and Galileo. It was the triumph of simplicity and law over complexity and cumbersomeness.

Though it cannot be said that the discoveries of Galileo would fully prove the Copernican system to those who were already insensible to reasoning from its sufficiency to explain the phenomena, they served to familiarize the mind to it, and to break down the strong rampart of prejudice which stood in its way. For eighty years, as has been said, this theory of the earth's motion had been maintained without censure, and it could only be the greater boldness of Galileo in its assertion which drew down upon him the censure of the Church. Moreover the followers of Copernicus, hitherto few in number, were now becoming more numerous, and the Church took alarm; the motion of the earth was conceived to be as repugnant to Scripture as the existence of antipodes had once been reckoned; hence Galileo's trial and condemnation. He suffered because he was too anxious to prove himself orthodox and his system compatible with Scripture, and the Jesuits and Doctors of the Inquisition were obliged to differ when the question was thus specifically brought under their notice. In arguing against the new view the Pope, Urban V, took his stand on the 'omnipotence of God.' 'It seems, in fact,' says Hallam, 'to have been the over-desire to prove his theory orthodox which incensed the Church against it. Many will tolerate propositions inconsistent with

orthodoxy, when they are not brought into immediate juxtaposition with it.' A pregnant sentence to which we shall refer later.

As a matter of fact the vast majority of ordinary Christians are still pre-Copernican in their ideas, when it comes, for example, to reciting the Creeds, for these were framed by men who held the pre-Copernican, and indeed pre-Ptolemaic, views stated above, and are no longer in harmony with anything that we can take as a statement of literal or material fact. It is as though we required men of mature years to hold the beliefs as to the rising and setting of the sun and such-like which were rightly so expressed in the language of childhood.

With the Copernican system a new outlook was slowly unfolded, and a revolution, the full effects of which are not yet apprehended, was brought to pass. The earth took her proper place in the universe, and with that the notion of a three or seven-storied building, or of the *primum mobile*, and the sun and starry heavens revolving round the earth each twenty-four hours had to be abandoned. The significance of this was not grasped at first, nor is it really grasped yet by most people.

I must not enlarge on the new views of the universe and of the earth and of man upon it opened up since the days of Galileo, in Astronomy, Geology, Biology and Anthropology, with which latter science my own studies have had most to do, in this place, but all of them follow on the same great lines. The old theology was a fixed and beautifully self-enclosed system, in which the heaven is open, and angels ascend and descend, and the supernatural (blessed word) mingles with the natural; but the lynch-pin has been knocked out of it; and the task of Modernists is to help the uninstructed masses to adapt themselves to the new point of view. Once this has been done, there will be no further use for Hyde Park oratory of the kind that discusses whether the story of the Fall is to be taken literally, or whether the Serpent of Paradise or Balaam's Ass really spoke, or the walls of Jericho fell down at the sound of the trumpet, or the sun and moon stood still over Gibeon, and such-like.

Two lessons, I think, we may learn: (1) Galileo recanted because he was old and feeble, and the threat of torture scared him; perhaps also, because he did not think the new views on cosmogony were worth martyrdom. We may learn not to mind even the mild form of persecution we may have to meet with—in our membership of a clerical society, for example, in which the majority of the members are probably obscurantists, or from the old lady in the front pew, and never to recant, or even hide, what we have learnt of truth, either under threats or blandishments.

(2) Galileo suffered because he was too anxious to prove himself orthodox; let us avoid this error; and let us above all beware of attempting to twist the Bible to suit our views. Let us be ready to follow the truth whithersoever it leads, and let us take the Bible and teach it frankly for what it is—the record of experiences—recognizing that religion and science move on different planes, the one material, the other spiritual, and that both are and must be, so far as known, true in their own spheres. Religion deals with the unseen, the moral, the spiritual; with these, rightly understood, no cosmological changes of outlook can interfere.

Galileo never said *Eppur si muove!* as the legend relates; but the thought was doubtless in his heart; and it is true not only of earth and planets and suns but of man's spiritual life; religion is, if real, not static but dynamic, ever moving on to new revelations of the divine; it is the Eternities alone that abide.

JOSEPH MAZZINI, 1805-1872.

By the Rev. F. G. GWEN-WILSON, M.A., Vicar of Dedham.

'Where there is no vision, the people perish.'—*Proverbs* xxix. 18.

THE name of Joseph Mazzini will always be associated with the genius and the creed of nationality. The idea is a distinctly modern one, and has been by no means universally accepted. It may be regarded as a bye-product of the French Revolution. Prior to that it would be hard to point to a single statesman, or political thinker, who believed that races and peoples had any right to determine how they should be governed. Under the *régime* of Napoleon it was quickened into consciousness, and alike in Germany and in Italy he was aware of its awakening impulses. But Italy was the only country where he intentionally encouraged the spirit of nationality. In the three Italian States of his creation, into which he divided the conquered land, and over which he retained a controlling hand, he introduced personal and religious freedom, equal and common laws. But from posing as the champion of Revolutionary France and the liberator of Italy from foreign and domestic tyrants, he became the imperial autocrat whose aim and ambition it was to sweep away all rivals, and be the sole arbiter of the destinies of nations and individuals. It was Mazzini who discerned the new political future, and gave the impulse to the nationalist movements which spread through Europe from 1830 to 1870; and those forty years exactly coincide with the active period of his own life. Born at Genoa in 1805, he died at Pisa in 1872. He was the prophet of the new age—the 'heart' of *Resorgimento*, as George Meredith sang, of which Cavour was the 'brain,' and Garibaldi the 'sword.' Modern history has no parallel to a struggle so intense, yet so full of romantic adventure and heroic self-sacrifice.

The Treaty of Paris practically restored the old territorial divisions of Italy as they existed before the coming of Napoleon, except that Venice and Lombardy were now held by Austria, and the republic of Genoa was assigned to Piedmont, which with Sardinia, and Savoy across the Alps, formed the kingdom of Sardinia. The centre of the peninsula was occupied by the Papal States and Tuscany, and the petty duchies of Modena, Parma and Lucca. The southern mainland, restored once more to the Bourbons, made up, with Sicily, the kingdom of Naples, called in the language of diplomacy the kingdom of the Two Sicilies. But these States had little independence of their own, and the authority of the Emperor Francis was almost as undisputed over the rest of Italy as it was in Lombardy and Venice. In Giusti's stinging phrase, 'the Italians ate Austria in their bread.' Piedmont alone preserved its independence, but Metternich, to whom Italy was no more than a 'geographical expression,' was persuaded that its absorption into Austria was merely a matter of time.

I.

Such was the political condition of Italy in 1830, which we may conveniently take as our starting point. Mazzini was then in his twenty-sixth year. He had been arrested and imprisoned on the charge of getting recruits for the secret society of the Carbonari, of which he had recently become a member. The governor of Genoa told

his father, who was a professor of anatomy at the University, that his son was gifted with some talent, but too fond of walking by himself at night absorbed in thought. 'We don't like young people thinking,' he added, 'without knowing the subject of their thoughts.' He was removed to the fortress of Savona, where from his cell window he had for prospect the broad expanse of sea and sky, and for occupation his own gloomy thoughts. With fragments of food he managed to entice and tame a greenfinch, which became the companion of his solitude. We get another glimpse of him twenty years later, on his return to London after his brief triumph at Rome. In his small and dingy lodging, littered with books and papers—his habit of sitting on the edge of a chair was due, it was said, to his own being piled with books—the air thick with the smoke of cheap cigars—coffee and cigars he could not deny himself even in the days of extreme poverty,—he was generally to be found writing at his desk, answering endless correspondence, composing articles for his Italian papers, or raising subscriptions to help on the cause, or to ease the lot of the poor refugees. Stretched across the window was a fine wire netting to prevent the escape of the tame canaries which flew freely about the room, or perched on his head and shoulders as he sat writing. These and his carefully tended plants were during his working hours his sole companions.¹

The governor of the prison at Savona had allowed him to read the Bible, Byron, and Tacitus, in the innocent belief that these books were harmless to a young man of revolutionary ideas. The Bible gave him that deep sense of justice, and intense sympathy for the poor and downtrodden, which remained with him through life; from Byron we may believe he learned that 'excellency of sincerity and strength' which Swinburne pronounced, in spite of offences and defects, to be the supreme source of the poet's inspiration; while he himself admits that his study of the classics under his Latin tutor was one of the influences which turned his mind to democracy. Another was the ineffaceable memory of a walk one Sunday, ten years earlier, with his mother and a friend of the family in the streets of Genoa, when they were addressed by 'a tall black-bearded man with a severe and energetic countenance,' who was soliciting help from passers-by 'for the refugees of Italy.'

The Carbonari revolution of 1821, ill-conceived and ruthlessly suppressed, was his first experience of a blow struck in the cause of Italian liberty. The memory of those refugees with their despairing faces haunted him. He neglected his lessons, sat silent and absorbed, and was only aroused to interest to hear tidings of the exiles, and learn the story of their defeat. From that travail of mind was born the idea, weak and frail at first, but soon to reach the full stature of a passionate conviction, that 'we Italians could and therefore ought to struggle for the liberty of our country.' His childish imagination decided him to put on mourning for his country, and from that time till the end of his life black was the habit of his dress.

II.

In February, 1831, Mazzini was released from prison. The court had not enough evidence to convict, but sufficient to regard him as a dangerous character. He was given the choice of police supervision or exile. He chose the latter, crossed the Alps, and after a period of wandering settled at Marseilles, where he was joined by other Italian refugees. There he

¹ See Bolton King, *Life of Mazzini*, pp. 18, 142.

founded 'Young Italy,' which began the real movement for the liberation of Italy. Like the Carbonari it displaced it was a secret society, otherwise it would have been stamped out. It was designed to enlist young men who pledged themselves to disseminate the ideas of national unity and freedom among all sections of the Italian people. Its members were to be prepared for every hardship, even to the sacrifice of life itself, in the belief that 'ideas grow quickly when they are watered by the blood of martyrs.' The cause of their country's freedom was to be to them a national religion—a duty which God had laid upon them; and if undertaken in that spirit success in the end must crown their efforts. Not less did Mazzini conceive his mission, which was not to form a political party, but to initiate a 'creed and an apostolate.'

The revolutionary activities of Mazzini could not long escape the notice of the authorities, and in August, 1832, a decree was passed expelling him from France. For a whole year he eluded the police, still pursuing his work with undaunted courage and determination. At last he was forced to flee, and escaped with a few friends to Geneva. But his presence soon became an embarrassment to the Swiss Government. The ill-starred expedition, which he planned to cross the border, raise the standard of revolt in Savoy, and fire the signal for risings in other parts of Italy, was easily defeated, and ignominiously suppressed. The Government was forced to take action, and Mazzini was condemned to perpetual exile from the Swiss Republic. He refused to leave, and search for him was made in vain. For nearly three years he led a hunted life, being kept a virtual prisoner in the various houses where he found a refuge, never daring to appear by day, and using night for a hurried removal from one place to another. At last his health broke down, and he sought a safer asylum in London, which was to be his home for the next ten years.

Those three hunted years in Switzerland were the hardest he had to bear. His party was demoralised, and he was reproached with being the cause of failure. Often in real want, miserably clothed, ill-fed, without books, his condition was piteous, and he was brought to the depths of dejection and despair. Courage he did not lack, even the life of a conspirator was endurable, but his sensitive nature shrank from the pain of exile. That heart-ache was always with him; 'a physical craving for home' as he calls it, 'for Italian clouds and wind and sea.' But, apart from his own sufferings, he was haunted by the thought of the suffering he had brought upon others. This was the deepest wound of all. 'I wanted to do good,' he writes to a friend, 'but I have always done harm to everybody, and the thought grows and grows till I think I shall go mad. Sometimes I fancy I am hated by those I love most.' He found relief, and was restored to mental health by his doctrine of duty—'an arid bare religion,' as he confessed, 'which does not save my heart a single atom of unhappiness, but still the only one that can save me from suicide.' He was always asking himself why Christianity had succeeded, while his own movement had failed. He found an answer in the fact that it lacked the spiritual power which made Christianity triumphant. He traced the failure of the French Revolution, as well as the various risings in Italy, to the egotism and selfishness of men, insistence on their rights, the pursuit of personal happiness. A higher note must be struck. 'We fell as a political party, we must rise as a religious party.' The new revolution must look for strength to 'the enthusiasm which alone begets great things'; it must appeal to man's sense of duty, and must bid him work not for himself, but for humanity.

This theory of duty saved him from suicide, but gave no rest to his soul. To look for happiness led to selfishness; now he learnt that 'sacrifice was the one real virtue,' and that 'duty to God, and humanity, and country, and all men' was the only law of life for the true man. Years afterwards he told the story of that inward crisis of his life, so fresh and poignant a memory did he keep of those tragic years.

'Were I to live for a century,' he writes, 'I could never forget the close of that year (1836), nor the moral tempest that passed over me, and amid the vortex of which my spirit was so nearly overwhelmed.' Every Italian hope, he goes on, had been overthrown for an indefinite time, through the loss or dispersion of the best spirits of the party, the exhaustion of its means, the growing burden of opposition, and the increasing peril of persecution. But these were not the heaviest trials. 'It was the falling to pieces of the moral edifice of faith and love, from which alone I had derived strength for the combat; the scepticism I saw rising around me on every side; the failure of faith in those who had solemnly bound themselves with me to pursue unshaken the path we had known at the outset to be choked with sorrows; the distrust I detected in those most dear to me as to the motives and intentions which sustained and urged me onward in the evidently unequal struggle.'

He felt alone in the world—alone but for his mother, far away and unhappy for his sake—and drew back in terror at the void before him. In that moral desert, doubt came upon him. Perhaps he was wrong and the world right. Perhaps he had become obsessed by an intellectual egotism withering the spontaneous impulses of his heart, which would have led him to the modest virtues of a limited sphere, and to duties near at hand, and easy of fulfilment. Gradually the tempest of doubt subsided. He searched his heart to see if there were any lurking selfishness in it. Material desires he had surrendered long ago, but he had clung to the affections. 'I ought to have regarded them as a blessing of God, to be accepted with gratitude when it descended to irradiate or cheer my existence, not demanded them either as a right or a reward. I had unconsciously made of them the condition of the fulfilment of my duties. I had been unable to realise the true ideal of love—love without earthly hope—and had unknowingly worshipped not love itself, but the joys of love.' He bade a long farewell to individual hopes, and dug the grave, not of his affections, but of all the desires and ineffable comforts of affection, so that none might ever know the Ego buried beneath.

'I came to my better self alone, without aid from others, through the help of a religious conception, which I verified in history. From the idea of God I descended to the conception of progress; from the conception of progress to a true conception of life, to faith in a mission and its logical consequences—duty, the supreme rule of life; and having reached that faith I swore to myself that nothing in this world should again make me doubt or forsake it.'

But the seed sown with so much difficulty and in such travail of soul, had taken firm root, and nothing now could arrest its growth. The idea of a united Italy, which Mazzini more than anyone else had planted in the hearts of his countrymen, had now become a fixed resolve, and though it might not take the form he most ardently desired, the day of fulfilment could not long be delayed.

III.

In March, 1848, Milan rose in revolt, and after five days of heroic struggle, the story of which has been so finely told in the pages of

Vittoria, the Austrian garrison was driven in flight from the city. War was declared, and at the good news Mazzini hurried to Italy. He reached Milan in April, to be welcomed with extraordinary enthusiasm by the people. After years of exile he appeared among his countrymen as a prophet, 'once cast out and stoned,' whose words had come true, and the dream of yesterday about to take shape in living reality. He promised to support Charles Albert so long as his intentions were to promote unity, and agreed that the question of the form of government should not be raised until the war was over. He himself stood firm for the republican idea, and was justified in regarding it as a breach of neutrality when a plebiscite was taken, which revealed a preponderating vote in favour of the fusion of Lombardy with Piedmont. Meanwhile the war was lost through the incompetence of Charles Albert as a general, and the defection of the Pope and the king of Naples. The vacillating policy of Pius IX was fatal to his position at Rome, and he escaped in disguise to the friendly security of Gaeta. A Republic was proclaimed, and Mazzini with two other Romans were chosen Triumvirs, but for the five months of its brief existence Mazzini was virtually dictator of Rome. The fortunes of that brave experiment of an ideal State, whose watchword was *God and the People*, were desperate from the first. But at least it could leave behind it, when the day of dissolution came, the memory of a great republican example.

The defence of the Roman Republic belongs properly to the story of of Garibaldi, but something must be said of those few months of rule in which Mazzini, whose character had been chastened and refined by years of suffering and self-surrender, proved in the full gaze of the world what manner of man he was. Lodged in the Quirinal, as his official residence, he chose a modest room from among its many spacious apartments, 'small enough to feel at home in.' There he lived in impressive simplicity, 'as accessible to working men and women as to his own officials, with the same smile and warm handshake for all; dining for two francs at a cheap restaurant, afterwards, during the siege, living on bread and raisins, his only luxury the flowers that an unknown hand sent every day, his one relaxation to sing to his guitar when left alone at night. The Triumvir's slender stipend of £32 a month he spent entirely on others.'²

He came to be regarded by those around him as possessed of an almost supernatural virtue: men gave him a confidence, and yielded him an obedience, which the fugitive of Gaeta might well envy, but could not command. 'Here in Rome,' he told the Assembly, 'we may not be moral mediocrities'; and under the spell of his persuasive personality, a remarkable change was wrought in the character of the people themselves. They bore with patience and outward calm the destruction of their homes, and the growing scarcity of food. Crime was almost unknown, and even the poorest showed an unwonted honesty. Women and children, driven from their homes by the French bombardment, were lodged for safety in the abandoned palaces of the Roman nobles, who had fled with the Pope to Gaeta, leaving money and jewelry lying about their rooms. They promised to take nothing, and to injure nothing, and it is said that not even a brooch was stolen.

Mazzini defined the policy of his rule as 'Stiffness in principles, toleration to individuals.' The press was allowed a freedom it had never before enjoyed. There were fewer arrests, and fewer penalties for political offences. The clergy were protected in their spiritual work, and the reli-

² Bolton King, *Life of Mazzini*, p. 133.

gious services went on uninterrupted. When the Triumvirs assumed power they found the public finances in a deplorable condition. By careful administration they were able to liquidate the huge deficit, and create a large reserve fund, which was duly appropriated by the Papal government on its return. The high ideal Mazzini set before him was reflected in his State papers, and Palmerston is said to have referred to his diplomatic notes as 'models of reasoning and argument.'

But against an enemy twice their number, supported by a powerful siege artillery, resistance was hopeless, and the French entered Rome. Three thousand brave men followed Garibaldi in his determination to fight his way to Venice, where Manin still defied the Austrian arms. Mazzini refused to leave. The dream of his life was over. He wandered openly about the city, but no one lifted a hand against him. The French dared not arrest him, knowing how much he was loved. At the end of a week he made his way back to England, where he was again to make his home for the greater part of the sad life that remained to him. Ten years were to pass before another and successful blow was struck in the cause of Italian freedom. The scene was not Rome, but Piedmont, and the master-mind was not Mazzini's, but Cavour's. The alliance with France, and the aid of French troops, to which he would never have consented, were dearly purchased. They meant the loss of Savoy, the ancestral home of Victor Emmanuel, and Nice, the birthplace of Garibaldi. But, in spite of its crushing defeat, the year 1849 was the turning point of Italian fortunes. For one brief moment Mazzini had been enthroned in the hearts of his people, and stood before the world as the prophet and legislator of Italian unity. As evidence of the reverence in which he was held let the following story suffice. Twenty years later he went to Genoa to visit his mother's tomb. 'The only thing really touching to me,' he wrote to England, 'was in the churchyard—it was late, and the place was quite empty, but a keeper had, it seems, recognised me, and coming out of the gate, some poor people, a priest among them, were drawn up in a line, bowing and almost touching the earth. Not a smile, no attempt at absurd applause; they felt my sadness, and contrived to show that they were sharing it.'³

Mazzini has been called a conspirator, with the opprobrium which attaches to so distasteful a business. And so indeed he was. But where, as he said, was the opening for a reformer in a country whose alien rulers permitted no representative institutions, and punished the mildest form of criticism, except through the agency of a secret organisation and a secret press? Yet the rôle of a conspirator tended to make him a mere mischief maker, while an irritability of temper, surely pardonable in one who had suffered such cruel and persistent misfortune, made him a difficult man to live with and work with. None the less his place is first among those who dreamed, and worked, and suffered, in the cause of a united Italy.

IV.

Among his contemporaries Mazzini stands apart, and few men of any age have shown so rare a love for fellow-men as he. In spite of defects and failings, all who knew him bear witness to the purity of his aims and the nobility of his soul. Carlyle, who detested his opinions, and was impatient of his 'republicanisms, his Progress, and other Rousseau fanaticisms,' could yet speak of him as 'recognisably a most valiant, faithful, considerably gifted and noble soul.'⁴ J. S. Mill wrote of him as 'one of the men he most respected'; a high tribute from so austere a mind. In conversation with Mr. Gladstone, who never met and thought little of

³ Bolton King, *Life of Mazzini*, p. 217.

Mazzini, Lord Morley stood up for him 'as one of the most morally impressive men I have ever known, or that his age knew: he breathed a soul into democracy.'⁵ His was the adoration of holy ideas, not the worship of material things.⁶ The words that he wrote of Lamennais might with greater justice be applied to himself;—'his voice resounded in double power, like the voice of the prophets of old; and his utterance had all the religious solemnity of one who, after long and weary search, has found at length the truth. He preached God, the people, love and liberty. He proclaimed the downfall of the powers of the day, and called upon the nations to wrest from their grasp the insignia of the mission they had betrayed.' It was not without reason that continental monarchs dreaded Mazzini as 'a man whose name was at once an alarm, a menace, and a prediction.'

Mazzini believed in progress. 'Every doctrine,' he said, 'that does not rest on progress as an essential law of its being is inferior to the ideal, and to the needs of the age.' And he taught that association was the means by which it would be gradually achieved. The cause of Italy made him the champion of all oppressed nationalities. His faith in the future was based on the belief that when the people were no longer ruled by alien masters, but free to adopt their own form of government, each would serve the other in bringing about the desired end, and thus make for the solidarity of the human race. 'We desire not only the freeing of one people, and of others through it, but the freeing of all the peoples through their own efforts.' In this he was disappointed, and waxed indignant when he saw nations bent on achieving their own freedom, but lifting no helping hand to others who were striving to attain the same end. But his vision of the future had its fantastic side. He confidently predicted that Catholicism, 'which was at first a form of Christianity, then a deviation from it,' was 'irrevocably doomed to perish'; but he believed that when Europe was remodelled, then the nations would look to Rome as the moral centre of the world, to teach them their common duties to humanity. Italy, he averred, with pardonable patriotism, from her geographical position, her character, her traditions, was 'the land destined by God to the great mission of giving moral unity to Europe, and through Europe to humanity.' We are reminded of that prophetic vision which saw in the days to come all nations flowing to Jerusalem to be instructed in the divine law.

Mazzini had at his command a terse, clear and vigorous language, which all could understand, while his burning enthusiasm and absolute sincerity won all hearts. And he was master of the art of casting a spell over the minds of men by the magic of a telling phrase. He invested the name of Italy with a sacred character, and so plays upon the sensibility of the mass till he makes the name a great emotional symbol. 'God and the people' is the watchword of the Republic. Duty is his great social doctrine: association his leading economic idea. His famous essay on the 'Duties of Man,' which contains a full statement of his teaching and opinions, he addressed to the Italian working men. God has made you, he said, social and progressive beings. Liberty gives you the power of choosing between good and evil, that is, between duty and egoism; educa-

⁴ *Reminiscences*, ii., 182.

⁵ *Life of Gladstone*, iii., 359 (shilling edition). There is an interesting and appreciative account of Mazzini in Lord Morley's *Recollections*, i., 75-80.

⁶ 'The cause is the gradual substitution of the worship of material interests, for the adoration of holy ideas.' *Preface to Faith and the Future*.

tion will teach you how to choose; association must give you the means by which to put your choice into practice. Progress is the end in view, and when visibly achieved, the proof that you are not mistaken in your choice.

By education Mazzini meant the cultivation of all the faculties with which God has endowed mankind, moral as well as intellectual. But the work of education is more rapidly accomplished when the individual is linked with a collective life. Man, therefore, was created for association. It multiplies his strength a hundredfold; improves and sanctifies his nature through the affections, and the growing sentiment of the human family; while the more intimate and comprehensive the co-operation of one man with another, the further will he go forward in the path of individual progress. It does not seem to have occurred to him that association may have the effect of breaking down individual liberty, and that is a serious defect in most forms of Socialist, Syndicalist, or Trades Union schemes. It is doubtless a powerful engine for securing material benefits, which he maintained must only be used to serve higher ends; but the fact remains that the implanting of moral and spiritual ideas is invariably due to the teaching and example of men of high endeavour, and saintly character. Corporations nourish and sustain social and religious movements, but do not initiate them. That is the work of individual men, and Mazzini is a case in point. There was more truth in Carlyle's contention that the course of events is influenced and guided by the world's great men and master-minds than he cared to admit. And history does not show us that steady progression towards a better state of things which he would have us believe. It is clear that he is thinking only of the development of the good in man. Education may be highly specialised, as in Germany, and yet lead men to a wrong choice. Association does help them to achieve their object, but that is no guarantee that it will be the right one. With our knowledge of Italian history after unity was won, we may hesitate to believe that political thought has progressed for the gradual betterment of the human race through the stages of liberty, equality, and association.

Mazzini's view of history briefly was this. Christianity made a great advance by the substitution of a belief in providence for the blind fatality of the old oriental and pagan religions, but it did not grasp the holy idea contained in the word progress. Its teaching was limited to the individual: humanity as a collective body remained unknown to it.

'To save oneself, not through the world, or by working with the world, but in spite of the world—that was the supreme formula of Christianity.'

I pause only to say how one-sided a view this is, and how strongly it would be repudiated to-day. No one spoke with greater fervour and reverence of the person and mission of Jesus, and he explained the divinity attributed to Jesus, which he denied, to the necessity of overcoming the immense disparity between the end which Christianity had in view, and the means of attaining it, by believing in the intervention of a superior power independent of all law. But he put his finger on a real defect in the Catholic presentment of Christian truth as a tradition maintained by rites, with its insistence on dogma, when he reminded us that Jesus in a solemn moment, and with a sublime intuition of the future, foretold the progressive revelation of a faith whose teaching should embrace His own, and promised us the Spirit of Truth, who should guide us into all truth, who should show us things to come, and should abide with us for ever.

The Papacy served its purpose in the early centuries of its institution, because it taught mankind that the spiritual power is higher than the temporal. Protestantism

‘was practically nothing more than a protest in favour of intellectual liberty, that had been systematically violated by the Papacy.’ Without the right of private judgement every attempt to pass the limits of the old belief would have failed: that was its sole mission in the world. The aim of the eighteenth century was to complete that human evolution, which was announced by Christianity, and attained in part by Protestantism. The French Revolution summarised and concluded the Christian age. Its work was to apply to social and political affairs the principles of Christianity which belong to a spiritual order of things, and which can only be verified by man in heaven. The Revolution must be considered, therefore, ‘not as a programme, but as a summary: not as the initiation of a new age, but as the last formula of an expiring age.’ The dawn of the new age will break when men rise to the need of association, which ‘is no more than the method of progress, the means by which it is gradually achieved.’

After long and anxious debate Mazzini declared that he was not a Christian. He was a theist, with a passionate belief in God and Duty—‘God indwelling, just and good; Duty that prompts to endless effort, rewarded by endless progress, while the soul mounts through ascending existences to an inconceivable oneness with the divine.’⁷ That was his creed. Yet by temperament he was essentially Christian; words of Christian prayer came naturally to his lips; Christmas Day was sacred to him; and he believed in the permanence of Christian ethics. He wrote to an English friend:

‘This will reach you on Christmas Day. I am not a Christian, I belong to what I believe to be a still purer and higher Faith; but its time has not yet come, and until that day the Christian manifestation remains the most sacred revelation of the ever-onward progressing spirit of mankind.’⁸

The main defect that Mazzini found in Christianity was that it taught mankind how to prepare for a life to come, but was not concerned with the amelioration of the social and economic conditions of this present life. The charge is a familiar one: the thorough-going eschatologist and the social democrat leave us in no doubt about that. But does it not rise from a confusion between two aspects of ethical teaching, which are held to be contradictory, but are in reality complementary? The first is the world-affirming ethic, which says that the world as we have it is God’s world, and that it is our duty as good citizens to make the best of it. The second is the world-renouncing ethic, which means that there is something beyond this present world, with the social and national claims that it makes upon us, and that to realise his true nature man must be more than a good citizen. It teaches us that there are times when we can only hope to fulfil our mission in the world, and do the good that we would, by keeping our mind fixed upon an ideal which promises neither for ourselves nor for others the realisation of worldly hopes and ambitions. The end is so boundless, the vision so ineffable, that only by looking beyond this world, and standing apart from the world, can the mind rest in confidence of its ultimate fulfilment. Must we not admit that a great source of strength of the early Christians was, that while they laboured for the

⁷ F. W. Myers, *Modern Essays*, Joseph Mazzini, p. 65.

⁸ See Bolton King, *Life of Mazzini*, p. 230.

edification of the Church in such tasks and duties as lay immediately at their hands, being in the world yet not of the world, they 'looked for the city, which hath the foundations, whose builder and maker is God'? And was not that true of Mazzini's own life? For the cause, which to him was a religion, he gave up all. He renounced his first love for literature, and put aside the counsel of friends to 'honour Italy with his pen.' He accepted exile rather than abjure the mission to which he felt himself called, and 'went out, not knowing whither he went.' His exile's life denied him the hope and the promise of marriage. Instead he embraced poverty as a bride, and with faith in God and Duty to guide him, dedicated his life to the service of mankind.

It is within two years of half a century since Mazzini died, and there is no more living question at this moment than the principle of national self-government. It has been conceded in the case of our own Colonies, and cannot in justice be long withheld from our dependencies of India and Egypt. In Ireland the problem is presented in its gravest and most difficult form. The absorbing concern of the Peace Conference was how to make effective the aspiration for self-government on the part of the subject races of Europe. But Mazzini further taught that only through the principle of nationality can the solidarity of the human race be permanently built up. That is the work of the League of Nations, by which nations in the enjoyment of self-government form a compact for the mutual protection of their distinctive and collective rights and interests. That is the ideal, which in its initial stage cannot expect to have much power of effective action. But it is faith which overcomes the mountains of prejudice, indifference, and unbelief; and if only we can get the ideal of a League of Nations believed in by the mass of people, and make it an article of our political faith, the day of its realisation cannot long be delayed.

RAYMOND LULL, 1236-1315

By the Rev. H. D. A. MAJOR, B.D., Principal of Ripon Hall, Oxford.

The Kings of Tharsis and of the isles shall give presents; the Kings of Arabia and Saba shall bring gifts. Ps. lxxvii, 10.

AT Palma in Majorca, in the year 1236, Raymond Lull was born. Lull's world was smaller than ours. Geographically it consisted of Europe, Northern Africa and Western Asia. The Mediterranean was its central sea. In Lull's world there were but three religions, those of Christ, Mohammed and Moses. Its literature was written in four languages, Latin, Greek, Hebrew and Arabic. The learned in Western Europe only knew Latin. But although a small world, its intellectual, religious and aesthetic energy were great.

During the eighty years of Lull's life many significant things happened. The national literatures of Southern Europe were born; the school of Italian painting originated; Gothic architecture began to assume its most inspiring forms; the newly-founded Universities became the chief training centres for service in Church and State; Parliamentary Government took its rise; the Church formulated a New Theology, the result of the recently discovered Aristotelian philosophy; Latin hymns unsurpassable in majesty and melody were composed in honour of the Virgin-Mother; the miracle of transubstantiation and the terrors of the way of judgment; last but not

least modern science was born into a world of which the acutest intellects believed in alchemy, astrology and magic.

Lull's age was one of mingled light and darkness. While it beheld the rise of arts and sciences, while it listened entranced to mendicant friars preaching Christian idealism, it sympathized with the extirpation of the Albigenses, the bloodshed of the Crusades, the cruelties of the Inquisition, the violent asceticism of the Flagellants, the aridities of Scholasticism, the search for the Philosopher's Stone and the *Elixir Vitae*. It might be justly described in the words of the Hebrew prophet, 'The light shall not be clear, nor dark; not day nor night.' Lull was born in the dayspring of the Renaissance, an age 'seething with great thoughts soon to be embodied in great lives.'

Among Lull's contemporaries were St. Thomas Aquinas and his rival Duns Scotus—the framers of contending theologies; Dante, the founder of Italian literature; Louis IX, the warrior-saint of France; Roger Bacon, the father of modern science; Marco Polo, the Venetian traveller, who unveiled for Europe the wonders of Eastern and Central Asia; Cimabué and his pupil Giotto, the originators of modern painting. St. Francis of Assisi died ten years before Lull was born; St. Dominic fifteen years; Innocent III, who raised the Papacy to the highest point of temporal power, twenty years.

Lull was a Spaniard—a Goth, not an Iberian—by descent. His father, a knight of Catalonia, helped his sovereign, James I of Arragon, to conquer the Balearic Islands, and received for his services large estates in Majorca. His son Raymond succeeded to the estates and became Master of the Royal Household. He was a man of many accomplishments—a soldier, courtier, musician, poet. His extant poems are among the earliest examples of Catalonian literature. He was devoted to pleasure. Although married young, he seems to have ignored the claims of conjugal fidelity. One night, when composing a love poem to a lady of the court, he had a vision of Christ on the cross. On successive nights he resumed the composition of the poem, but the vision re-appeared. In Lull's case the vision was as effective as that which St. Paul beheld on the road to Damascus, or that which befell Joan of Arc among the apple blossom of Domremy. Lull resolved to renounce self-indulgence and devote himself to Christ. With Lull devotion meant active service. Thirteenth-century Christianity was certainly ascetic, but it was not the arid asceticism of the Thebaid. It was active and social. It not only suffered, it worked for Christ. Lull quickly decided on his life's work. He would be the Apostle of the Moslems. Why exactly he chose this task is not easy to say. Perhaps because he lived on the frontiers of Islam; perhaps because he came early under the influence of the Franciscans. St. Francis had done a remarkable thing. During the Fifth Crusade, when in 1219 the Christians were besieging Damietta, he visited the Christian camp, but he resolved to minister to their enemies also. He allowed himself to be led a captive before Malek-al-Kamel, Sultan of Egypt. The Sultan listened with respect to his exhortations, and when dismissing him said (so Bishop Jacques de St. Vitry relates):

'Pray for me that God may enlighten me, and enable me to hold firmly to that religion which is most pleasing to Him.'

In an age when the Church slaughtered heretics, offered to Jews and Moors the alternatives of baptism or exile, taught that Crusaders who fell fighting against Saracens passed straight to Paradise, Lull perceived that the wrath

of man worketh not the righteousness of God, and resolved to convert Mohammedans to Christianity by Christian means. He writes:

'It is my belief, O Christ, that the conquest of the Holy Land should be accomplished in no other way than as Thou and Thy apostles undertook to accomplish it—by love, by prayer, by tears, and by the offering up of our own lives.'

This is an extraordinary declaration for the son of a Spanish cavalier, whose father, sword in hand, had won his estate from the infidel.

The task to which Lull devoted himself was extremely difficult. To-day it is no easy matter to convert a Mohammedan, yet the Christian world commands the resources of philosophy, science and criticism in a much higher degree than does Islam. In Lull's day the position was reversed. Muslim culture stood much higher than Christian. By means of Arabic translations the Muslim world had become the heir of Greek philosophy and Greek science. Western Christianity was exerting no intellectual influence on Islam, but Islam was penetrating Western Christianity at many points. The philosophy of the Arab Averroes with its disintegrating scepticism, which taught that a thing might be true for faith but false for philosophy and *vice versa*, was gaining ground in the Christian universities; in medicine and mathematics as well as in alchemy and astrology Christian investigators looked to Islam for enlightenment; even in literature, as a distinguished professor of poetry in this university points out, the imaginative poetry of Southern Europe, whether of Sicily, Provence or Italy, was inspired by Arabian models.¹ To-day Christian converts to Islam are so rare that they are decorated by the Sultan. In Lull's day the seaports of Islam swarmed with Christian renegades. Mohammed was still in a very real sense the Anti-Christ, and the decision as to whether Europe should be Christian or Mohammedan was still in the balance. In the case of Africa and Asia it seemed to have been definitely settled; they were dominantly Mohammedan. The Christian feared the Mohammedan and he hated him. Dante placed Mohammed in the deepest portion of his Inferno. The reverses of the crusades and the ravages of Moorish pirates embittered Christian feeling. Moreover the Christian Church was profoundly ignorant of the tenets of Mohammedanism. Instead of viewing Mohammedans as ethical Monotheists; they regarded them as heathen. Alanus de Insulis, in the twelfth century, wrote a Latin book against Mohammedans and entitled it, *Contra paganos seu Mahometanos*.² Lull's task was incredibly hard and required that he should convert the Christian world to his ideals before he could convert the world of Islam to Christ.

There is a prophetic saying: 'He that believeth shall not make haste.' Lull matured his plans slowly. Although thirty-two years old at his conversion, he spent some ten years in personal preparation. It took three forms—devotional, linguistic, and philosophical. He spent much time in prayer. He bought a Saracen slave and began to learn Arabic from him. The slave nearly assassinated his master and afterwards hanged himself. Lull studied scholastic philosophy at the University of Montpellier, and began to think out a system of Christian apologetic. As he proceeded with his personal preparation, it became increasingly clear to him that he must work on a larger scale. He must rouse the interest of the authorities in Church and State to assist in the conversion of Islam by those means

¹ Mackail, *Lectures on Poetry*, p. 97.

² On the other side it ought to be noted that his contemporary, Peter the Venerable, a worthy precursor of Lull, translated the Koran into Latin, and wished that parts of the New Testament might be translated into Arabic.

which he and he alone knew to be effective. He interviewed his sovereign, who gave him a handsome endowment with which he founded a missionary *studium* at Miramar. He secured thirteen Franciscan friars for it, but they grew weary and deserted. With indefatigable pertinacity Lull visited popes, sovereigns and university authorities and strove to get Chairs of Arabic established in the universities. The authorities did not respond quickly. There were many more interesting and absorbing occupations. But Lull never gave in. Towards the end of his life he wrote:

‘I have laboured for forty-five years to gain over the shepherds of the Church and the princes of Europe to the common good of Christendom.’

At last in 1311 at the Council of Vienne, Lull being now in his 75th year, he secured a decree that chairs of Arabic, Chaldee, Hebrew and Greek should be established in all cities where the Papal Court resides and in the Universities of Bologna, Paris, Oxford and Salamanca.

But a new Christian apologetic was not less needful than linguistic knowledge. In seeking this Lull invented an ingenious system of study—a sort of cyclopædia of categories and syllogisms. On this account he became so famous in the universities that he received the title *Doctor Illuminatus*, and hundreds of students adopted his method—Lull’s art as it was called—and praised it in very much the same terms as young officers have recently praised Pelmanism. A modern scholar (Prantl), after carefully investigating it, remarks:

‘That the whole Art of Lull is plainly worthless needs now no special proof.’

Perhaps you will say; why then mention it? I do so because Lull’s Art was the outcome of Lull’s conviction that the Christian Missionary must receive a first-class mental training in order to win the intellectual assent of those whom he would convert. Just as Lull did not believe in force as a means of making converts, so he did not believe in missionary preaching which was not based on Reason. He wrote this:

‘If the Christian faith is incapable of proof according to the processes of the mind, then it is impossible that it can be true,’

and on another occasion he wrote:

‘The attempt mentally to accept mutually incompatible things is the first step to the complete denial of the spiritual.’

In one of his exhortations to Christians he says:

‘Let Christians consumed with a burning love for the cause of the faith, but consider that since nothing has power to withstand the truth, which by the strength of arguments is mighty over all things, they can with God’s help and by His might bring back infidels to the way of faith . . . For to the infidels it seems a difficult and dangerous thing to abandon their own belief . . . but it will be impossible for them not to abandon the faith which is proved to be false and contradictory for the sake of that which is true and necessary.’

Propagandist Christianity in Lull’s day, when it did not make use of force turned too often to miracles or ecstasies or vile abuse to win adherents. But to satisfy Lull’s idea of conversion the Mohammedan must be shewn *rationally* why Christianity is true, and Mohammedanism, by comparison false. Lull had faith in the force of Reason and dared to believe that man is ultimately reasonable, and that therefore a religion which could justify itself at the bar of reason must prevail. He really believed in the Divine Logos in humanity and was also sure that Mohammedans shared in

the Logos. Hence he declared that he should find three good friends among the Mohammedans, namely, Subtlety of Intellect, Reason, and Good Will.

Lull therefore is of that noble company, in which the Cambridge Platonists and Bishop Butler are also to be found, who believe that Reason is the candle of the Lord within us and that by which we must judge even of Revelation itself.

But although Lull believed in the human Reason, he did not suppose that by the exercise of the intellect alone man can know God. There must also be moral effort and whole-hearted devotion. This he sets forth clearly in one of his meditations:

‘He who would find Thee, O God, let him go forth to seek Thee in love, loyalty, devotion, faith, hope, justice, mercy, and truth, for in every place where these are, Thou art.’

For Lull there could be no right opposition between Reason and Faith; nor any true alliance between Religion and Obscurantism.

‘Elevate thy knowledge, and thy love will be elevated.’
is one of his sayings.

But although self-discipline was essential in the man who would know God, it is important to note that Lull attached no primary importance to asceticism, although the ascetic rigours of that period were terrific. In the spirit of Him who said ‘the Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath,’ Lull declared:

‘Better is a life spent in instructing others, than a life spent in fasting.’

Even devotional exercises he thought might be over-valued in comparison with moral character and conduct.

On one occasion he wrote:

‘He who is just, compassionate, humble, patient, prays although he is not consciously thinking of God.’

Yet Lull was pre-eminently a man of prayer. Whilst he believed that to work is to pray, he also believed that to pray is to work, and spent long hours in devotion before the crucifix.

I have said that Lull believed that a new Christian apologetic was needed to win Islam to Christ. He spent long in constructing this apologetic. When we study it to-day we can say of large parts of it what Luther said of one of St. Paul’s arguments, ‘Brother Paul, this does not hold.’ But the fundamental thesis of Lull’s apologetic is sound and deserves the attention and respect of every Christian apologist.

Lull’s age was an age of miracles. It invented the miracle of the Immaculate Conception; it witnessed daily with unquestioning reverence the perpetually recurring miracle of the Mass, it was wrought to adoring ecstasy by the marvels produced by the relics of the saints. What more natural than that Lull should base the Christian Faith on miracles? Paley in an age of rationalism, not to say, of scepticism, based the Christian Faith on miracles. How could Lull escape doing so in an age of miracles? Yet he did. He based the Christian Faith not on miracles, but where it must ever be based. He based it on the Character of God—the character of God as unveiled in Jesus Christ.

This was the centre of his apologetic—we need not trouble about its circumference.

‘That religion is the true religion,’ said he, ‘which holds the highest and most perfect conception of God.’

Now this was how he applied his argument.

When we examine the Allah of Mohammed, although there be Righteousness and Wisdom visible in Him, there is no Love to be found; but when we examine the Christian Religion we see clearly that in it God is unveiled as love. Now the conception of God as love is the highest and most perfect conception we can have of God, and therefore the Religion of Christ is to be accepted in preference to the Religion of Mohammed.

So spiritual, moral and rational a conception of the Christian Religion did not capture the Christian world. It failed to win even the enthusiastic adhesion of the rulers of the Church. Why? Perhaps a saying of our Lord answers the question.

'Strait is the gate and narrow is the way that leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it.'

Lull narrowly escaped ecclesiastical censure. He might have died as a heretic, if many important Churchmen had not regarded him as quite harmless—a well meaning man, a religious man, but with a bee in his bonnet. After his death the Inquisitor-General in Arragon, at the instigation of the Dominicans, the zealots of orthodoxy, formulated 500 charges against Lull's teaching, of which the three most important were these:—

1. That one can prove by natural reason all the articles of the Christian Faith.
2. That Jews and Saracens who believe in all good faith and do not sin mortally, can be saved.
3. That true love consists in loving God because He is God, and that it is false love which moves us to love God through hope of Paradise or temporal welfare.

His friends the Franciscans and his fellow countrymen the Majorcans defended Lull and so the prosecution failed.

A man with such large views of God's love and with such a profound belief in human goodness might easily have excused himself from facing the rigours and dangers of the life of the missionary in foreign lands. It is urged, I think, but not justly, that liberal Christians do not become ardent missionaries. If the charge be true generally, at least it is not true of Lull. Lull not only formulated an apologetic which was to win Islam; he not only founded centres for training missionaries to Islam; he himself became an active missionary to Islam.

He visited North Africa at least thrice. His first visit was in 1287. On landing he sought out the leading Mohammedan teachers. He told them that he possessed an accurate knowledge of Christianity, but that he wished also to have an accurate knowledge of Mohammedanism for the purpose of instituting a comparison between the two, and that he was resolved to adopt the truer as his religion. The Mohammedan doctors welcomed him, but failed to convert him, and he seems equally to have failed to convert them.

He next tried to convert the Mohammedans in Majorca, his native Isle. Here he was most successful. In 1301 he visited Cyprus and desired the king to command his infidel subjects to attend a sermon (*predicatio*) to be delivered by Lull, which in true mediæval fashion was to be followed by a disputation (*disputatio*).

He then tried North Africa again.

In 1306 he had a most successful visit, and his arguments proved so effective that he was deported and warned not to come again.

Nevertheless in 1314 he returned to Bugia in Tunis and worked there in secret for over a year, but venturing to preach in public on June 30, 1315, he was stoned to death by a fanatical Mohammedan mob.

Although Lull was much too wise and too conscientious a man to throw away his life, and declined to go forth as a missionary until he had completed his Art, saying:

‘O Lord, my help, till this work is completed I cannot go to the land of the Saracens,’

yet he was quite willing to die when his end came. Shortly before his death he had composed this prayer:

‘Thy servant is ready to offer up himself and to pour out his blood for Thee. May it please Thee therefore. ere he comes to die, so to unite him to Thyself that he, by meditation and love, may never be separated from Thee.’

I have given you but the merest outline of Lull’s life and work. I have said nothing of his extraordinary literary activity. There have been 4,000 treatises assigned to him. This is gross exaggeration; but he did write several hundreds dealing not only with religion, but with physical science, mathematics, horsemanship, navigation, medicine, proverbs and philosophy.

In connection with medicine he deals with two interesting facts (1) the effect of climate on disease, and (2) the part that can be played by the mind in curing the sicknesses of the body. Lull himself had a striking experience of this.

Lull’s theological treatises are of the most varied kind ranging from *The Language of the Angels* to the *One Hundred Names of God*.

One of Lull’s most readable books I believe is a religious allegory called *Blanquerua*. It has even been compared with *The Pilgrim’s Progress*. Its hero is a monk, and I need hardly add that its theme is the obligation of Christians to convert Moors and Jews. Lull in a spirit of irony put himself into his allegory under the character of the Papal Fool.

Raymond Lull deserves to be commemorated at such a gathering as this. He combined, as Neander points out, three qualities not often combined in one personality—a very powerful intellect, a deeply loving heart, and great practical efficiency.

The just balance of his Christianity; his clear grasp of essentials; his truly Christian spirit should commend him to us as an example and an inspiration. He was a thinker, a worker, a mystic. Two of his mystical sayings deserve to be treasured.

‘The human spirit longs after nothing as it longs after God.’

‘He who loves not lives not. He who lives by the Life cannot die.’

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